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This	  dissertation	  consists	  of	  three	  related	  essays	  on	  the	  motivations	  and	  
behavior	  of	  individual	  political	  donors.	  These	  essays	  test	  theoretical	  predictions	  
from	  the	  campaign	  finance	  and	  political	  behavior	  literature	  using	  field	  experiments	  
and	  a	  natural	  experiment,	  bolstering	  the	  causal	  interpretation	  of	  the	  findings.	  
The	  first	  essay	  reports	  the	  results	  of	  a	  field	  experiment	  examining	  the	  effect	  
of	  political	  information	  on	  the	  decision	  to	  contribute.	  In	  advance	  of	  the	  November	  
2014	  election,	  postcards	  with	  information	  about	  the	  major	  party	  candidates	  for	  
Ohio	  governor	  and	  secretary	  of	  state	  were	  mailed	  to	  nearly	  40,000	  randomly	  
selected	  likely	  donors	  in	  Ohio.	  The	  messages	  in	  these	  mailings,	  seven	  in	  all,	  provided	  
factual	  information	  regarding	  campaign	  fundraising	  and	  endorsements,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  
simple	  election	  reminder.	  Notably,	  the	  messages	  did	  not	  include	  encouragements	  to	  
donate	  or	  partisan	  cues.	  The	  experimental	  results	  show	  that	  partisan	  donors	  
respond	  to	  electoral	  threats	  as	  well	  as	  electoral	  opportunities	  under	  different	  
conditions.	  Donors	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  give	  to	  the	  stronger	  candidate	  when	  they	  
receive	  a	  simple	  election	  reminder	  with	  no	  fundraising	  information.	  But	  when	  
donors	  see	  which	  candidates	  are	  ahead	  and	  behind	  in	  total	  fundraising,	  donors	  give	  
more	  to	  the	  candidate	  who	  is	  behind	  while	  donations	  to	  the	  candidate	  with	  more	  
money	  are	  unaffected.	  The	  results	  show	  that	  donors	  respond	  to	  objective	  
information	  about	  fundraising	  weakness	  in	  order	  to	  help	  their	  preferred	  candidate.	  
	  
The	  second	  essay	  (co-­‐authored)	  uses	  experimental	  designs	  to	  explore	  two	  
possible	  paths	  to	  expanding	  the	  number	  of	  small	  donors.	  First,	  we	  examine	  whether	  
nonpartisan	  appeals,	  of	  the	  kind	  that	  nonprofit	  groups	  or	  governments	  could	  use,	  
expand	  the	  donor	  base.	  The	  results	  suggest	  that	  one	  type	  of	  nonpartisan	  message	  
represents	  a	  promising	  fundraising	  appeal:	  encouraging	  subjects	  to	  contribute	  in	  
order	  to	  keep	  elected	  officials	  focused	  on	  policy	  issues	  of	  importance	  to	  the	  
potential	  donor.	  Second,	  we	  determine	  whether	  informing	  the	  public	  about	  existing	  
incentives	  for	  making	  small	  contributions	  increases	  the	  number	  and	  size	  of	  
contributions.	  We	  report	  the	  results	  of	  two	  field	  experiments	  that	  randomly	  
provided	  information	  to	  likely	  donors	  about	  municipal-­‐	  and	  state-­‐level	  incentives	  
for	  making	  political	  contributions.	  Across	  the	  two	  experiments,	  we	  find	  little	  
evidence	  that	  information	  about	  contribution	  incentives	  increases	  giving.	  
The	  third	  essay	  examines	  the	  effect	  of	  presidential	  political	  advertisements	  
on	  contributing	  to	  the	  presidential	  campaigns	  of	  the	  major	  party	  candidates.	  I	  
examine	  the	  effect	  of	  aggregate	  political	  advertising	  on	  aggregate	  contributing	  at	  the	  
media	  zone	  level,	  and	  also	  estimate	  the	  effects	  of	  each	  party’s	  advertisements	  
separately	  on	  giving	  to	  the	  party’s	  presidential	  campaign.	  I	  find	  that	  aggregate	  
advertisements	  may	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  aggregate	  giving,	  but	  this	  effect	  is	  
substantively	  small	  (much	  smaller	  than	  previous	  scholars	  have	  found)	  and	  
inconsistent	  across	  different	  model	  specifications.	  In	  addition,	  I	  find	  that	  examining	  
aggregate	  amounts	  may	  mask	  differences	  between	  the	  parties.	  During	  the	  2008	  
election,	  Democratic	  presidential	  advertisements	  had	  a	  small,	  but	  detectable,	  
positive	  effect	  on	  giving	  to	  the	  Democratic	  campaign.	  By	  contrast,	  Republican	  
	  
advertisements	  did	  not	  significantly	  increase	  giving	  to	  the	  Republican	  campaign	  in	  
2008.	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In	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  investigate	  the	  motivations	  and	  behavior	  of	  individual	  
campaign	  contributors	  via	  their	  reactions	  to	  political	  information,	  incentives,	  
encouragements,	  and	  partisan	  media.	  The	  role	  of	  political	  donations	  in	  American	  
politics	  poses	  an	  ongoing	  challenge	  to	  the	  democratic	  ideal	  of	  equal	  representation.	  
Contributions	  are	  an	  essential	  part	  of	  any	  viable	  political	  campaign,	  yet	  political	  
donors	  are	  a	  small	  and	  unrepresentative	  slice	  of	  the	  American	  electorate.	  By	  one	  
estimate,	  less	  than	  one	  half	  of	  one	  percent	  of	  Americans	  donated	  $200	  or	  more	  to	  
any	  federal	  campaign	  committee	  during	  the	  2012	  election	  cycle	  (Center	  for	  
Responsive	  Politics	  2013).	  Even	  among	  individual	  contributors,	  a	  small	  share	  of	  
donors	  accounts	  for	  a	  disproportionate	  amount	  of	  the	  money	  in	  campaign	  coffers	  
(Malbin	  2013).	  The	  Supreme	  Court’s	  recent	  decisions	  in	  Citizens	  United	  v.	  FEC	  
(2010)	  and	  McCutcheon	  v.	  FEC	  (2014)	  have	  limited	  the	  government’s	  ability	  to	  
regulate	  campaign	  contributions,	  increasing	  the	  relative	  role	  of	  wealthy	  individuals	  
in	  the	  campaign	  finance	  system.	  Unsurprisingly,	  some	  scholars	  claim	  that	  political	  
donations	  contribute	  to	  the	  disproportionate	  political	  influence	  of	  wealthy	  
Americans	  (Bartels	  2008;	  Gilens	  2012).	  Others	  attribute	  the	  rise	  of	  political	  
polarization	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  donors	  with	  extreme	  ideology	  (Bafumi	  and	  Herron	  
2010;	  Johnson	  2013).	  In	  reaction,	  reformers	  have	  proposed	  an	  array	  of	  solutions	  to	  
counterbalance	  the	  perceived	  power	  of	  large	  donors,	  including	  various	  forms	  of	  




and	  even	  amending	  the	  Constitution	  in	  order	  to	  challenge	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  
interpretation	  of	  money	  as	  speech.	  
The	  broad	  concern	  about	  political	  contributions	  expressed	  by	  journalists,	  
reformers,	  researchers,	  and	  many	  members	  of	  the	  public	  is	  accompanied	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  
scholarly	  knowledge	  about	  the	  behavior	  of	  the	  largest	  group	  of	  political	  donors:	  
individuals.	  Individuals	  are	  the	  ultimate	  source	  of	  all	  direct	  political	  contributions,	  
since	  federal	  law	  forbids	  corporations	  and	  unions	  from	  using	  treasury	  money	  for	  
donations	  to	  candidates	  and	  parties.	  (This	  limitation	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  independent	  
expenditures,	  which	  may	  now	  originate	  from	  organizational	  treasuries	  as	  well	  as	  
individuals.)	  During	  the	  2007-­‐2008	  election	  cycle,	  the	  Federal	  Election	  Committee	  
(FEC)	  reported	  that	  individual	  donors	  gave	  over	  $3	  billion	  in	  itemized	  donations	  to	  
federal	  political	  committees.	  Some	  individual	  donations	  are	  routed	  through	  political	  
action	  committees	  (PACs)	  that	  are	  effectively	  controlled	  by	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  PAC’s	  
affiliated	  company,	  trade	  association,	  or	  union.	  However,	  the	  majority	  of	  individual	  
donations	  are	  given	  directly	  to	  candidate	  and	  party-­‐controlled	  committees.	  	  
	  	   In	  spite	  of	  the	  clear	  importance	  of	  individual	  donors,	  most	  of	  the	  campaign	  
finance	  literature	  is	  devoted	  to	  the	  study	  of	  interest	  group-­‐affiliated	  PACs.	  PACs	  
associated	  with	  economic	  interest	  groups	  lend	  themselves	  to	  analyses	  that	  focus	  on	  
politics	  as	  a	  form	  of	  exchange:	  an	  interest	  group	  gives	  money	  in	  return	  for	  favorable	  
policies.	  Much	  of	  the	  theoretical	  literature	  associated	  with	  campaign	  finance	  
employs	  rational	  choice	  models	  that	  treat	  campaign	  contributions	  and	  political	  
favors	  as	  goods	  in	  an	  efficient	  political	  marketplace	  (Stigler	  1971;	  Baron	  1989;	  




limited	  associations	  between	  interest	  group	  PAC	  donations	  and	  legislative	  activity	  
when	  proper	  methods	  are	  employed	  (Ansolabehere,	  de	  Figueiredo,	  and	  Snyder	  
2003).	  
	   Researchers	  who	  study	  individual	  donors	  have	  used	  addresses	  available	  in	  
public	  donation	  records	  (or	  information	  from	  campaigns)	  to	  survey	  contributors	  
and	  ask	  them	  about	  their	  reasons	  for	  giving	  (Francia	  et	  al.	  2003;	  Barber	  2016).	  
Contributor	  surveys	  generally	  find	  that	  ideological	  and	  policy-­‐oriented	  motives	  
dominate	  self-­‐reported	  reasons	  for	  individual	  giving.	  Contrary	  to	  the	  notion	  that	  
donors	  give	  in	  order	  to	  further	  their	  immediate	  economic	  interests,	  many	  donors	  
report	  giving	  in	  order	  to	  support	  a	  candidate	  or	  party’s	  policy	  platform	  or	  because	  
they	  view	  the	  opposition	  platform	  as	  unacceptable.	  Donors	  also	  report	  giving	  for	  
social	  reasons;	  many	  know	  the	  candidate	  through	  family,	  religious,	  or	  professional	  
networks.	  Finally,	  survey-­‐based	  studies	  have	  produced	  interesting	  demographic	  
information	  about	  donors,	  showing	  that	  contributors	  are	  wealthier,	  more	  educated,	  
older,	  and	  more	  ideologically	  extreme	  than	  the	  general	  population.	  
	   Contributor	  surveys	  produce	  useful	  insights	  into	  donor	  accounts	  of	  why	  they	  
give,	  but	  surveys	  generally	  cannot	  explain	  how	  donors	  respond	  to	  the	  ongoing	  
stimuli	  of	  political	  campaigns.	  Donors	  are	  unlikely	  to	  know	  and	  be	  able	  to	  report	  all	  
of	  the	  factors	  that	  led	  them	  to	  make	  a	  donation.	  In	  addition,	  donors’	  recollections	  are	  
subject	  to	  various	  biases,	  such	  as	  social	  desirability	  bias	  or	  post	  hoc	  reasoning,	  
which	  may	  make	  their	  accounts	  unreliable.	  In	  order	  to	  address	  these	  concerns	  and	  
build	  on	  these	  previous	  studies,	  the	  papers	  in	  this	  dissertation	  use	  field	  experiments	  




stimuli	  and	  documented	  contributions.	  Field	  experiments	  allow	  the	  researcher	  to	  
control	  the	  types	  of	  messages	  to	  which	  individuals	  are	  exposed	  and	  know	  the	  
probability	  of	  assignment	  to	  exposure.	  In	  addition,	  by	  using	  public	  records	  to	  record	  
contributions,	  the	  essays	  in	  this	  dissertation	  do	  not	  need	  to	  rely	  on	  donor	  
recollections	  of	  contributing.	  
	   The	  papers	  in	  this	  dissertation	  also	  address	  a	  policy	  question	  with	  an	  
underlying	  normative	  concern:	  How	  can	  policymakers	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  small	  
donors	  to	  political	  campaigns?	  Reformers	  advocate	  increasing	  small	  political	  
contributions	  in	  order	  to	  balance	  out	  the	  influence	  of	  large	  individual	  and	  
institutional	  donors.	  The	  second	  essay	  in	  this	  dissertation	  examines	  whether	  
providing	  information	  about	  public	  incentives	  to	  make	  small	  donations	  actually	  
increases	  individual	  giving.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  entire	  dissertation’s	  examination	  
of	  contributing’s	  causal	  foundations	  adds	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  how	  policy	  
interventions	  are	  likely	  to	  influence	  campaign	  giving.	  
	   The	  essays	  in	  this	  dissertation	  provide	  nuanced	  support	  for	  the	  findings	  in	  
the	  survey-­‐based	  literature.	  Individual	  political	  giving	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  largely	  
ideological	  and	  policy-­‐motivated	  behavior.	  Contributors	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  give	  
when	  they	  are	  prompted	  to	  think	  about	  the	  policy	  consequences	  of	  an	  election	  than	  
when	  they	  are	  encouraged	  to	  think	  about	  access,	  civic	  duty,	  or	  leveling	  the	  playing	  
field	  with	  special	  interests.	  Information	  about	  public	  contribution	  incentives	  (like	  
tax	  credits	  and	  matching	  programs)	  appears	  to	  have	  little	  influence	  on	  the	  decision	  
to	  give,	  indicating	  that	  the	  “price”	  of	  donating	  is	  not	  a	  key	  factor.	  In	  addition,	  




is	  behind	  in	  fundraising,	  and	  at	  risk	  of	  losing	  the	  race,	  than	  when	  they	  learn	  about	  a	  
candidate’s	  base	  of	  financial	  support.	  Finally,	  I	  find	  some	  evidence	  that	  contributors	  
are	  motivated	  to	  give	  by	  exposure	  to	  partisan	  television	  advertising.	  Even	  though	  
political	  television	  advertisements	  do	  not	  typically	  ask	  for	  contributions,	  they	  
appear	  to	  encourage	  donations	  nonetheless.	  
Below	  I	  provide	  a	  brief	  summary	  of	  each	  paper.	  
	  
Essay	  1:	  Information	  and	  Donor	  Behavior:	  Evidence	  from	  a	  Field	  Experiment	  
in	  Ohio	  
	  
Political	  campaigns	  and	  the	  news	  media	  expose	  potential	  campaign	  
contributors	  to	  information	  about	  candidates	  and	  the	  state	  of	  political	  races	  
throughout	  the	  course	  of	  an	  election	  campaign.	  In	  mass	  solicitations	  and	  
announcements,	  campaigns	  stress	  their	  recent	  fundraising	  performance,	  the	  
number	  of	  small	  donors	  who	  have	  given	  to	  the	  campaign,	  and	  their	  key	  
endorsements.	  The	  news	  media	  also	  analyze	  rival	  campaign	  fundraising,	  
endorsements,	  and	  other	  perceived	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses.	  Although	  the	  
dissemination	  of	  information	  is	  a	  perennial	  and	  dynamic	  feature	  of	  political	  races,	  
relatively	  little	  is	  known	  about	  the	  effects	  of	  such	  information	  on	  the	  decisions	  of	  
individual	  contributors.	  In	  particular,	  it	  is	  unknown	  how	  objective	  information	  
about	  a	  campaign’s	  relative	  fundraising	  strength	  or	  weakness	  influences	  contributor	  
decision-­‐making.	  
This	  paper	  reports	  the	  results	  of	  a	  field	  experiment	  that	  examines	  the	  effect	  
of	  political	  information	  on	  the	  decision	  to	  contribute.	  In	  advance	  of	  the	  November	  




Ohio	  governor	  and	  secretary	  of	  state	  were	  mailed	  to	  nearly	  40,000	  randomly	  
selected	  likely	  donors	  in	  Ohio.	  The	  messages	  in	  these	  mailings,	  seven	  in	  all,	  provided	  
factual	  information	  regarding	  campaign	  fundraising	  and	  endorsements,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  
simple	  election	  reminder.	  Notably,	  the	  messages	  did	  not	  include	  encouragements	  to	  
donate	  or	  partisan	  cues;	  the	  messages	  were	  sent	  from	  an	  academic	  center.	  As	  a	  
result,	  this	  study	  is	  able	  to	  isolate	  the	  effect	  of	  informational	  stimuli	  alone	  on	  
donation	  behavior.	  While	  much	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  political	  giving	  stresses	  the	  role	  
of	  partisan	  and	  ideological	  reasons	  for	  giving,	  this	  study	  assesses	  experimentally	  
how	  donors	  react	  to	  objective	  information	  about	  candidates	  and	  the	  current	  state	  of	  
an	  electoral	  race.	  
	   The	  experimental	  results	  show	  that	  partisan	  donors	  respond	  to	  electoral	  
threats	  as	  well	  as	  electoral	  opportunities	  under	  different	  conditions.	  Donors	  are	  
more	  likely	  to	  give	  to	  the	  stronger	  candidate	  when	  they	  receive	  a	  simple	  election	  
reminder.	  But	  when	  donors	  see	  which	  candidates	  are	  ahead	  and	  behind	  in	  total	  
fundraising,	  donors	  give	  more	  to	  the	  candidate	  who	  is	  behind	  while	  donations	  to	  the	  
candidate	  with	  more	  money	  are	  unaffected.	  Receiving	  information	  about	  a	  
campaigns	  relative	  donation	  sizes	  and	  endorsements	  has	  no	  effect	  on	  giving	  to	  
candidates	  of	  either	  party.	  The	  results	  show	  that	  objective	  information	  about	  a	  
campaign’s	  fundraising	  weakness	  can	  induce	  donors	  to	  mobilize	  in	  support	  of	  the	  
campaign.	  
	  




Essay	  2:	  Encouraging	  Small	  Donor	  Contributions:	  Evidence	  from	  Field	  
Experiments	  Using	  Nonpartisan	  Messages	  
	  
Advocates	  for	  campaign	  finance	  reform	  contend	  that	  increasing	  the	  number	  
of	  political	  contributors,	  and	  small	  donors	  in	  particular,	  would	  dilute	  the	  influence	  
of	  very	  large	  donors	  and	  make	  the	  donor	  pool	  more	  representative	  of	  the	  electorate.	  
But	  how	  might	  one	  expand	  the	  relatively	  small	  share	  of	  Americans	  who	  give	  to	  
campaigns?	  In	  this	  paper,	  we	  use	  experimental	  designs	  to	  explore	  two	  possible	  
paths	  to	  expanding	  the	  number	  of	  small	  donors.	  First,	  we	  examine	  whether	  
nonpartisan	  appeals,	  of	  the	  kind	  that	  nonprofit	  groups	  or	  governments	  could	  use,	  
expand	  the	  donor	  base.	  We	  report	  the	  results	  of	  a	  large	  field	  experiment	  in	  New	  
York	  City	  that	  tested	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  different	  nonpartisan	  fundraising	  appeals	  
aimed	  at	  activating	  distinct,	  potential	  motivations	  for	  giving.	  The	  results	  suggest	  
that	  one	  type	  of	  nonpartisan	  message	  represents	  a	  promising	  fundraising	  appeal:	  
encouraging	  subjects	  to	  contribute	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  elected	  officials	  focused	  on	  
policy	  issues	  of	  importance	  to	  the	  potential	  donor.	  
Second,	  we	  determine	  whether	  informing	  the	  public	  about	  existing	  incentives	  
for	  making	  small	  contributions	  increases	  the	  number	  and	  size	  of	  contributions.	  
Public	  incentives	  are	  a	  key	  public	  policy	  intervention	  that	  reformers	  have	  
championed	  for	  expanding	  the	  number	  of	  small	  donors.	  Although	  the	  effects	  of	  
contribution	  incentive	  policies	  have	  been	  the	  object	  of	  cross-­‐jurisdiction	  and	  over-­‐
time	  comparisons,	  to	  date	  the	  causal	  effects	  of	  incentives	  have	  not	  been	  gauged	  
experimentally	  outside	  the	  lab.	  We	  report	  the	  results	  of	  two	  field	  experiments	  that	  
provided	  information	  to	  likely	  donors	  about	  municipal-­‐	  and	  state-­‐level	  incentives	  




experiment	  that	  randomly	  selected	  likely	  donors	  to	  be	  sent	  mailed	  messages	  about	  
an	  upcoming	  election.	  Among	  those	  mailings	  that	  were	  sent	  in	  the	  larger	  
experiments,	  half	  of	  the	  messages	  included	  additional	  information	  about	  public	  
contribution	  incentives	  while	  the	  other	  half	  contained	  only	  the	  basic	  message.	  
Across	  the	  two	  experiments,	  we	  find	  little	  evidence	  that	  information	  about	  
contribution	  incentives	  increases	  giving.	  Our	  research	  leaves	  open	  the	  possibility	  
that	  contribution	  incentive	  programs,	  and	  donation	  matching	  programs	  in	  
particular,	  may	  nonetheless	  affect	  campaign	  behavior	  and	  encourage	  campaigns	  to	  
pursue	  more	  small	  donors.	  
	  
Essay	  3:	  Does	  Presidential	  Advertising	  Mobilize	  Campaign	  Contributors?	  
Television	  advertisements	  are	  a	  major	  tool	  of	  modern	  political	  campaigns	  
and	  one	  of	  their	  most	  costly	  expenditures.	  Political	  campaigns	  typically	  run	  
advertisements	  in	  order	  to	  promote	  their	  candidate	  or	  denigrate	  the	  opposing	  
candidate	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  voters.	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  examine	  the	  effect	  of	  presidential	  
political	  advertisements	  on	  contributing	  to	  the	  presidential	  campaigns	  of	  the	  major	  
party	  candidates.	  There	  is	  no	  clear	  intentional	  link	  between	  political	  ads	  and	  
campaign	  fundraising.	  Even	  so,	  advertising	  may	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  activating	  
partisan	  mobilization	  during	  the	  campaign.	  Advertising	  may	  reinforce	  in-­‐group	  and	  
out-­‐group	  feelings	  that	  encourage	  partisan	  behaviors,	  like	  willingness	  to	  work	  on	  
behalf	  of	  the	  party's	  candidate	  or	  give	  money	  to	  the	  campaign.	  Precisely	  because	  
political	  advertisements	  are	  not	  a	  vehicle	  for	  direct	  solicitation,	  they	  provide	  a	  




I	  examine	  the	  effect	  of	  aggregate	  political	  advertising	  on	  aggregate	  
contributing	  at	  the	  media	  zone	  level,	  and	  also	  estimate	  the	  effects	  of	  each	  party’s	  
advertising	  separately	  on	  giving	  to	  the	  party’s	  presidential	  campaign.	  I	  find	  that	  
aggregate	  advertising	  may	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  aggregate	  giving,	  but	  this	  effect	  is	  
substantively	  small	  (much	  smaller	  than	  previous	  scholars	  have	  found)	  and	  
inconsistent	  across	  different	  model	  specifications.	  In	  addition,	  I	  find	  that	  examining	  
aggregate	  amounts	  may	  mask	  differences	  between	  the	  parties.	  During	  the	  2008	  
election,	  Democratic	  presidential	  advertisements	  had	  a	  small,	  but	  detectable,	  
positive	  effect	  on	  giving	  to	  the	  Democratic	  campaign.	  By	  contrast,	  Republican	  
advertisements	  did	  not	  appear	  to	  increase	  giving	  to	  the	  Republican	  campaign	  in	  
2008.	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This	  essay	  reports	  the	  results	  of	  a	  field	  experiment	  examining	  the	  effect	  of	  
political	  information	  on	  the	  decision	  to	  contribute.	  Although	  information	  
dissemination	  is	  a	  perennial	  and	  dynamic	  feature	  of	  political	  races,	  scholars	  know	  
little	  about	  the	  effects	  of	  information	  on	  the	  decisions	  of	  individual	  contributors.	  In	  
particular,	  it	  is	  unknown	  how	  objective	  information	  about	  a	  campaign’s	  relative	  
fundraising	  strength	  or	  weakness	  influences	  contributor	  decision-­‐making.	  In	  
advance	  of	  the	  November	  2014	  election,	  postcards	  with	  information	  about	  the	  
major	  party	  candidates	  for	  Ohio	  governor	  and	  secretary	  of	  state	  were	  mailed	  to	  
nearly	  40,000	  randomly	  selected	  likely	  donors	  in	  Ohio.	  The	  messages	  in	  these	  
mailings,	  seven	  in	  all,	  provided	  factual	  information	  regarding	  campaign	  fundraising	  
and	  endorsements,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  simple	  election	  reminder.	  Notably,	  the	  messages	  did	  
not	  include	  encouragements	  to	  donate	  or	  partisan	  cues.	  The	  experimental	  results	  
show	  that	  partisan	  donors	  respond	  to	  electoral	  threats	  as	  well	  as	  electoral	  
opportunities	  under	  different	  conditions.	  Donors	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  give	  to	  the	  
stronger	  candidate	  when	  they	  receive	  a	  simple	  election	  reminder	  with	  no	  
fundraising	  information.	  But	  when	  donors	  see	  which	  candidates	  are	  ahead	  and	  
behind	  in	  total	  fundraising,	  donors	  give	  more	  to	  the	  candidate	  who	  is	  behind	  while	  
donations	  to	  the	  candidate	  with	  more	  money	  are	  unaffected.	  The	  results	  show	  that	  
donors	  respond	  to	  objective	  information	  about	  fundraising	  weakness	  in	  order	  to	  






Political	  campaigns	  and	  the	  news	  media	  expose	  potential	  campaign	  
contributors	  to	  information	  about	  candidates	  and	  the	  state	  of	  political	  races	  
throughout	  the	  course	  of	  an	  election	  campaign.	  In	  mass	  solicitations	  and	  
announcements,	  campaigns	  stress	  their	  recent	  fundraising	  performance,	  the	  
number	  of	  small	  donors	  who	  have	  given	  to	  the	  campaign,	  or	  their	  key	  
endorsements.	  The	  news	  media	  also	  analyze	  rival	  campaign	  fundraising,	  
endorsements,	  and	  other	  perceived	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  the	  campaigns.	  In	  
Ohio,	  the	  setting	  of	  this	  study,	  the	  local	  news	  media	  regularly	  reported	  on	  
fundraising	  by	  statewide	  candidates	  in	  2014	  following	  the	  release	  of	  public	  reports:	  
“Kasich	  Raises	  $2.3	  million;	  FitzGerald	  $533,000,	  Latest	  Campaign	  Reports	  Show;”	  
“Kasich	  Holds	  Big	  Lead	  in	  Money:	  Governor	  has	  $8.5M	  on	  Hand	  for	  Race	  Against	  
FitzGerald;”	  “Reports	  Show	  Lopsided	  September	  Coffers”	  (The	  Columbus	  Dispatch	  
2014a;	  Dayton	  Daily	  News	  2014a;	  The	  Plain	  Dealer	  [Cleveland]	  2014).	  The	  local	  
media	  also	  ran	  stories	  comparing	  candidate	  fundraising	  from	  large	  and	  small	  donors	  
(Dayton	  Daily	  News	  2014b,	  The	  Columbus	  Dispatch	  2014a).	  These	  themes	  are	  
reflected	  at	  the	  national	  level,	  as	  major	  news	  outlets	  analyze	  presidential	  campaign	  
fundraising	  (New	  York	  Times	  2008a;	  Boston	  Globe	  2008;	  Associated	  Press	  2012).	  
Although	  the	  dissemination	  of	  information	  is	  a	  perennial	  and	  dynamic	  feature	  of	  
political	  races,	  relatively	  little	  is	  known	  about	  the	  effects	  of	  such	  information	  on	  the	  
decisions	  of	  individual	  contributors.	  
This	  paper	  reports	  the	  results	  of	  a	  field	  experiment	  that	  examines	  the	  effect	  




objective	  information	  about	  a	  campaign’s	  relative	  fundraising	  strength	  or	  weakness	  
influences	  contributor	  decision-­‐making.	  As	  I	  discuss	  below,	  much	  of	  the	  literature	  
on	  the	  role	  of	  information	  in	  political	  behavior	  focuses	  on	  whether	  individuals	  vote	  
“correctly”	  in	  line	  with	  their	  interests	  or	  expressed	  preferences.	  Individual	  donors,	  
by	  contrast,	  are	  overwhelmingly	  committed	  partisans	  who	  have	  already	  identified	  
their	  preferred	  candidate	  in	  a	  general	  election.	  Yet	  potential	  donors	  must	  still	  decide	  
whether	  or	  not	  to	  contribute	  to	  their	  preferred	  candidate.	  This	  decision	  may	  have	  a	  
rational	  basis;	  that	  is,	  donors	  may	  help	  their	  favored	  candidate	  when	  they	  perceive	  
that	  their	  help	  is	  most	  crucial.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  (these	  options	  are	  not	  mutually	  
exclusive),	  donating	  may	  respond	  to	  information	  that	  is	  not	  tied	  to	  strictly	  rational	  
considerations.	  In	  this	  vein,	  donors	  may	  respond	  to	  a	  candidate’s	  relative	  
fundraising	  strength	  by	  jumping	  on	  the	  bandwagon	  and	  contributing	  even	  when	  
their	  donations	  are	  not	  likely	  to	  be	  crucial.	  I	  also	  examine	  whether	  potential	  donors	  
respond	  to	  information	  that	  primes	  ideology,	  like	  endorsements	  from	  liberal	  and	  
conservative	  groups.	  Finally,	  I	  investigate	  whether	  potential	  donors	  respond	  to	  
information	  about	  the	  size	  of	  donations	  that	  candidates	  receive.	  	  
	  In	  advance	  of	  the	  November	  2014	  election,	  postcards	  with	  information	  
about	  the	  major	  party	  candidates	  for	  Ohio	  governor	  and	  secretary	  of	  state	  were	  
mailed	  to	  nearly	  40,000	  randomly	  selected	  likely	  donors	  in	  Ohio.	  The	  messages	  in	  
these	  mailings,	  seven	  in	  all,	  provided	  factual	  information	  regarding	  campaign	  
fundraising	  and	  endorsements,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  simple	  election	  reminder.	  Notably,	  the	  
messages	  did	  not	  include	  encouragements	  to	  donate	  or	  partisan	  cues;	  the	  messages	  




of	  informational	  stimuli	  alone	  on	  donation	  behavior.	  While	  much	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  
political	  giving	  stresses	  the	  role	  of	  partisan	  and	  ideological	  reasons	  for	  giving,	  this	  
study	  allows	  me	  to	  assess	  experimentally	  how	  donors	  react	  to	  objective	  information	  
about	  candidates	  and	  the	  current	  state	  of	  an	  electoral	  race.	  	  
This	  essay	  proceeds	  as	  follows.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  discuss	  the	  previous	  
literature	  that	  informs	  this	  study.	  In	  the	  following	  section,	  I	  explain	  the	  study’s	  
methodology	  and	  design;	  I	  also	  describe	  the	  nonpartisan	  treatment	  messages	  sent	  
to	  potential	  donors.	  In	  the	  penultimate	  section,	  I	  describe	  the	  results	  of	  my	  
statistical	  analysis.	  I	  discuss	  the	  results	  and	  conclude	  in	  the	  final	  section.	  
	  
Previous	  Literature	  
Theories	  of	  political	  contributing	  typically	  divide	  donors	  into	  “investors”	  who	  
seek	  quid	  pro	  quo	  exchanges	  of	  money	  for	  political	  access	  or	  favors,	  and	  
“ideologues”	  who	  give	  money	  in	  order	  to	  influence	  election	  outcomes	  for	  their	  
favored	  candidate	  or	  party	  (Ben-­‐Zion	  and	  Eytan	  1974;	  Welch	  1974).	  Most	  
theoretical	  studies	  of	  campaign	  finance	  focus	  on	  political	  action	  committees	  (PACs)	  
aligned	  with	  economic	  interest	  groups	  and	  assume	  that	  PACs	  are	  quid	  pro	  quo	  
investors	  in	  politics	  (Stigler	  1971;	  Baron	  1989;	  Grossman	  and	  Helpman	  1996).	  
Empirical	  studies	  of	  campaign	  contributions	  also	  focus	  heavily	  on	  PAC	  giving,	  but	  
authors	  find	  differences	  in	  strategy	  between	  primarily	  access-­‐oriented	  and	  
ideologically	  oriented	  committees	  (Snyder	  1990;	  Snyder	  1992;	  Ansolabehere,	  
Snyder,	  and	  Tripathi	  2002;	  Barber	  2016).	  By	  contrast,	  scholarship	  examining	  the	  




Figueiredo,	  and	  Snyder	  2003).	  Research	  on	  individual	  contributors	  suffers	  from	  a	  
lack	  of	  readily	  available	  information	  about	  donor	  preferences	  and	  motivations.	  
While	  campaign	  contribution	  records	  provide	  the	  names	  of	  individuals,	  public	  
knowledge	  about	  individual	  donors	  typically	  ends	  there.	  By	  contrast,	  information	  
about	  the	  organizations	  associated	  with	  PACs	  is	  easier	  to	  find	  and	  their	  objectives	  
are	  easier	  to	  intuit.	  	  
Survey-­‐based	  designs	  dominate	  the	  study	  of	  individual	  donors,	  sometimes	  in	  
conjunction	  with	  broader	  studies	  of	  political	  participation	  (Rosenstone	  and	  Hansen	  
1993;	  Verba,	  Schlozman,	  and	  Brady	  1995;	  Francia	  et	  al.	  2003).	  Contributor	  surveys	  
find	  that	  ideological	  and	  policy-­‐oriented	  motives	  dominate	  self-­‐reported	  reasons	  for	  
individual	  giving	  (Francia	  et	  al.	  2003;	  Magleby,	  Goodliffe,	  and	  Olsen	  2014;	  Barber	  
2016).	  Though	  some	  individual	  donors	  say	  that	  they	  give	  for	  access-­‐oriented	  
reasons,	  most	  donors	  assert	  that	  they	  want	  to	  support	  an	  ideological	  position	  and	  
influence	  election	  outcomes	  (Francia	  et	  al.	  2003).	  A	  small	  number	  of	  experimental	  
studies	  have	  also	  pointed	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  policy	  preferences	  as	  a	  motivator	  of	  
donations.	  Miller	  and	  Krosnick	  (2004),	  for	  example,	  show	  that	  the	  threat	  of	  
unwanted	  policy	  change	  motivates	  donors	  to	  give	  to	  advocacy	  groups.	  
The	  individual	  contributions	  literature	  does	  not	  address	  how	  information	  
about	  candidates	  and	  the	  state	  of	  a	  political	  race	  influences	  the	  decision	  to	  give.	  
While	  potential	  donors	  may	  report	  that	  they	  give	  to	  a	  candidate	  based	  on	  partisan	  
or	  ideological	  characteristics,	  dynamic	  political	  races	  generate	  many	  other	  types	  of	  
information	  throughout	  the	  electoral	  cycle	  that	  likely	  affect	  contributing.	  Since,	  




sense	  to	  study	  its	  relationship	  to	  those	  types	  of	  information	  that	  can	  change	  
throughout	  the	  race.	  Potential	  donors,	  who	  are	  more	  politically	  aware	  than	  the	  
general	  public,	  may	  respond	  to	  information	  about	  a	  candidate’s	  relative	  fundraising	  
strength,	  the	  base	  of	  his	  or	  her	  financial	  support,	  or	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  urgency	  about	  the	  
upcoming	  election.	  In	  this	  study,	  these	  types	  of	  information	  represent	  an	  exogenous	  
shock	  that	  may	  shift	  the	  utility	  of	  giving	  for	  a	  potential	  donor	  who	  has	  already	  
identified	  his	  or	  her	  preferred	  candidate.	  	  
Little	  research	  addresses	  the	  role	  of	  information	  about	  the	  state	  of	  an	  
electoral	  race	  on	  other	  forms	  of	  political	  participation.	  In	  the	  literature	  on	  voting	  
and	  information,	  researchers	  have	  focused	  on	  whether	  low	  information	  voters	  can	  
vote	  in	  ways	  that	  correctly	  match	  their	  opinions	  and	  ideology	  (Lupia	  1994;	  Lupia	  
and	  McCubbins	  1998;	  Popkin	  1994;	  Bartels	  1996;	  Lau	  and	  Redlawsk	  1997).	  In	  
addition,	  a	  rich	  experimental	  literature	  has	  evaluated	  how	  different	  modes	  of	  
campaign	  communications	  (Gerber	  and	  Green	  2000;	  Green	  and	  Gerber	  2015;	  
Nickerson	  2005),	  as	  well	  as	  guides	  that	  offer	  information	  about	  issues	  on	  the	  ballot	  
(Bedolla	  and	  Michelson	  2009),	  affect	  voter	  turnout.	  However,	  only	  a	  small	  amount	  of	  
work	  has	  examined	  the	  effects	  of	  telling	  voters	  about	  the	  state	  of	  an	  electoral	  race	  
(e.g.,	  Enos	  and	  Fowler	  2014).	  	  
	   Given	  this	  state	  of	  the	  political	  science	  literature,	  I	  look	  briefly	  to	  the	  
extensive	  economics	  literature	  on	  charitable	  donations.	  From	  a	  theoretical	  
perspective,	  the	  economic	  research	  on	  charitable	  giving	  offers	  competing	  
hypotheses	  about	  the	  likely	  effects	  of	  providing	  information	  concerning	  the	  relative	  




represents	  a	  public	  good	  for	  a	  candidate’s	  partisans.	  A	  candidate’s	  supporters	  make	  
donations	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  that	  the	  public	  good	  will	  be	  provided.	  
Learning	  that	  one’s	  preferred	  candidate	  has	  amassed	  more	  money	  than	  his	  or	  her	  
opponent	  may	  stimulate	  giving	  if	  prospective	  donors	  see	  their	  donations	  as	  
complements	  to	  the	  donations	  of	  others	  and	  want	  to	  “jump	  on	  the	  bandwagon.”	  In	  
this	  situation,	  donors	  want	  to	  participate	  when	  they	  perceive	  that	  the	  public	  good	  is	  
more	  likely	  to	  be	  provided	  (i.e.,	  their	  candidate	  is	  likely	  to	  win).	  Such	  bandwagon	  
effects	  have	  been	  theoretically	  predicted	  and	  experimentally	  detected	  in	  charitable	  
fundraising	  settings	  (Andreoni	  1998;	  Romano	  and	  Yildirim	  2001;	  List	  and	  Lucking-­‐
Reiley	  2002).	  This	  phenomenon	  may	  be	  driven	  by	  social	  comparison	  (Frey	  and	  
Meier	  2004;	  Shang	  and	  Corson	  2009),	  the	  “warm	  glow”	  that	  comes	  from	  
participating	  in	  charitable	  acts	  (Andreoni	  1990;	  Andreoni	  1995),	  the	  desire	  to	  signal	  
one’s	  trustworthiness	  (Nelson	  and	  Greene	  2003),	  or	  some	  combination	  of	  these.	  
Alternatively,	  information	  about	  other	  contributors	  may	  crowd	  out	  
subsequent	  donations	  if	  donors	  view	  their	  own	  contributions	  as	  substitutes	  for	  
other	  donations	  rather	  than	  complements.	  In	  this	  case,	  donors	  who	  perceive	  that	  
their	  preferred	  candidate	  is	  ahead	  are	  likely	  to	  donate	  less	  since	  they	  can	  still	  
participate	  in	  the	  public	  good	  (a	  winning	  candidate)	  without	  making	  contributions	  
themselves.	  This	  situation	  is	  a	  classic	  free-­‐riding	  problem	  (Olson	  1965).	  Crowding	  
out	  has	  been	  predicted	  in	  theoretical	  models	  of	  charitable	  giving	  (Warr	  1982;	  
Roberts	  1984).	  Although	  there	  is	  little	  empirical	  evidence	  of	  complete	  crowding	  out	  
(or	  perfect	  substitution)	  between	  one’s	  own	  contributions	  and	  other	  private	  




which	  some	  crowding	  out	  occurs	  (Kingma	  1989;	  Andreoni	  1993;	  Andreoni	  and	  
Payne	  2003).	  
Charities	  differ	  from	  political	  campaigns	  in	  fundamental	  ways.	  Charities	  may	  
provide	  incremental	  benefits	  as	  they	  obtain	  new	  contributions,	  while	  campaigns	  end	  
with	  either	  a	  win	  or	  a	  loss.	  This	  binary	  outcome	  may	  contribute	  to	  more	  crowding	  
out	  among	  political	  donations	  than	  scholars	  observe	  in	  charitable	  giving.	  Political	  
donors	  must	  decide	  how	  they	  want	  to	  contribute	  based	  not	  only	  on	  their	  ideological	  
preferences,	  but	  also	  on	  what	  they	  know	  about	  a	  campaign’s	  fundraising	  and	  
likelihood	  of	  winning.	  	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  donors	  may	  alter	  their	  perceptions	  of	  candidates	  based	  on	  
fundraising	  information.	  Americans	  generally	  believe	  that	  campaign	  finance	  
contributes	  to	  political	  corruption	  and	  support	  limits	  on	  campaign	  contributions	  
and	  spending	  (New	  York	  Times/CBS	  News	  Poll	  2015;	  Gallup	  2013).	  Many	  political	  
donors	  are	  also	  critical	  of	  the	  campaign	  finance	  system	  and	  feel	  that	  money	  has	  too	  
much	  influence	  in	  politics	  (Francia	  et	  al.	  2003).	  These	  normative	  concerns	  about	  the	  
role	  of	  campaign	  donations	  may	  alter	  behavior	  when	  donors	  learn	  how	  much	  money	  
candidates	  have	  raised,	  particularly	  from	  large	  contributions.	  Alternatively,	  donors	  
may	  mimic	  the	  general	  public	  in	  placing	  relatively	  low	  importance	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  
money	  in	  politics	  even	  as	  they	  express	  concern	  (Gallup	  2008).	  
Why	  would	  political	  information	  received	  through	  the	  mail,	  and	  campaign	  
fundraising	  information	  in	  particular,	  influence	  contribution	  decisions?	  Donors	  
follow	  politics	  closely	  and	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  among	  the	  best-­‐informed	  members	  of	  the	  




regarding	  campaign	  fundraising	  will	  be	  news	  to	  many	  recipients.	  Ansolabehere,	  
Snowberg,	  and	  Snyder	  (2005)	  find	  that	  survey	  respondents	  vastly	  overstate	  the	  
amounts	  that	  candidates	  raise	  and	  underestimate	  the	  extent	  of	  individual	  
contributions.	  1	  The	  most	  educated	  respondents,	  who	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  read	  
newspapers,	  ironically	  show	  the	  greatest	  discrepancies	  between	  their	  beliefs	  about	  
campaign	  finance	  and	  the	  facts	  (Ansolabehere,	  Snowberg,	  and	  Snyder	  2005).	  In	  
addition,	  mailed	  messages	  without	  partisan	  cues	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  influence	  
campaign	  contributions	  in	  several	  other	  field	  experiments	  (Green	  et	  al.	  2015;	  Perez-­‐




The	  study	  took	  place	  in	  the	  lead	  up	  to	  the	  November	  2014	  statewide	  
elections	  in	  Ohio.	  A	  month	  before	  the	  election,	  postcards	  were	  mailed	  to	  nearly	  
40,000	  randomly	  selected	  likely	  donors	  in	  Ohio.	  The	  messages	  in	  these	  mailings,	  
seven	  in	  all,	  provided	  factual	  information	  about	  the	  major	  party	  candidates	  for	  Ohio	  
governor	  and	  Ohio	  secretary	  of	  state.	  After	  the	  election,	  I	  matched	  campaign	  
donations	  made	  during	  the	  post-­‐treatment	  period	  back	  to	  the	  subjects	  in	  the	  
treatment	  and	  control	  groups	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  information	  
treatments	  on	  donation	  behavior.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  These	  misperceptions	  may	  mirror	  the	  framing	  of	  news	  reporting	  on	  campaign	  finance.	  Sorauf	  
(1987)	  observes	  that	  news	  reporters	  tend	  to	  understand	  campaign	  finance	  through	  a	  progressive	  
lens	  of	  special	  interests	  versus	  public	  interests,	  which	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  focus	  on	  potential	  corruption	  at	  




	  I	  chose	  the	  races	  for	  governor	  and	  secretary	  of	  state	  in	  order	  to	  examine	  the	  
effects	  of	  the	  treatments	  on	  both	  high	  and	  low	  salience	  elections.	  In	  Ohio’s	  2014	  
gubernatorial	  race,	  the	  Republican	  incumbent,	  John	  Kasich,	  ran	  against	  the	  
Democratic	  County	  Executive	  of	  Cuyahoga	  County	  (the	  county	  that	  encompasses	  the	  
Cleveland	  metropolitan	  area),	  Ed	  FitzGerald.	  Though	  Kasich	  was	  favored	  from	  the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  race,	  FitzGerald	  weathered	  a	  number	  of	  controversies	  during	  the	  
course	  of	  the	  campaign.	  Kasich	  ultimately	  won	  in	  a	  landslide,	  with	  nearly	  64	  percent	  
of	  the	  vote.	  In	  the	  race	  for	  Ohio	  secretary	  of	  state,	  the	  Republican	  incumbent,	  Jon	  
Husted,	  ran	  against	  Democratic	  State	  Senator	  Nina	  Turner.	  Husted	  won	  with	  nearly	  
60	  percent	  of	  the	  vote.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  offices	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  attorney	  
general,	  state	  treasurer,	  state	  auditor,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  entire	  Ohio	  House	  of	  
Representatives	  and	  half	  of	  the	  Ohio	  Senate	  were	  also	  up	  for	  election	  in	  2014.	  	  
	  
Predicting	  the	  Probability	  of	  Donating	  
The	  first	  step	  in	  preparing	  the	  experiment	  was	  to	  identify	  likely	  donors.	  This	  
predictive	  model	  then	  served	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  targeting	  the	  experimental	  mailings	  
(see	  Green	  et	  al.	  2015	  for	  a	  similar	  design).	  I	  first	  obtained	  Ohio’s	  public	  voter	  file,	  
which	  includes	  information	  on	  voter	  turnout	  history,	  gender,	  party	  registration,	  and	  
age.	  I	  also	  obtained	  publicly	  available	  political	  contributions	  data	  from	  the	  Ohio	  
secretary	  of	  state.	  Donor	  records	  were	  then	  matched	  to	  the	  state’s	  public	  voter	  files.	  
The	  matching	  algorithm	  took	  each	  donor	  and	  searched	  within	  the	  donor’s	  zip	  code	  
for	  a	  voter	  in	  that	  zip	  code	  with	  the	  same	  last	  name,	  the	  same	  first	  three	  letters	  of	  




match	  approximately	  60	  percent	  of	  donors	  uniquely	  to	  names	  in	  the	  voter	  file.	  By	  
scanning	  the	  matches	  myself,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  confirm	  that	  there	  were	  almost	  no	  false	  
positives	  (any	  observed	  false	  positives	  were	  corrected).	  
Next,	  I	  constructed	  a	  logistic	  regression	  model	  to	  predict	  contributions.	  The	  
dichotomous	  dependent	  variable	  was	  whether	  a	  voter	  made	  a	  campaign	  
contribution	  according	  to	  the	  matched	  donation	  data.	  The	  independent	  variables	  
consisted	  of	  age,	  age-­‐squared,	  party	  registration,	  the	  proportion	  of	  donors	  in	  a	  zip	  
code,	  and	  turnout	  history	  for	  the	  elections	  included	  in	  the	  voter	  file.	  
The	  logistic	  regression	  model	  was	  used	  to	  generate	  predicted	  probabilities	  of	  
making	  a	  campaign	  contribution	  for	  each	  voter	  in	  the	  Ohio	  voter	  file.	  As	  expected,	  
the	  vast	  majority	  of	  voters	  have	  a	  very	  small	  predicted	  probability	  of	  making	  a	  
contribution.	  The	  distribution	  of	  predicted	  probabilities	  spikes	  near	  zero	  and	  then	  
declines	  rapidly,	  with	  very	  few	  voters	  near	  the	  maximum.	  The	  average	  predicted	  
probability	  of	  making	  a	  donation	  was	  approximately	  1.0	  percent,	  which	  was	  close	  to	  
the	  actual	  proportion	  of	  donors	  in	  the	  matched	  dataset.	  As	  I	  explain	  in	  more	  detail	  
below,	  the	  predicted	  probabilities	  of	  donating	  served	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  selecting	  the	  
experimental	  subject	  pool.	  	  
	   I	  validated	  the	  predictive	  model	  after	  the	  experiment	  by	  regressing	  a	  binary	  
variable	  recording	  whether	  an	  experimental	  subject	  donated	  in	  the	  post-­‐treatment	  
period	  on	  his	  or	  her	  predicted	  probability	  of	  donating	  calculated	  before	  the	  
experiment.	  The	  calculated	  probabilities	  proved	  to	  be	  highly	  predictive	  of	  post-­‐
treatment	  donations.	  Using	  only	  members	  of	  the	  control	  group	  (N	  =	  1,157,148),	  a	  




predicted	  probability	  of	  contributing	  reveals	  a	  positive	  and	  statistically	  significant	  
relationship	  (see	  Table	  1).	  The	  regression	  coefficient,	  0.130	  (SE	  =	  0.0042),	  implies	  
that	  moving	  from	  a	  zero	  predicted	  probability	  to	  a	  100	  percent	  predicted	  
probability	  of	  donating	  results	  in	  an	  increase	  in	  actual	  probability	  of	  donating	  of	  13	  
percentage	  points.	  Readers	  should	  recall	  that	  I	  used	  many	  more	  donations	  from	  the	  
pre-­‐treatment	  period	  to	  make	  the	  prediction	  model	  than	  I	  had	  in	  the	  post-­‐treatment	  
period	  to	  test	  it.	  As	  a	  result,	  one	  would	  expect	  the	  model	  to	  under-­‐predict	  the	  
probability	  of	  donating	  over	  the	  shorter	  post-­‐treatment	  period.	  
	  
Treatment	  Messages	  
Postcards	  were	  mailed	  to	  randomly	  selected	  recipients	  with	  seven	  different	  
types	  of	  information	  about	  the	  major	  party	  candidates	  in	  Ohio’s	  gubernatorial	  and	  
secretary	  of	  state	  races.2	  The	  treatments	  were	  sent	  on	  October	  8,	  2014	  and	  
contained	  a	  return	  address	  from	  Binghamton	  University’s	  Center	  for	  Democratic	  
Performance.	  The	  full	  wording	  of	  the	  postcards	  is	  shown	  in	  the	  appendix	  to	  this	  
paper.	  
The	  postcard	  messages	  were	  based	  on	  information	  that	  contributors	  might	  
be	  exposed	  to	  during	  the	  course	  of	  an	  election	  and	  tap	  into	  distinct	  potential	  reasons	  
for	  political	  contributing.	  In	  keeping	  with	  the	  need	  to	  present	  true	  and	  balanced	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Each	  treatment	  was	  presented	  in	  two	  forms.	  The	  standard	  wording	  is	  presented	  in	  the	  appendix.	  An	  
alternative	  wording	  included	  a	  short	  message	  about	  Ohio’s	  political	  contribution	  tax	  credit.	  The	  
results	  of	  this	  additional	  tax	  credit	  information	  treatment	  are	  examined	  in	  the	  second	  essay	  in	  this	  
dissertation	  and	  found	  to	  be	  negligible.	  The	  results	  reported	  here	  pool	  subjects	  who	  were	  sent	  the	  




information,	  every	  treatment	  provided	  the	  same	  statistics	  about	  both	  major	  party	  
candidates	  in	  each	  race.	  
The	  first	  treatment	  message	  (“Total	  Donations”)	  showed	  the	  total	  amount	  of	  
money	  raised	  by	  each	  candidate	  through	  the	  most	  recent	  campaign	  finance	  report	  
available.	  This	  treatment	  provided	  potential	  donors	  with	  an	  opportunity	  to	  view	  
their	  preferred	  candidate’s	  relative	  fundraising	  strength	  or	  weakness.	  In	  the	  two	  
races	  mentioned	  in	  the	  mailing,	  both	  Republican	  incumbents	  raised	  far	  more	  than	  
their	  Democratic	  challengers.	  This	  treatment	  tests	  whether	  donors	  are	  motivated	  by	  
the	  sense	  that	  a	  candidate	  is	  clearly	  ahead	  (a	  bandwagon	  effect)	  or	  falling	  behind	  
and	  in	  need	  of	  funds	  (an	  electoral	  threat).	  Other	  scholars	  have	  found	  that	  advocacy	  
group	  donors	  are	  motivated	  by	  threats	  to	  policies	  they	  support	  (Miller	  and	  Krosnick	  
2004),	  but	  little	  work	  examines	  the	  effect	  of	  electoral	  threat	  on	  giving	  to	  candidates.	  
I	  expect	  that	  donors	  will	  likewise	  be	  motivated	  to	  give	  money	  when	  their	  party’s	  
candidate	  is	  behind	  and	  donors	  perceive	  that	  their	  money	  can	  make	  the	  greatest	  
difference.	  By	  contrast,	  when	  donors	  learn	  that	  a	  candidate	  is	  ahead	  in	  fundraising,	  
they	  may	  see	  little	  reason	  to	  give	  more	  money	  and	  may	  even	  decide	  to	  give	  less.	  	  
The	  second	  treatment	  message	  (“Election	  Reminder”)	  named	  the	  major	  party	  
candidates,	  their	  party,	  and	  reminds	  recipients	  of	  the	  approaching	  election	  date.	  
This	  mailing	  tests	  whether	  donors	  respond	  to	  receiving	  a	  postcard	  reminder	  that	  
stresses	  the	  imminence	  of	  the	  election.	  In	  particular,	  partisans	  of	  winning	  
candidates	  may	  be	  more	  enthusiastic	  when	  reminded	  of	  an	  upcoming	  election	  than	  
a	  losing	  candidate’s	  supporters.	  A	  number	  of	  studies	  suggest	  that	  election	  reminders	  




Panagopoulos	  2011).	  In	  practice,	  however,	  actual	  political	  fundraising	  messages	  
make	  frequent	  reference	  to	  upcoming	  deadlines	  of	  all	  kinds	  to	  create	  a	  sense	  of	  
urgency	  among	  contributors	  (New	  York	  Post	  2015).	  
The	  third	  treatment	  message	  (“Endorsements”)	  listed	  several	  prominent	  
ideological	  groups	  (e.g.,	  Planned	  Parenthood)	  that	  endorsed	  each	  candidate.	  While	  I	  
expect	  that	  many	  likely	  donors	  will	  already	  know	  something	  about	  each	  candidate’s	  
ideology	  or	  surmise	  it	  from	  the	  party	  label,	  the	  endorsements	  treatment	  makes	  each	  
candidate’s	  ideology	  especially	  clear	  and	  salient.	  Candidates	  often	  tout	  their	  
endorsements	  from	  ideological	  groups	  to	  their	  supporters	  and	  scholars	  generally	  
agree	  that	  ideological	  motivation	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  individual	  contribution	  
decisions	  (Francia	  et	  al.	  2003;	  Herrnson	  2011).	  The	  endorsements	  treatment	  tests	  
experimentally	  whether	  making	  candidate	  ideology	  salient	  induces	  contributions	  in	  
the	  absence	  of	  partisan	  messaging.	  
The	  fourth	  through	  seventh	  treatment	  messages	  provided	  different	  types	  of	  
information	  about	  the	  size	  of	  donations	  to	  each	  candidate.	  The	  fourth	  overall	  
message	  (“Average	  Donor”)	  gave	  the	  size	  of	  the	  average	  individual	  donation	  to	  each	  
candidate’s	  campaign	  through	  the	  most	  recent	  campaign	  finance	  report	  available.	  
The	  averages	  ranged	  widely,	  from	  $168	  for	  Nina	  Turner’s	  campaign	  to	  $832	  for	  Jon	  
Husted’s	  campaign.	  In	  both	  elections,	  the	  average	  donation	  to	  the	  Democratic	  (and	  
challenger)	  candidates	  was	  significantly	  smaller	  than	  the	  average	  donation	  to	  the	  
Republican	  incumbents.	  The	  average	  donor	  treatment	  showed	  potential	  donors	  that	  




their	  campaigns.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  these	  two	  elections,	  the	  mailing	  also	  provided	  a	  sharp	  
contrast	  between	  the	  average	  donation	  sizes	  to	  each	  party’s	  candidate.	  
The	  fifth	  treatment	  message	  (“Large	  Donors”)	  provided	  the	  number	  of	  
individual	  donations	  to	  each	  candidate	  equal	  to	  or	  larger	  than	  $1000.	  The	  sixth	  
treatment	  message	  (“Small	  Donors”)	  gave	  the	  number	  of	  individual	  donations	  to	  
each	  candidate	  equal	  to	  or	  smaller	  than	  $50.	  The	  seventh	  treatment	  message	  
(“Large	  and	  Small	  Donors”)	  provided	  the	  amount	  of	  money	  each	  candidate	  raised	  
from	  large	  and	  small	  individual	  donations,	  defined	  as	  in	  the	  previous	  treatments.	  I	  
chose	  the	  cutoff	  amounts	  of	  $50	  and	  $1000	  because	  they	  very	  clearly	  fall	  within	  the	  
categories	  of	  “small”	  and	  “large”	  donations	  while	  still	  delimiting	  groups	  with	  a	  
substantial	  number	  of	  donors	  in	  each.	  Among	  the	  matched	  pre-­‐treatment	  Ohio	  
donations	  in	  the	  data	  set,	  35	  percent	  were	  $50	  or	  less	  and	  9	  percent	  were	  $1000	  or	  
more.	  However,	  I	  am	  cognizant	  that	  campaigns,	  journalists,	  and	  scholars	  may	  apply	  
different	  standards	  when	  defining	  large	  and	  small	  donors.	  
The	  average	  donor	  message	  and	  the	  three	  “large”	  and	  “small”	  donor	  
messages	  allow	  me	  to	  assess	  how	  information	  about	  contribution	  size	  influences	  
donor	  decision-­‐making.	  In	  particular,	  these	  messages	  test	  whether	  donors	  favor	  
candidates	  who	  raise	  more	  money	  from	  small	  donors	  or	  withdraw	  support	  from	  
those	  who	  rely	  heavily	  on	  large	  donors.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  donors	  and	  the	  general	  
public	  express	  unease	  with	  the	  outsize	  role	  of	  money	  in	  politics	  and	  generally	  favor	  
limitations	  on	  political	  contributions	  and	  spending	  (Francia	  et	  al.	  2003;	  New	  York	  
Times/CBS	  2015;	  Gallup	  2013).	  At	  the	  same,	  the	  public	  places	  relative	  low	  




amounts	  of	  money	  coming	  from	  large	  and	  small	  donors	  in	  national	  campaigns,	  and	  
candidates	  strategically	  advertise	  these	  numbers	  as	  well	  (Boston	  Globe	  2008;	  New	  
York	  Times	  2012).	  Campaigns	  often	  tout	  the	  number	  of	  small	  donations	  they	  receive	  
as	  evidence	  of	  grassroots	  support	  (Pittsburgh	  Post-­‐Gazette	  2008;	  Associated	  Press	  
2012).	  In	  2008,	  Barack	  Obama	  partly	  justified	  his	  decision	  to	  forgo	  public	  financing	  
for	  his	  presidential	  campaign	  by	  citing	  his	  campaign’s	  ability	  to	  raise	  small	  
donations	  (New	  York	  Times	  2008b).	  Bernie	  Sanders	  has	  also	  touted	  his	  small	  donor	  
fundraising	  in	  his	  2016	  presidential	  campaign	  (Burlington	  Free	  Press	  2016).	  In	  
keeping	  with	  the	  logic	  that	  small	  donations	  are	  considered	  normatively	  better	  (i.e.,	  
less	  corrupting)	  than	  large	  donations,	  candidates	  who	  have	  collected	  smaller	  
donations	  on	  average	  or	  more	  small	  donations	  overall	  should	  receive	  more	  
donations	  in	  the	  post-­‐treatment	  period.	  
	  
Random	  Assignment	  Procedures	  
The	  experimental	  groups	  were	  formed	  using	  block	  random	  assignment.	  The	  
initial	  subject	  pool	  consisted	  of	  registered	  voters	  for	  whom	  I	  generated	  predicted	  
donation	  probabilities	  as	  described	  above.	  I	  further	  restricted	  the	  experimental	  
subject	  pool	  to	  registered	  voters	  who	  had	  a	  predicted	  probability	  of	  donating	  of	  over	  
2	  percent	  (approximately	  double	  the	  average	  for	  all	  registered	  voters).	  This	  created	  
an	  experimental	  data	  set	  of	  approximately	  1.2	  million	  subjects	  out	  of	  an	  initial	  file	  of	  
7.7	  million	  registered	  Ohio	  voters.	  Within	  the	  experimental	  data	  set,	  I	  formed	  one	  
block	  made	  up	  of	  subjects	  who	  were	  past	  donors	  (i.e.,	  had	  been	  linked	  to	  a	  donation	  




blocks	  according	  to	  their	  predicted	  probability	  of	  donating	  and	  randomly	  allocated	  
subjects	  within	  each	  block	  to	  treatment	  and	  control	  conditions.	  Since	  there	  were	  
more	  subjects	  at	  lower	  values	  of	  predicted	  probabilities,	  lower	  probability	  blocks	  
were	  larger	  than	  higher	  probability	  blocks.	  Each	  probability-­‐based	  block	  was	  
randomly	  assigned	  the	  same	  number	  of	  subjects	  in	  each	  treatment	  condition,	  which	  
means	  there	  were	  varying	  numbers	  of	  subjects	  in	  the	  control	  condition	  by	  block.	  In	  
the	  probability-­‐based	  blocks,	  3,290	  subjects	  in	  each	  of	  the	  ten	  blocks	  were	  randomly	  
chosen	  to	  be	  in	  the	  treatment	  groups.	  In	  the	  previous	  donor	  block,	  7,000	  subjects	  
were	  randomly	  selected	  into	  the	  treatment	  groups.	  Overall,	  there	  were	  5,700	  
subjects	  in	  each	  treatment	  group	  across	  all	  of	  the	  blocks	  and	  39,900	  subjects	  total	  in	  
treatment.	  The	  remaining	  subjects	  were	  placed	  into	  the	  control	  condition.	  The	  full	  
experimental	  design	  is	  shown	  in	  Table	  2.	  
	  
Outcome	  measures	  and	  descriptive	  statistics	  
I	  used	  Ohio’s	  public	  donor	  database	  to	  count	  the	  frequency	  and	  size	  of	  
donations	  made	  in	  the	  post-­‐treatment	  period.	  Ohio	  is	  well	  suited	  for	  this	  
investigation	  because	  state	  law	  requires	  campaigns	  to	  itemize	  all	  donations	  
regardless	  of	  size.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  cutoff	  for	  itemizing	  federal	  contributions	  is	  $200,	  
and	  contribution	  reporting	  thresholds	  vary	  widely	  in	  other	  jurisdictions.	  Using	  the	  
same	  matching	  procedure	  described	  in	  the	  section	  explaining	  the	  donor	  prediction	  
model,	  I	  matched	  post-­‐treatment	  donations	  and	  donation	  amounts	  to	  the	  
experimental	  subjects.	  I	  also	  matched	  post-­‐treatment	  voting	  behavior	  in	  the	  




I	  identified	  5,717	  post-­‐treatment	  donors	  among	  the	  experimental	  subjects	  
who	  gave	  a	  total	  of	  $2.93	  million	  to	  Ohio	  state-­‐level	  candidates.	  John	  Kasich,	  the	  
Republican	  incumbent	  candidate	  for	  governor	  had	  509	  donors	  and	  received	  
$209,000	  in	  post-­‐treatment	  donations.	  Ed	  FitzGerald,	  the	  Democratic	  challenger	  in	  
the	  gubernatorial	  race	  had	  467	  donors	  but	  just	  $20,000	  in	  post-­‐treatment	  
donations.	  Jon	  Husted,	  the	  Republican	  incumbent	  candidate	  for	  secretary	  of	  state	  
had	  77	  donors	  and	  received	  $46,000	  in	  post-­‐treatment	  donations.	  Nina	  Turner,	  the	  
Democratic	  challenger	  in	  the	  secretary	  of	  state	  race	  had	  587	  donors	  but	  a	  similar	  
$47,000	  in	  post-­‐treatment	  donations.	  
Unsurprisingly,	  the	  likely	  donors	  in	  the	  experimental	  subject	  pool	  proved	  to	  
be	  avid	  voters	  in	  the	  November	  2014	  election.	  In	  the	  control	  group	  (which	  was	  
unaffected	  by	  the	  intervention),	  91.5	  percent	  of	  subjects	  voted.	  Contributors	  in	  the	  
control	  group	  were	  even	  more	  consistent	  voters	  and	  had	  a	  turnout	  rate	  of	  98.1	  
percent.	  By	  contrast,	  turnout	  among	  all	  Ohio	  registered	  voters	  in	  the	  November	  
2014	  election	  was	  40.7	  percent.	  
There	  was	  no	  overlap	  between	  the	  post-­‐treatment	  donors	  to	  the	  two	  
Republican	  and	  the	  two	  Democratic	  candidates	  mentioned	  in	  the	  postcards.	  In	  other	  
words,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  behavior	  of	  some	  access-­‐seeking	  interest	  groups	  
(Ansolabehere,	  Snyder,	  and	  Tripathi	  2002),	  donors	  who	  gave	  to	  one	  side	  never	  gave	  
to	  the	  opposing	  side	  in	  the	  post-­‐treatment	  period.	  The	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  
experimental	  subjects	  were	  registered	  Democrats	  (34.4	  percent)	  or	  Republicans	  
(55.3	  percent).	  Nearly	  all	  of	  the	  donors	  to	  the	  candidates	  mentioned	  in	  the	  postcards	  




are	  highly	  polarized	  by	  party,	  I	  analyze	  the	  treatment	  effects	  on	  the	  probability	  of	  
giving	  to	  and	  the	  total	  amount	  given	  to	  each	  candidate	  separately.	  I	  then	  examine	  
the	  interaction	  between	  donor	  partisanship	  and	  the	  treatment	  effects	  since	  I	  assume	  
that	  a	  candidate’s	  copartisans	  likely	  drive	  any	  observed	  effects.	  
	  
Statistical	  Model	  
The	  results	  presented	  below	  focus	  on	  two	  dependent	  variables.	  The	  first	  is	  a	  
binary	  outcome	  indicating	  whether	  a	  subject	  donated	  or	  not	  in	  the	  post-­‐treatment	  
period;	  the	  second	  is	  the	  amount	  that	  each	  subject	  donated.	  In	  the	  first	  case,	  I	  am	  
measuring	  how	  each	  mailing	  affected	  the	  probability	  of	  donation.	  The	  estimand	  in	  
the	  second	  case	  is	  the	  average	  treatment	  effect	  associated	  with	  each	  mailing:	  how	  
many	  dollars	  on	  average	  were	  donated	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  treatment?	  
I	  estimate	  each	  quantity	  by	  comparing	  average	  outcomes	  in	  treatment	  and	  
control	  groups	  within	  each	  block.	  In	  order	  to	  summarize	  these	  results	  across	  all	  
blocks	  while	  taking	  into	  account	  that	  the	  probability	  of	  treatment	  assignment	  varied	  
by	  block,	  I	  weight	  the	  results	  from	  each	  block	  by	  the	  share	  of	  the	  subject	  pool	  in	  each	  
block;	  these	  weights	  are	  equivalent	  to	  inverse-­‐probability	  weights,	  whereby	  each	  
observation	  is	  weighted	  by	  the	  inverse	  of	  the	  probability	  that	  it	  was	  assigned	  to	  its	  
experimental	  condition	  (Gerber	  and	  Green	  2012,	  chap.	  3).	  	  
I	  report	  heteroskedasticity-­‐robust	  standard	  errors,	  as	  I	  expect	  the	  treatment	  
to	  change	  the	  disturbance	  variance	  in	  the	  experimental	  groups.	  In	  addition,	  I	  
calculate	  two-­‐sided	  p-­‐values	  for	  the	  coefficient	  estimates	  based	  on	  randomization	  




condition	  and	  to	  control,	  I	  can	  simulate	  a	  large	  number	  of	  randomly	  generated	  
treatment	  assignments	  and	  obtain	  a	  distribution	  of	  treatment	  effect	  estimates	  from	  
these	  assignments	  under	  the	  sharp	  null	  assumption	  of	  no	  treatment	  effect	  (Gerber	  
and	  Green	  2012).	  I	  then	  observe	  where	  the	  actual	  estimates	  fall	  in	  these	  simulated	  
distributions	  and	  calculate	  p-­‐values	  to	  determine	  how	  likely	  I	  would	  be	  to	  observe	  
the	  estimated	  average	  treatment	  effect	  if	  there	  were	  no	  true	  treatment	  effect.	  All	  of	  
the	  randomization	  inference	  p-­‐values	  are	  based	  on	  1,000	  simulated	  random	  
assignments.	  
Finally,	  I	  conduct	  a	  series	  of	  simulations	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  
study’s	  significant	  treatment	  effects	  vary	  by	  subjects’	  party	  registration	  (using	  the	  
party	  registration	  variable	  from	  the	  Ohio	  voter	  file)	  or	  their	  previous	  donor	  status.	  
Given	  the	  skewness	  of	  the	  contributions	  data,	  I	  use	  the	  following	  approach,	  
suggested	  in	  Gerber	  and	  Green	  (2012,	  chap.	  9),	  for	  detecting	  heterogeneous	  
treatment	  effects	  in	  experimental	  data.	  I	  first	  regress	  the	  outcome	  variable	  on	  the	  
treatment	  variable	  and	  an	  indicator	  variable	  designating	  the	  party	  subgroup.	  This	  
regression	  constitutes	  the	  null	  model,	  to	  which	  an	  alternative	  model	  is	  compared.	  
The	  alternative	  specification	  regresses	  the	  outcome	  on	  those	  same	  variables	  plus	  a	  
variable	  made	  up	  of	  their	  interaction.	  I	  then	  obtain	  an	  F-­‐statistic	  from	  a	  comparison	  
of	  the	  sum	  of	  squared	  residuals	  of	  the	  two	  models.	  In	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  
significance	  of	  the	  F-­‐statistic,	  I	  generate	  a	  full	  schedule	  of	  potential	  outcomes	  under	  
the	  assumption	  that	  the	  coefficients	  from	  the	  null	  model	  are	  the	  same	  for	  each	  
subject.	  I	  then	  repeat	  the	  random	  assignment	  1,000	  times,	  estimate	  the	  null	  and	  




p-­‐value	  by	  observing	  the	  proportion	  of	  F-­‐statistics	  simulated	  under	  the	  null	  model	  
that	  are	  greater	  than	  the	  observed	  F-­‐statistic.	  
One	  should	  use	  caution	  when	  interpreting	  interactions	  between	  randomly	  
assigned	  treatments	  and	  fixed	  subject	  covariates	  like	  party	  registration	  (often	  
referred	  to	  as	  “treatment-­‐by-­‐covariate”	  interactions).	  First,	  subgroup	  analysis	  is	  
fundamentally	  descriptive.	  Political	  party	  registration	  is	  not	  assigned	  randomly,	  and	  
so,	  while	  subgroup	  membership	  may	  be	  predictive	  of	  treatment	  effects,	  the	  detected	  
interactions	  may	  not	  have	  a	  causal	  interpretation.	  Second,	  because	  I	  conduct	  several	  
tests	  due	  to	  the	  assortment	  of	  treatments,	  at	  least	  one	  interaction	  model	  may	  appear	  
significant	  merely	  by	  chance	  (Gerber	  and	  Green	  2012,	  299-­‐300).	  I	  address	  this	  issue	  
in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  
	  
Results	   	   	  
I	  describe	  the	  results	  below	  separately	  for	  giving	  to	  each	  of	  the	  candidates	  
mentioned	  in	  the	  mailings.	  Table	  3	  shows	  the	  results	  for	  giving	  to	  John	  Kasich,	  the	  
Republican	  candidate	  for	  governor,	  from	  weighted	  regressions	  of	  donating	  and	  total	  
donation	  amount	  on	  treatment	  assignment.	  Although	  some	  of	  the	  regression	  
estimates	  suggest	  slightly	  negative	  treatment	  effects	  on	  the	  probability	  of	  donating,	  
none	  of	  the	  randomization	  inference-­‐based	  p-­‐values	  associated	  with	  the	  negative	  
coefficients	  approach	  conventional	  levels	  of	  significance.	  The	  only	  treatment	  that	  
significantly	  increased	  the	  probability	  of	  making	  a	  donation	  is	  the	  Election	  
Reminder	  treatment	  (p	  =	  0.010,	  two-­‐sided	  test).	  Recall	  that	  the	  reminder	  treatment	  




election	  date.	  The	  Election	  Reminder	  treatment	  increased	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  subjects	  
donated	  to	  Kasich	  by	  over	  200	  percent	  relative	  to	  the	  control	  group.	  Table	  3.1	  shows	  
that	  this	  effect	  is	  driven	  by	  subjects	  who	  are	  registered	  Republicans	  (F-­‐test	  p-­‐value	  
=	  0.057).	  Among	  registered	  Republicans,	  subjects	  in	  the	  treatment	  group	  were	  3.4	  
times	  more	  likely	  to	  give	  to	  Kasich	  than	  subjects	  in	  the	  control	  group.	  Assuming	  that	  
a	  candidate	  would	  target	  his	  or	  her	  copartisans	  for	  contributions,	  the	  election	  
reminder	  has	  a	  strong	  effect	  on	  giving	  even	  without	  an	  explicit	  donation	  request.	  
However,	  the	  reminder	  treatment	  does	  not	  exert	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  average	  
amount	  that	  subjects	  donated	  to	  Kasich.	  
Candidates	  typically	  target	  their	  messages	  to	  individuals	  who	  have	  made	  
contributions	  in	  the	  past.	  In	  Table	  3.2,	  I	  examine	  the	  interaction	  between	  receiving	  
the	  Election	  Reminder	  message	  and	  being	  a	  past	  donor	  to	  any	  candidate.	  The	  results	  
show	  that	  there	  is	  no	  significant	  difference	  in	  the	  treatment	  effect	  between	  previous	  
donors	  and	  subjects	  who	  have	  not	  given	  before	  (F-­‐test	  p-­‐value	  =	  0.866).	  The	  
election	  reminder	  affects	  past	  donors	  and	  individuals	  who	  have	  not	  contributed	  
before	  in	  a	  similar	  way.	  
The	  mere	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  seven	  treatments	  in	  each	  analysis	  means	  that	  
nominal	  significance	  levels	  may	  overstate	  the	  true	  level	  of	  significance,	  a	  
consequence	  of	  the	  multiple	  comparisons	  problem	  (Gerber	  and	  Green	  2012,	  chap.	  
9).	  In	  order	  to	  address	  the	  multiple	  comparisons	  issue	  in	  a	  rigorous	  way,	  I	  use	  
randomization	  inference	  to	  gauge	  the	  probability	  of	  obtaining	  an	  estimate	  from	  any	  
of	  the	  treatments	  as	  large	  as	  the	  Election	  Reminder	  coefficient	  under	  the	  sharp	  null	  




one-­‐tailed	  p-­‐value	  is	  0.060,	  implying	  that	  there	  is	  approximately	  a	  one-­‐in-­‐seventeen	  
chance	  that	  I	  would	  obtain	  a	  maximal	  estimate	  as	  large	  as	  the	  Election	  Reminder	  
coefficient	  by	  chance	  if	  in	  fact	  none	  of	  the	  treatments	  had	  any	  effect.	  This	  result	  
allows	  one	  to	  be	  fairly	  confident	  that	  the	  coefficient	  is	  not	  due	  to	  random	  chance.	  
	   In	  Table	  4,	  I	  show	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  mailers	  on	  giving	  to	  Ed	  FitzGerald,	  the	  
Democratic	  candidate	  for	  governor.	  The	  results	  reveal	  that	  the	  Total	  Donations	  
treatment	  increases	  both	  the	  probability	  of	  donating	  (p	  =	  0.037,	  two-­‐sided	  test)	  to	  
the	  FitzGerald	  campaign	  and	  the	  total	  amount	  given	  (p	  =	  0.040,	  two-­‐sided	  test).	  The	  
results	  suggest	  that	  receiving	  the	  Total	  Donations	  treatment	  increased	  the	  
probability	  of	  giving	  to	  FitzGerald	  by	  approximately	  140	  percent	  and	  increased	  the	  
average	  donation	  amount	  by	  170	  percent	  relative	  to	  the	  control	  group.	  The	  analysis	  
of	  the	  interaction	  effects	  with	  party	  registration	  (Table	  4.1)	  shows	  that	  registered	  
Democrats	  drove	  these	  effects.	  Democrats	  in	  the	  treatment	  group	  gave	  at	  a	  rate	  2.5	  
times	  larger	  and	  gave	  in	  amounts	  2.8	  times	  larger	  than	  Democrats	  in	  the	  control	  
group.	  
	   The	  pattern	  of	  effects	  for	  Fitzgerald	  donations	  reveals	  that	  previous	  donors	  
acted	  differently	  in	  response	  to	  the	  Total	  Donations	  treatment	  than	  subjects	  who	  
had	  not	  donated	  before	  (see	  Table	  4.2).	  Previous	  donors	  who	  are	  sent	  the	  treatment	  
actually	  lowered	  their	  rate	  of	  giving	  and	  the	  average	  amount	  that	  they	  gave	  to	  0.7	  
times	  the	  rate	  and	  average	  amount	  of	  previous	  donors	  in	  the	  control	  group.	  By	  
contrast,	  individuals	  who	  had	  not	  made	  a	  contribution	  in	  the	  past	  increased	  their	  
probability	  of	  giving	  by	  5.3	  times	  and	  increased	  the	  average	  amount	  that	  they	  gave	  




message.	  New	  contributors	  were	  responsible	  for	  the	  overall	  the	  positive	  effect	  of	  the	  
Total	  Donations	  message	  on	  giving	  to	  Fitzgerald,	  while	  previous	  donors	  actually	  had	  
a	  negative	  reaction	  to	  the	  message	  that	  their	  candidate	  was	  behind	  in	  the	  money	  
race.	  
When	  I	  use	  randomization	  inference	  to	  gauge	  the	  probability	  of	  obtaining	  
estimates	  from	  any	  of	  the	  treatments	  as	  large	  as	  the	  Total	  Donations	  coefficients,	  I	  
obtain	  one-­‐tailed	  p-­‐values	  of	  0.235	  for	  the	  probability	  of	  donating	  and	  0.266	  for	  
average	  donation	  amount.	  These	  results	  imply	  that	  there	  is	  a	  1-­‐in-­‐4	  chance	  that	  I	  
would	  obtain	  coefficients	  as	  large	  as	  the	  Total	  Donation	  treatment	  coefficients	  by	  
chance	  if	  none	  of	  the	  treatments	  had	  any	  effect.	  These	  results	  require	  me	  to	  
interpret	  the	  findings	  with	  caution.	  
I	  present	  the	  results	  for	  donations	  to	  Jon	  Husted,	  the	  Republican	  candidate	  
for	  secretary	  of	  state,	  in	  Table	  5.	  Similar	  to	  the	  results	  described	  above	  for	  John	  
Kasich,	  receiving	  the	  Election	  Reminder	  treatment	  increases	  the	  probability	  of	  
donating	  to	  Husted	  (p	  =	  0.012,	  two-­‐sided	  test).	  The	  same	  treatment	  also	  increases	  
the	  amount	  donated	  to	  Husted	  (p	  =	  0.024,	  two-­‐sided	  test).	  The	  results	  imply	  that	  
being	  sent	  the	  Election	  Reminder	  treatment	  increased	  the	  probability	  of	  giving	  to	  
Husted	  by	  about	  370	  percent	  and	  increased	  the	  average	  donation	  amount	  by	  about	  
650	  percent	  relative	  to	  the	  control	  group.	  The	  analysis	  of	  interaction	  effects	  with	  
Republican	  registration	  indicates	  that	  copartisan	  donations	  did	  not	  drive	  this	  effect.	  
(There	  were	  also	  very	  few	  donations	  overall	  to	  Husted	  in	  the	  post-­‐treatment	  
period.)	  When	  I	  employ	  randomization	  inference	  to	  gauge	  the	  probability	  of	  




coefficients,	  I	  obtain	  one-­‐tailed	  p-­‐values	  of	  0.090	  for	  the	  probability	  of	  donating	  and	  
0.199	  for	  donation	  amount.	  
Table	  6	  displays	  the	  results	  for	  Nina	  Turner,	  the	  Democratic	  secretary	  of	  
state	  candidate.	  None	  of	  the	  treatments	  exerted	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  contributing	  
to	  the	  Turner	  campaign.	  Finally,	  Table	  7	  shows	  the	  results	  from	  weighted	  
regressions	  of	  donating	  and	  total	  donation	  amount	  on	  treatment	  assignment	  for	  
giving	  to	  any	  major	  party	  candidate	  for	  Ohio	  governor	  or	  secretary	  of	  state.	  Since	  
the	  results	  combine	  giving	  to	  all	  four	  candidates,	  they	  are	  essentially	  a	  weighted	  
average	  of	  the	  results	  from	  the	  previous	  four	  tables.	  The	  results	  indicate	  that	  the	  
Election	  Reminder	  increased	  the	  probability	  of	  donating	  significantly	  (p	  =	  0.020).	  In	  
addition,	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  Total	  Donations	  treatment	  on	  the	  probability	  of	  donating	  
and	  total	  amount	  donated	  are	  positive	  and	  approach	  conventional	  levels	  of	  
significance	  (p	  =	  0.057	  and	  0.075,	  respectively).	  When	  I	  employ	  randomization	  
inference	  to	  gauge	  the	  probability	  of	  obtaining	  estimates	  from	  any	  of	  the	  treatments	  
as	  large	  as	  the	  Election	  Reminder	  coefficient,	  I	  obtain	  one-­‐tailed	  p-­‐values	  of	  0.040.	  
	  
Conclusion	  
	   The	  experimental	  results	  reported	  here	  show	  that	  partisan	  donors	  respond	  
to	  electoral	  threats	  as	  well	  as	  electoral	  opportunities.	  Democrats	  responded	  to	  the	  
information	  that	  their	  gubernatorial	  candidate,	  Ed	  FitzGerald,	  had	  less	  money	  than	  
his	  opponent	  by	  donating	  more	  often	  and	  in	  larger	  amounts	  to	  his	  campaign.	  
Donations	  to	  John	  Kasich,	  FitzGerald’s	  Republican	  competitor,	  who	  was	  ahead	  in	  the	  




after	  receiving	  an	  election	  reminder,	  while	  the	  same	  treatment	  did	  not	  help	  the	  
Democratic	  candidate.	  	  
These	  results	  likely	  reflect	  the	  general	  sense	  of	  Republican	  strength	  in	  the	  
November	  2014	  elections.	  By	  the	  final	  months	  before	  the	  2014	  election,	  polls	  in	  
Ohio	  showed	  that	  John	  Kasich	  was	  well	  ahead	  of	  Ed	  FitzGerald	  and	  that	  Republican	  
candidates	  were	  heavily	  favored	  in	  down-­‐ballot	  races	  as	  well	  (YouGov	  2014;	  
Columbus	  Dispatch	  2014b).	  This	  information	  offers	  one	  clue	  as	  to	  why	  the	  election	  
reminder	  treatment,	  which	  merely	  mentioned	  the	  names	  of	  the	  candidates	  and	  their	  
party,	  had	  a	  strong	  impact	  on	  giving	  to	  Republicans	  and	  no	  effect	  on	  donations	  to	  
Democrats.	  Republicans	  received	  the	  election	  reminder	  and,	  knowing	  that	  Kasich	  
was	  likely	  to	  win,	  decided	  to	  increase	  their	  donations.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  information	  
about	  how	  much	  money	  Kasich	  had	  raised,	  Republicans	  were	  eager	  to	  participate	  in	  
the	  hopes	  of	  pushing	  Kasich	  over	  the	  top.	  However,	  Republicans	  had	  little	  incentive	  
to	  donate	  to	  Kasich	  when	  they	  received	  the	  Total	  Donations	  message	  and	  were	  
reminded	  that	  Kasich	  already	  had	  much	  more	  money	  than	  his	  opponent.	  The	  
election	  reminder	  prompted	  Republican	  donors,	  enthusiastic	  about	  their	  
candidates’	  chances	  but	  without	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  how	  much	  money	  he	  had,	  to	  jump	  
on	  the	  bandwagon	  and	  donate.	  But	  the	  bandwagon	  effect	  required	  remaining	  
ignorant	  of	  Kasich’s	  actual	  fundraising	  advantage.	  Using	  the	  election	  reminder	  
treatment	  effect	  estimate	  among	  registered	  Republicans,	  I	  calculate	  that	  Kasich	  
would	  have	  had	  approximately	  1070	  more	  donors	  in	  the	  post-­‐treatment	  period	  if	  
every	  Republican	  in	  the	  control	  group	  (N	  =	  638,930)	  were	  sent	  the	  election	  




the	  control	  group.	  (Although	  the	  average	  donation	  amount	  among	  Republicans	  was	  
higher	  in	  the	  election	  reminder	  treatment	  group	  that	  in	  the	  control	  group,	  this	  effect	  
was	  not	  statistically	  significant	  and	  so	  I	  do	  not	  estimate	  an	  increase	  in	  fundraising	  
amount	  due	  to	  the	  treatment.)	  This	  is	  a	  substantively	  large	  number	  of	  new	  donors,	  
and	  the	  effect	  is	  particularly	  notable	  given	  that	  the	  mailing	  did	  not	  include	  partisan	  
language	  or	  a	  donation	  request.	  
The	  pattern	  of	  effects	  for	  FitzGerald	  donors	  points	  to	  the	  motivating	  role	  of	  
electoral	  threat.	  The	  Total	  Donations	  treatment	  showed	  that	  FitzGerald	  had	  raised	  
only	  one-­‐third	  of	  the	  funds	  raised	  by	  his	  Republican	  opponent.	  This	  message	  was	  an	  
easily	  interpretable	  signal	  that	  FitzGerald’s	  campaign	  was	  behind	  and	  needed	  help.	  
Democrats	  who	  received	  the	  total	  donations	  treatment	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  give	  and	  
to	  give	  more	  generously	  to	  FitzGerald,	  their	  candidate	  for	  governor.	  3	  However,	  
when	  presented	  with	  a	  simple	  election	  reminder,	  Democratic	  donors	  were	  not	  
inspired	  to	  give	  since	  they	  faced	  no	  concrete	  electoral	  threat.	  Using	  the	  treatment	  
effect	  estimates	  among	  registered	  Democrats,	  I	  calculate	  that	  FitzGerald	  would	  have	  
raised	  approximately	  $33,000	  more	  and	  would	  have	  had	  approximately	  650	  more	  
donors	  in	  the	  post-­‐treatment	  period	  if	  every	  Democrat	  in	  the	  control	  group	  (N	  =	  
397,653)	  were	  sent	  the	  Total	  Donations	  mailing.	  There	  were	  approximately	  390	  
Democratic	  contributors	  in	  the	  control	  group	  who	  gave	  about	  $17,000	  to	  FitzGerald	  
in	  the	  post-­‐treatment	  period.	  This	  again	  is	  a	  large	  substantive	  effect	  that	  stands	  out	  
for	  being	  a	  consequence	  of	  information	  alone.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  total	  donations	  treatment	  did	  not	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  giving	  to	  
Nina	  Turner,	  the	  Democratic	  candidate	  for	  secretary	  of	  state.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  recipients	  simply	  did	  





Information	  about	  total	  donations	  only	  increased	  FitzGerald’s	  support	  from	  
individuals	  who	  were	  new	  donors;	  previous	  donors	  actually	  lowered	  their	  support	  
when	  they	  learned	  about	  Fitzgerald’s	  relatively	  low	  levels	  of	  fundraising.	  Seasoned	  
donors	  may	  have	  interpreted	  Fitzgerald’s	  trailing	  fundraising	  as	  a	  signal	  that	  more	  
money	  could	  not	  help,	  while	  less	  savvy	  donors	  reacted	  to	  the	  threat	  of	  his	  loss	  and	  
sent	  more	  money.	  
Information	  about	  the	  size	  of	  donations	  to	  each	  campaign	  had	  no	  effect	  on	  
giving	  to	  candidates	  of	  either	  party.	  While	  candidates	  often	  tout	  their	  small	  
donations	  when	  it	  seems	  to	  suit	  their	  interests,	  this	  information	  did	  not	  influence	  
subjects	  in	  the	  study.	  The	  results	  suggest	  that	  donors	  are	  focused	  on	  electoral	  
outcomes	  and	  do	  not	  respond	  to	  information	  about	  how	  a	  candidate	  raises	  his	  or	  
her	  money.	  Information	  about	  ideological	  endorsements	  also	  had	  no	  effect	  on	  
donation	  decisions.	  Likely	  donors	  may	  already	  have	  enough	  information	  on	  a	  
candidate’s	  ideology	  based	  on	  their	  party	  label.	  However,	  candidates	  also	  frequently	  
advertise	  ideological	  endorsements	  when	  they	  seek	  support.	  The	  null	  findings	  raise	  
doubts	  about	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  ideological	  endorsements	  as	  fundraising	  messages	  
in	  a	  general	  election	  (primary	  elections	  may	  be	  quite	  different).	  
The	  findings	  provide	  a	  nuanced	  interpretation	  of	  how	  political	  donations	  are	  
similar	  to	  and	  different	  from	  charitable	  contributions.	  The	  public	  good	  obtained	  
from	  a	  winning	  campaign	  has	  a	  dichotomous	  quality:	  either	  the	  candidate	  wins	  or	  
loses.	  By	  contrast,	  charitable	  goods	  can	  usually	  be	  provided	  in	  incremental	  amounts	  
depending	  on	  how	  much	  money	  is	  raised.	  The	  results	  indicate	  that	  supportive	  




winning	  campaign	  has	  much	  more	  money	  than	  the	  opposing	  campaign.	  However,	  
theory	  and	  experimental	  evidence	  from	  the	  charitable	  giving	  literature	  show	  that	  
donors	  to	  charity	  are	  inspired	  to	  give	  at	  higher	  rates	  when	  a	  charity	  signals	  that	  it	  
has	  raised	  more	  money	  from	  other	  donors	  (Romano	  and	  Yildirim	  2001;	  List	  and	  
Lucking-­‐Reiley	  2002).	  Political	  donors	  are	  also	  inspired	  to	  give	  when	  their	  
candidate	  is	  behind	  in	  fundraising	  and	  they	  face	  the	  threat	  of	  an	  opposition	  victory.	  
Charitable	  giving	  does	  not	  usually	  share	  this	  oppositional	  framework	  and,	  as	  a	  
result,	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  charitable	  donors	  are	  inspired	  by	  fundraising	  
weakness.	  Individual	  political	  donors	  are	  seeking	  a	  win	  and	  their	  strategic	  
considerations	  may	  be	  quite	  different	  from	  charitable	  donors	  who	  want	  to	  support	  a	  
viable	  charity.	  
	   In	  addition	  to	  insights	  about	  donor	  behavior,	  this	  study	  reveals	  important	  
lessons	  for	  political	  campaigns	  seeking	  to	  raise	  funds.	  As	  I	  show	  above,	  certain	  types	  
of	  information	  can	  have	  large,	  substantive	  effects	  on	  fundraising.	  I	  expect	  that	  the	  
effects	  would	  be	  amplified	  when	  combined	  with	  partisan	  messages	  and	  direct	  
requests	  to	  contribute.	  When	  a	  campaign	  is	  behind	  in	  the	  money	  race,	  it	  may	  be	  
advantageous	  to	  mention	  how	  far	  behind	  it	  is	  (though	  there	  may	  be	  limits	  to	  how	  
much	  weakness	  a	  campaign	  should	  reveal).	  When	  a	  campaign	  is	  ahead	  in	  
fundraising,	  it	  may	  be	  preferable	  to	  avoid	  revealing	  how	  far	  ahead	  the	  campaign	  is	  
and	  simply	  remind	  supporters	  about	  the	  upcoming	  election.	  Finally,	  campaigns	  may	  
find	  little	  benefit	  from	  telling	  their	  potential	  donors	  about	  how	  much	  the	  campaign	  
has	  raised	  from	  large	  or	  small	  donations.	  Though	  other	  types	  of	  supporters	  may	  




	   The	  messages	  in	  this	  study	  were	  nonpartisan	  and	  made	  no	  mention	  of	  
donating.	  Yet	  I	  demonstrate	  that	  basic	  information,	  delivered	  through	  the	  mail	  and	  
without	  the	  gloss	  of	  campaign	  marketing,	  can	  nonetheless	  influence	  donor	  decision-­‐
making.	  Voting	  field	  experiments	  have	  generated	  a	  rich	  literature	  on	  the	  relative	  
effectiveness	  of	  different	  turnout	  strategies	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  shedding	  light	  on	  
the	  complex	  dynamics	  of	  the	  decision	  to	  vote.	  I	  anticipate	  that	  the	  same	  will	  soon	  be	  
true	  of	  the	  decision	  to	  make	  a	  political	  contribution.	  






Table	  1:	  OLS	  Regression	  of	  Donating	  on	  Predicted	  Probability	  of	  Donating	  
within	  Control	  Group	  
	   DV:	  Made	  Post-­‐
treatment	  
Donation	  
Std.	  Error	  	  
(Intercept)	  	   -­‐0.00134	   0.000173	  
Predicted	  Probability	  
of	  Donating	  
0.130*	   0.00424	  
Note:	  Heteroskedasticity-­‐robust	  standard	  errors	  are	  reported.	  
*	  p	  <	  0.05;	  N	  =	  1,157,148	  
	  
	  








Control	  Subjects	   Totals	  
Block	  1:	  0.02-­‐0.03	   3,290	   396,009	   399,299	  
Block	  2:	  0.03-­‐0.04	   3,290	   263,543	   266,833	  
Block	  3:	  0.04-­‐0.05	   3,290	   175,118	   178,408	  
Block	  4:	  0.05-­‐0.06	   3,290	   108,913	   112,203	  
Block	  5:	  0.06-­‐0.07	   3,290	   60,877	   64,167	  
Block	  6:	  0.07-­‐0.08	   3,290	   34,076	   37,366	  
Block	  7:	  0.08-­‐0.09	   3,290	   18,843	   22,133	  
Block	  8:	  0.09-­‐0.11	   3,290	   21,518	   24,808	  
Block	  9:	  0.11-­‐0.15	   3,290	   16,933	   20,223	  
Block	  10:	  0.15+	   3,290	   14,231	   17,521	  
Block	  11:	  
Previous	  Donors	   7,000	   47,087	   54,087	  
	   	   	   	  
Totals	   39,900	   1,157,148	   1,197,048	  
Note:	  Within	  each	  block,	  the	  subjects	  in	  treatment	  were	  divided	  evenly	  into	  the	  
seven	  (7)	  message	  conditions.	  Each	  of	  the	  seven	  conditions	  had	  5700	  subjects	  total	  
across	  blocks.	  





Table	  3:	  Weighted	  Regressions	  of	  Donating	  and	  Amount	  Donated	  to	  
Republican	  Gubernatorial	  Candidate	  (Kasich)	  on	  Treatment	  Assignment	  	  
Treatments	   DV:	  Donating	  to	  Kasich	  (R)	   Std.	  Error	  
p-­‐value	  
(2-­‐tailed)	  
(Control	  Mean)	   0.000421	   0.0000198	   	  
Average	  Donor	   -­‐0.000249	   0.0000884	   0.234	  
Election	  Reminder	   0.000886*	   0.000616	   0.010	  
Endorsements	   -­‐0.000195	   0.000103	   0.333	  
Large	  Donors	   0.000203	   0.000168	   0.302	  
Large	  &	  Small	  
Donors	   -­‐0.000151	   0.000112	   0.449	  
Small	  Donors	   0.0000219	   0.000142	   0.936	  
Total	  Donations	   -­‐0.000104	   0.000121	   0.636	  





Std.	  Error	   p-­‐value	  (2-­‐tailed)	  
(Control	  Mean)	   0.176	   0.0296	   	  
Average	  Donor	   -­‐0.145	   0.0351	   0.428	  
Election	  Reminder	   -­‐0.0681	   0.0652	   0.859	  
Endorsements	   -­‐0.147	   0.0340	   0.383	  
Large	  Donors	   -­‐0.0895	   0.0559	   0.739	  
Large	  &	  Small	  
Donors	   -­‐0.154	   0.0321	   0.354	  
Small	  Donors	   0.0673	   0.228	   0.861	  
Total	  Donations	   0.345	   0.456	   0.079	  
Note:	  Heteroskedasticity-­‐robust	  standard	  errors	  are	  reported.	  
*	  p	  <	  0.05	  using	  a	  two-­‐tailed	  test	  based	  on	  randomization	  inference	  with	  1000	  
simulations;	  N	  =	  1,197,048	  
	  





Table	  3.1:	  Weighted	  Regression	  of	  Donating	  to	  Kasich	  on	  Election	  Reminder	  
Interacted	  with	  Republican	  Registration	  
	   DV:	  Donating	  
to	  Kasich	  (R)	  
Std.	  Error	  	  
(Intercept)	  	   0.0000794	   0.0000129	  
Election	  reminder	   -­‐0.0000794	   0.0000129	  
Republican	  
Registration	  




0.00176	   0.00112	  




Table	  3.2:	  Weighted	  Regression	  of	  Donating	  to	  Kasich	  on	  Election	  Reminder	  
Interacted	  with	  Previous	  Donor	  Status	  
	   DV:	  Donating	  
to	  Kasich	  (R)	  
Std.	  Error	  	  
(Intercept)	  	   0.000143	   0.000056	  
Election	  reminder	   0.000895	   0.000185	  
Previous	  Donor	   0.00614	   0.000262	  
Election	  reminder	  
*	  Previous	  
-­‐0.000181	   0.000039	  
F-­‐test	  p-­‐value	  based	  on	  1000	  simulations:	  0.866	  
	  
	  





Table	  4:	  Weighted	  Regressions	  of	  Donating	  to	  and	  Amount	  Donated	  to	  









(Control	  Mean)	   0.000394	   0.0000192	   	  
Average	  Donor	   -­‐0.000123	   0.000112	   0.505	  
Election	  Reminder	   0.0000765	   0.000229	   0.687	  
Endorsements	   0.0000352	   0.000166	   0.855	  
Large	  Donors	   -­‐0.000305	   0.0000660	   0.133	  
Large	  &	  Small	  Donors	   0.000300	   0.000345	   0.135	  
Small	  Donors	   -­‐0.000100	   0.000147	   0.631	  
Total	  Donations	   0.000563*	   0.000719	   0.037	  









(Control	  Mean)	   0.0168	   0.00158	   	  
Average	  Donor	   -­‐0.00710	   0.00553	   0.496	  
Election	  Reminder	   0.00423	   0.0112	   0.694	  
Endorsements	   0.00821	   0.0185	   0.459	  
Large	  Donors	   -­‐0.0152	   0.00199	   0.106	  
Large	  &	  Small	  Donors	   0.0149	   0.0174	   0.106	  
Small	  Donors	   0.00267	   0.0126	   0.810	  
Total	  Donations	   0.0287*	   0.0359	   0.040	  
Note:	  Heteroskedasticity-­‐robust	  standard	  errors	  are	  reported.	  
*	  p	  <	  0.05	  using	  a	  two-­‐tailed	  test	  based	  on	  randomization	  inference	  with	  1000	  
simulations;	  N	  =	  1,197,048	  




Table	  4.1:	  Weighted	  Regressions	  of	  Donating	  to	  FitzGerald	  on	  Total	  Donations	  
Treatment	  Interacted	  with	  Democratic	  Registration	  








Std.	  Error	  	  
(Intercept)	  	   0.0000404	   0.00000752	   	   0.00124	   0.000292	  
Total	  
Donations	  
-­‐0.0000404	   0.00000752	   	   -­‐0.00124	   0.000292	  
Democratic	  
Registration	  





0.00169	   0.00204	   	   0.0840	   0.102	  
F-­‐test	  p-­‐values	  based	  on	  1000	  simulations:	  0.064	  and	  0.055,	  respectively.	  
	  
Table	  4.2:	  Weighted	  Regressions	  of	  Donating	  to	  FitzGerald	  on	  Total	  Donations	  
Treatment	  Interacted	  with	  Previous	  Donor	  Status	  








Std.	  Error	  	  
(Intercept)	  	   0.000125	   0.000035	   	   0.00429	   0.00214	  
Total	  
Donations	  
0.000688	   0.000049	   	   0.0346	   0.00302	  
Previous	  
Donor	  




-­‐0.00276	   0.000232	   	   -­‐0.131	   0.0142	  
F-­‐test	  p-­‐values	  based	  on	  1000	  simulations:	  0.032	  and	  0.044,	  respectively.	  




Table	  5:	  Weighted	  Regressions	  of	  Donating	  to	  and	  Amount	  Donated	  to	  





Std.	  Error	   p-­‐value	  (2-­‐tailed)	  
(Control	  Mean)	   0.0000578	   0.00000741	   	  
Average	  Donor	   -­‐0.0000578	   0.00000741	   0.400	  
Election	  Reminder	   0.000213*	   0.000111	   0.012	  
Endorsements	   -­‐0.0000127	   0.0000458	   0.997	  
Large	  Donors	   -­‐0.0000127	   0.0000458	   0.995	  
Large	  &	  Small	  
Donors	   0.0000325	   0.0000644	   0.460	  
Small	  Donors	   0.0000777	   0.0000787	   0.060	  
Total	  Donations	   0.0000777	   0.0000787	   0.074	  





Std.	  Error	   p-­‐value	  (2-­‐tailed)	  
(Control	  Mean)	   0.0329	   0.0126	   	  
Average	  Donor	   -­‐0.0329	   0.0126	   0.560	  
Election	  Reminder	   0.215*	   0.227	   0.024	  
Endorsements	   -­‐0.0295	   0.0130	   0.676	  
Large	  Donors	   -­‐0.0306	   0.0128	   0.644	  
Large	  &	  Small	  
Donors	   0.0891	   0.114	   0.088	  
Small	  Donors	   0.130	   0.122	   0.068	  
Total	  Donations	   -­‐0.0259	   0.0133	   0.723	  
Note:	  Heteroskedasticity-­‐robust	  standard	  errors	  are	  reported.	  
*	  p	  <	  0.05	  using	  a	  two-­‐tailed	  test	  based	  on	  randomization	  inference	  with	  1000	  
simulations;	  N	  =	  1,197,048	  
	  





Table	  6:	  Weighted	  Regressions	  of	  Donating	  to	  and	  Amount	  Donated	  to	  





Std.	  Error	   p-­‐value	  (2-­‐tailed)	  
(Control	  Mean)	   0.000485	   0.0000213	   	  
Average	  Donor	   0.000291	   0.000488	   0.173	  
Election	  Reminder	   -­‐0.0000333	   0.000145	   0.894	  
Endorsements	   0.000121	   0.000242	   0.608	  
Large	  Donors	   0.000353	   0.000364	   0.135	  
Large	  &	  Small	  
Donors	   -­‐0.000304	   0.0000929	   0.186	  
Small	  Donors	   -­‐0.0000572	   0.000146	   0.800	  
Total	  Donations	   0.000309	   0.000261	   0.174	  





Std.	  Error	   p-­‐value	  (2-­‐tailed)	  
(Control	  Mean)	   0.0401	   0.00433	   	  
Average	  Donor	   -­‐0.00776	   0.0173	   0.840	  
Election	  Reminder	   -­‐0.0290	   0.00617	   0.252	  
Endorsements	   0.0182	   0.0240	   0.562	  
Large	  Donors	   0.0263	   0.0471	   0.325	  
Large	  &	  Small	  
Donors	   -­‐0.0342	   0.00532	   0.177	  
Small	  Donors	   -­‐0.0161	   0.0136	   0.655	  
Total	  Donations	   0.0078	   0.0190	   0.838	  
Note:	  Heteroskedasticity-­‐robust	  standard	  errors	  are	  reported.	  
*	  p	  <	  0.05	  using	  a	  two-­‐tailed	  test	  based	  on	  randomization	  inference	  with	  1000	  
simulations;	  N	  =	  1,197,048	  




Table	  7:	  Weighted	  Regressions	  of	  Donating	  to	  and	  Amount	  Donated	  to	  Ohio	  




Gov	  &	  SOS	  
Std.	  Error	   p-­‐value	  (2-­‐tailed)	  
(Control	  Mean)	   0.00131	   0.0000349	   	  
Average	  Donor	   -­‐0.0000861	   0.000509	   0.852	  
Election	  Reminder	   0.00111*	   0.000680	   0.020	  
Endorsements	   -­‐0.0000891	   0.000308	   0.829	  
Large	  Donors	   0.000290	   0.000409	   0.533	  
Large	  &	  Small	  
Donors	   -­‐0.0000701	   0.000380	   0.862	  
Small	  Donors	   -­‐0.0000958	   0.000255	   0.836	  
Total	  Donations	   0.000807	   0.000775	   0.057	  




Gov	  &	  SOS	  
Std.	  Error	   p-­‐value	  (2-­‐tailed)	  
(Control	  Mean)	   0.266	   0.0363	   	  
Average	  Donor	   -­‐0.193	   0.0446	   0.310	  
Election	  Reminder	   0.122	   0.237	   0.653	  
Endorsements	   -­‐0.151	   0.0502	   0.520	  
Large	  Donors	   -­‐0.109	   0.0760	   0.695	  
Large	  &	  Small	  
Donors	   -­‐0.0843	   0.121	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1)	  Ideological	  Endorsements	  Treatment:	  
	  
Did	  you	  know?	  
	  
Ohio	  Governor	  Race:	  
	  
Ed	  FitzGerald,	  the	  Democratic	  candidate	  for	  governor,	  has	  been	  endorsed	  by	  the	  
Ohio	  AFL-­‐CIO,	  Planned	  Parenthood	  Advocates	  of	  Ohio,	  and	  the	  Ohio	  Federation	  of	  
Teachers.	  
	  
John	  Kasich,	  the	  Republican	  candidate	  for	  governor,	  has	  been	  endorsed	  by	  the	  Ohio	  
Restaurant	  Association,	  the	  National	  Federation	  of	  Independent	  Business	  (Ohio),	  
and	  Ohio	  Right	  to	  Life.	  
	  
Ohio	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Race:	  
	  
Nina	  Turner,	  the	  Democratic	  candidate	  for	  secretary	  of	  state,	  has	  been	  endorsed	  by	  
the	  Ohio	  AFL-­‐CIO,	  the	  Ohio	  National	  Organization	  for	  Women	  (NOW),	  and	  the	  
United	  Steelworkers	  District	  1.	  
	  
Jon	  Husted,	  the	  Republican	  candidate	  for	  secretary	  of	  state,	  has	  been	  endorsed	  by	  
the	  Ohio	  Restaurant	  Association,	  Ohioans	  for	  Concealed	  Carry,	  and	  Ohio	  Right	  to	  
Life.	  
	  






2)	  Total	  fundraising	  treatment:	  
	  
Did	  you	  know?	  
	  
Ohio	  Governor	  Race:	  
	  
Ed	  FitzGerald,	  the	  Democratic	  candidate	  for	  governor,	  has	  raised	  $4.51	  million	  for	  
his	  campaign	  so	  far.	  
	  
John	  Kasich,	  the	  Republican	  candidate	  for	  governor,	  has	  raised	  $14.88	  million	  for	  
his	  campaign	  so	  far.	  
	  
Ohio	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Race:	  
	  
Nina	  Turner,	  the	  Democratic	  candidate	  for	  secretary	  of	  state,	  has	  raised	  $1.57	  
million	  for	  her	  campaign	  so	  far.	  
	  
Jon	  Husted,	  the	  Republican	  candidate	  for	  secretary	  of	  state,	  has	  raised	  $2.68	  
million	  for	  his	  campaign	  so	  far.	  
	  
Source:	  Compiled	  from	  official	  records	  provided	  by	  the	  Ohio	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  
January	  2013	  -­‐	  August	  2014.	  
	  




3)	  Large	  and	  small	  donors	  treatment:	  
	  
Did	  you	  know?	  
	  
Ohio	  Governor	  Race:	  
	  
Ed	  FitzGerald,	  the	  Democratic	  candidate	  for	  governor,	  has	  raised	  $1.46	  million	  
from	  Ohioans	  giving	  $1000	  or	  more,	  and	  $0.17	  million	  from	  Ohioans	  giving	  $50	  or	  
less.	  
	  
John	  Kasich,	  the	  Republican	  candidate	  for	  governor,	  has	  raised	  $7.81	  million	  from	  
Ohioans	  giving	  $1000	  or	  more,	  and	  $0.27	  million	  from	  Ohioans	  giving	  $50	  or	  less.	  
	  
Ohio	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Race:	  
	  
Nina	  Turner,	  the	  Democratic	  candidate	  for	  secretary	  of	  state,	  has	  raised	  $0.24	  
million	  from	  Ohioans	  giving	  $1000	  or	  more,	  and	  $0.04	  million	  from	  Ohioans	  giving	  
$50	  or	  less.	  
	  
Jon	  Husted,	  the	  Republican	  candidate	  for	  secretary	  of	  state,	  has	  raised	  $1.74	  
million	  from	  Ohioans	  giving	  $1000	  or	  more,	  and	  $0.02	  million	  from	  Ohioans	  giving	  
$50	  or	  less.	  
	  
Source:	  Compiled	  from	  official	  records	  provided	  by	  the	  Ohio	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  
January	  2013	  -­‐	  August	  2014.	  





4)	  Average	  donations	  treatment:	  
	  
Did	  you	  know?	  
	  
Ohio	  Governor	  Race:	  
	  
Ed	  FitzGerald,	  the	  Democratic	  candidate	  for	  governor,	  received	  $234	  from	  the	  
average	  Ohio	  donor	  to	  his	  campaign	  so	  far.	  
	  
John	  Kasich,	  the	  Republican	  candidate	  for	  governor,	  received	  $561	  from	  the	  
average	  Ohio	  donor	  to	  his	  campaign	  so	  far.	  
	  
Ohio	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Race:	  
	  
Nina	  Turner,	  the	  Democratic	  candidate	  for	  secretary	  of	  state,	  received	  $168	  from	  
the	  average	  Ohio	  donor	  to	  her	  campaign	  so	  far.	  
	  
Jon	  Husted,	  the	  Republican	  candidate	  for	  secretary	  of	  state,	  received	  $832	  from	  the	  
average	  Ohio	  donor	  to	  his	  campaign	  so	  far.	  
	  
Source:	  Compiled	  from	  official	  records	  provided	  by	  the	  Ohio	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  
January	  2013	  -­‐	  August	  2014.	  
	  





5)	  Large	  donors	  treatment:	  
	  
Did	  you	  know?	  
	  
Ohio	  Governor	  Race:	  
	  
Ed	  FitzGerald,	  the	  Democratic	  candidate	  for	  governor,	  has	  received	  campaign	  
contributions	  of	  $1,000	  or	  more	  from	  496	  Ohioans	  so	  far.	  
	  
John	  Kasich,	  the	  Republican	  candidate	  for	  governor,	  has	  received	  campaign	  
contributions	  of	  $1,000	  or	  more	  from	  1,608	  Ohioans	  so	  far.	  
	  
Ohio	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Race:	  
	  
Nina	  Turner,	  the	  Democratic	  candidate	  for	  secretary	  of	  state,	  has	  received	  
campaign	  contributions	  of	  $1,000	  or	  more	  from	  103	  Ohioans	  so	  far.	  
	  
Jon	  Husted,	  the	  Republican	  candidate	  for	  secretary	  of	  state,	  has	  received	  campaign	  
contributions	  of	  $1,000	  or	  more	  from	  616	  Ohioans	  so	  far.	  
	  
Source:	  Compiled	  from	  official	  records	  provided	  by	  the	  Ohio	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  
January	  2013	  -­‐	  August	  2014.	  
	  




6)	  Small	  donors	  treatment:	  
	  
Did	  you	  know?	  
	  
Ohio	  Governor	  Race:	  
	  
Ed	  FitzGerald,	  the	  Democratic	  candidate	  for	  governor,	  has	  received	  campaign	  
contributions	  of	  $50	  or	  less	  from	  5,597	  Ohioans	  so	  far.	  
	  
John	  Kasich,	  the	  Republican	  candidate	  for	  governor,	  has	  received	  campaign	  
contributions	  of	  $50	  or	  less	  from	  9,122	  Ohioans	  so	  far.	  
	  
Ohio	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Race:	  
	  
Nina	  Turner,	  the	  Democratic	  candidate	  for	  secretary	  of	  state,	  has	  received	  
campaign	  contributions	  of	  $50	  or	  less	  from	  1,716	  Ohioans	  so	  far.	  
	  
Jon	  Husted,	  the	  Republican	  candidate	  for	  secretary	  of	  state,	  has	  received	  campaign	  
contributions	  of	  $50	  or	  less	  from	  780	  Ohioans	  so	  far.	  
	  
Source:	  Compiled	  from	  official	  records	  provided	  by	  the	  Ohio	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  
January	  2013	  -­‐	  August	  2014.	  
	  





7)	  Election	  reminder	  treatment:	  
	  
Did	  you	  know?	  
	  
There	  is	  an	  election	  coming	  up	  on	  November	  4,	  2014.	  
	  
Ohio	  Governor	  Race:	  
	  
Ed	  FitzGerald	  is	  the	  Democratic	  candidate	  for	  governor.	  
	  
John	  Kasich	  is	  the	  Republican	  candidate	  for	  governor.	  
	  
Ohio	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Race:	  
	  
Nina	  Turner	  is	  the	  Democratic	  candidate	  for	  secretary	  of	  state.	  
	  
Jon	  Husted	  is	  the	  Republican	  candidate	  for	  secretary	  of	  state.	  
	  
Source:	  Compiled	  from	  official	  records	  provided	  by	  the	  Ohio	  Secretary	  of	  State.	  
	  





2)	  Encouraging	  Small	  Donor	  Contributions:	  Evidence	  from	  Field	  Experiments	  
Using	  Nonpartisan	  Messages	  
	  
	  






Advocates	  for	  campaign	  finance	  reform	  contend	  that	  increasing	  the	  number	  
of	  political	  contributors,	  and	  small	  donors	  in	  particular,	  would	  dilute	  the	  influence	  
of	  very	  large	  donors	  and	  make	  the	  donor	  pool	  more	  representative	  of	  the	  electorate.	  
In	  this	  paper,	  we	  use	  experimental	  designs	  to	  explore	  two	  possible	  paths	  to	  
expanding	  the	  number	  of	  small	  donors.	  First,	  we	  examine	  whether	  nonpartisan	  
appeals,	  of	  the	  kind	  that	  nonprofit	  groups	  or	  governments	  could	  use,	  expand	  the	  
donor	  base.	  We	  report	  the	  results	  of	  a	  large	  field	  experiment	  in	  New	  York	  City	  that	  
tested	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  different	  nonpartisan	  fundraising	  appeals	  aimed	  at	  
activating	  distinct,	  potential	  motivations	  for	  giving.	  The	  results	  suggest	  that	  one	  
type	  of	  nonpartisan	  message	  represents	  a	  promising	  fundraising	  appeal:	  
encouraging	  subjects	  to	  contribute	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  elected	  officials	  focused	  on	  
policy	  issues	  of	  importance	  to	  the	  potential	  donor.	  
Second,	  we	  determine	  whether	  informing	  the	  public	  about	  existing	  incentives	  
for	  making	  small	  contributions	  increases	  the	  number	  and	  size	  of	  contributions.	  We	  
report	  the	  results	  of	  two	  field	  experiments	  that	  randomly	  provided	  information	  to	  
likely	  donors	  about	  municipal-­‐	  and	  state-­‐level	  incentives	  for	  making	  political	  
contributions.	  Across	  the	  two	  experiments,	  we	  find	  little	  evidence	  that	  information	  




possibility	  that	  contribution	  incentive	  programs,	  and	  donation	  matching	  programs	  
in	  particular,	  may	  nonetheless	  affect	  campaign	  behavior	  and	  encourage	  campaigns	  
to	  pursue	  more	  small	  donors.	  
	  
Introduction	  
Reformers	  and	  some	  scholars	  argue	  that	  the	  campaign	  finance	  system	  skews	  
public	  policy	  towards	  the	  preferences	  of	  the	  donor	  class	  (Bartels	  2010;	  Gilens	  2012)	  
and	  have	  advocated	  for	  public	  financing	  and	  related	  policies	  to	  incentivize	  political	  
contributions,	  especially	  from	  new	  and	  small	  donors	  (Panagopoulos	  2011;	  Malbin,	  
Brusoe,	  and	  Glavin	  2012;	  Skaggs	  and	  Wertheimer	  2012).	  Individual	  donors	  
constitute	  the	  financial	  backbone	  of	  political	  campaigns	  (Sorauf	  1994)	  but	  comprise	  
a	  small	  and	  unrepresentative	  segment	  of	  the	  electorate.	  Political	  donors	  are	  
wealthier	  and	  more	  ideologically	  extreme	  than	  non-­‐donors	  (Panagopoulos	  and	  
Bergan	  2006;	  Lipsitz	  and	  Panagopoulos	  2011;	  Barber	  2016).	  And	  even	  among	  
contributors,	  a	  small	  share	  of	  donors	  accounts	  for	  a	  disproportionate	  amount	  of	  the	  
money	  in	  campaign	  coffers	  (Malbin	  2013).	  	  
Advocates	  contend	  that	  increasing	  the	  number	  of	  political	  contributors,	  and	  
small	  donors	  in	  particular,	  would	  dilute	  the	  influence	  of	  very	  large	  donors	  and	  make	  
the	  donor	  pool	  more	  representative	  of	  the	  electorate.	  But	  how	  might	  one	  expand	  the	  
relatively	  small	  share	  of	  Americans	  who	  give	  to	  campaigns?	  We	  use	  experimental	  
designs	  to	  explore	  two	  possible	  paths	  to	  expanding	  the	  number	  of	  donors	  and	  the	  
size	  of	  their	  donations.	  First,	  we	  examine	  whether	  nonpartisan	  appeals,	  of	  the	  kind	  




the	  results	  of	  a	  large-­‐scale	  field	  experiment	  in	  New	  York	  City	  that	  tested	  the	  
effectiveness	  of	  different	  nonpartisan	  fundraising	  appeals	  aimed	  at	  activating	  
distinct,	  potential	  motivations	  for	  giving.	  The	  results	  suggest	  that	  one	  type	  of	  
nonpartisan	  message	  represents	  a	  promising	  fundraising	  appeal:	  encouraging	  
subjects	  to	  contribute	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  elected	  officials	  focused	  on	  policy	  issues	  of	  
importance	  to	  the	  potential	  donor.	  
Second,	  we	  determine	  whether	  informing	  the	  public	  about	  existing	  incentives	  
for	  making	  small	  contributions	  increases	  the	  number	  and	  size	  of	  contributions.	  
Public	  incentives	  are	  a	  key	  public	  policy	  intervention	  that	  reformers	  have	  
championed	  in	  order	  to	  expand	  the	  number	  of	  small	  donors	  in	  American	  elections.	  
Although	  the	  effects	  of	  contribution	  incentive	  policies	  have	  been	  the	  object	  of	  cross-­‐
jurisdiction	  and	  over-­‐time	  comparisons,	  to	  date	  the	  causal	  effects	  of	  incentives	  have	  
not	  been	  gauged	  experimentally	  outside	  the	  lab.	  We	  report	  the	  results	  of	  two	  field	  
experiments	  that	  provided	  information	  to	  likely	  donors	  about	  municipal-­‐	  and	  state-­‐
level	  incentives	  for	  making	  political	  contributions.	  Each	  experiment	  was	  embedded	  
in	  a	  larger	  experiment	  that	  randomly	  selected	  likely	  donors	  to	  be	  sent	  mailed	  
messages	  about	  an	  upcoming	  election.	  Among	  those	  mailings	  that	  were	  sent	  in	  the	  
larger	  experiments,	  half	  of	  the	  messages	  included	  additional	  information	  about	  
public	  contribution	  incentives	  while	  the	  other	  half	  contained	  only	  the	  basic	  message.	  
Across	  all	  of	  the	  experiments,	  we	  sent	  nearly	  60,000	  mailings.	  
This	  essay	  is	  structured	  as	  follows.	  We	  begin	  by	  reviewing	  prior	  literature	  on	  
contributor	  motivations	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  incentives	  on	  political	  and	  non-­‐political	  




the	  targeting	  of	  potential	  donors,	  and	  the	  mailings	  that	  were	  sent.	  After	  presenting	  
our	  results,	  we	  conclude	  by	  discussing	  the	  implications	  for	  our	  understanding	  of	  
donor	  motivations	  and	  contribution	  incentive	  policies.	  
	  
Previous	  Literature	  
For	  reformers,	  the	  importance	  of	  attracting	  new	  donors	  is	  especially	  timely	  
in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  decisions	  in	  McCutcheon	  v.	  FEC	  (2014),	  Citizens	  
United	  v.	  FEC	  (2010),	  and	  FEC	  v.	  Wisconsin	  Right	  to	  Life	  (2007),	  which	  have	  steadily	  
removed	  constraints	  on	  the	  amounts	  and	  ways	  in	  which	  donors	  can	  make	  large	  
contributions	  to	  political	  campaigns.	  Given	  the	  restrictions	  that	  the	  Court	  has	  placed	  
on	  campaign	  finance	  regulation,	  policy	  options	  are	  limited.	  One	  approach	  is	  to	  dilute	  
the	  impact	  of	  large	  players	  with	  more	  money	  from	  smaller	  donors.	  The	  reform	  
community	  has	  long	  sought	  to	  encourage	  more	  people	  to	  participate	  financially	  in	  
campaigns.	  The	  matching	  funds	  provision	  for	  presidential	  primaries	  is	  designed	  to	  
encourage	  candidates	  to	  raise	  money	  from	  a	  large	  number	  of	  individuals.	  Several	  
states	  and	  localities	  have	  instituted	  public	  financing	  programs	  that	  encourage	  small,	  
individual	  donations	  (Panagopoulos	  2011).	  
Our	  experiments	  examine	  different	  types	  of	  motivations	  and	  incentives	  to	  
make	  contributions.	  The	  non-­‐partisan	  encouragements	  used	  in	  New	  York	  City	  were	  
designed	  to	  tap	  into	  four	  distinct,	  potential	  motivations	  for	  contributing	  to	  
candidates	  in	  elections.	  Given	  legal	  constraints	  on	  the	  operation	  of	  nonprofit	  
organizations,	  these	  messages	  could	  not	  mention	  specific	  candidates	  or	  parties	  




effect	  of	  the	  encouragement	  alone,	  without	  party	  or	  ideological	  cues.	  The	  first	  
treatment	  (“Voice”),	  reminded	  subjects	  that	  very	  few	  Americans	  contribute	  to	  
political	  candidates	  and	  appealed	  to	  voters	  to	  contribute	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  making	  
their	  voices	  heard	  (“Make	  sure	  candidates	  are	  hearing	  from	  ALL	  Americans.”).	  Our	  
goal	  in	  this	  treatment	  version	  was	  to	  tap	  into	  the	  commonly	  held	  perception	  that	  
politicians	  pay	  greater	  attention	  to	  the	  views	  of	  donors	  than	  non-­‐donors	  (New	  York	  
Times/CBS	  2015).	  Some	  scholarly	  work	  provides	  support	  for	  this	  contention	  (Gilens	  
2012).	  This	  appeal	  references,	  at	  least	  implicitly,	  accessibility	  to	  politicians;	  as	  such,	  
it	  incorporates	  elements	  that	  leverage	  individuals’	  motivations	  to	  be	  “investors”	  
who	  seek	  exchanges	  of	  money	  for	  political	  access	  (Ben-­‐Zion	  and	  Eytan	  1974;	  Welch	  
1974).	  
The	  second	  manipulation	  (“Special	  Interests”)	  concentrated	  on	  concerns	  that	  
special	  interests,	  partly	  via	  their	  financial	  contributions	  to	  candidates,	  exert	  
disproportionate	  influence	  in	  politics.	  The	  message	  noted,	  “Lobbyists	  and	  special	  
interests	  make	  big	  donations	  to	  political	  campaigns	  every	  day.	  But	  regular	  
Americans	  can	  level	  the	  playing	  field	  if	  we	  all	  step	  up	  and	  participate…Make	  sure	  
politicians	  work	  for	  us	  and	  not	  for	  special	  interests.”	  This	  message	  more	  explicitly	  
assumes	  that	  powerful	  interests	  are	  purchasing	  access	  to	  politicians,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  
investment	  model	  of	  economic	  interest	  groups	  (Ben-­‐Zion	  and	  Eytan	  1974;	  Welch	  
1974;	  Stigler	  1971;	  Baron	  1989;	  Grossman	  and	  Helpman	  1996).	  Previous	  literature	  
contains	  few	  predictions	  for	  how	  identifying	  a	  powerful	  entity	  with	  opposing	  
interest	  might	  influence	  political	  participation.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  there	  is	  some	  




Krosnick	  2004).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  is	  growing	  evidence	  that	  rhetoric	  
emphasizing	  an	  individual’s	  lack	  of	  power	  can	  be	  demobilizing	  (Levine	  2015).	  
The	  third	  message	  (“Civic	  Duty”)	  reminded	  subjects	  that	  democracy	  is	  
expensive	  and	  that	  candidates	  require	  resources	  to	  wage	  electoral	  battles.	  It	  also	  
reminded	  recipients	  that	  only	  about	  2	  percent	  of	  Americans	  donate	  to	  political	  
campaigns.	  The	  message	  asked	  voters	  to	  do	  their	  part	  and	  to	  “[c]ontribute	  to	  
democracy	  today.”	  Our	  goal	  with	  this	  treatment	  was	  to	  inspire	  subjects	  to	  perceive	  
contributing	  as	  a	  civic	  duty,	  akin	  to	  voting,	  volunteering	  to	  work	  on	  campaigns,	  or	  
displaying	  a	  yard	  sign	  or	  campaign	  button.	  The	  nature	  of	  this	  message	  would	  likely	  
appeal	  especially	  to	  those	  motivated	  by	  “solidary”	  incentives	  or	  intangible	  rewards	  
from	  the	  act	  of	  association—sociability,	  status,	  identification	  (Clark	  and	  Wilson	  
1961;	  Francia	  et	  al.	  2003;	  Magleby,	  Goodliffe,	  and	  Olsen	  2014).	  Studies	  often	  
describe	  these	  behaviors	  as	  a	  class	  of	  political	  activities	  with	  altruistic	  and	  civic	  
dimensions	  (Verba,	  Scholzman	  and	  Brady	  1995).	  Field	  experiments	  have	  also	  shown	  
that	  simple	  appeals	  to	  civic	  duty	  can	  moderately	  increase	  the	  probability	  of	  voting	  
(Gerber,	  Green,	  and	  Larimer	  2008).	  
A	  final	  message	  appealed	  to	  subjects	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  promoting	  their	  policy	  
preferences	  (“Policy”).	  This	  message	  was	  intended	  to	  resonate	  most	  strongly	  with	  
subjects	  with	  ideological	  motivations,	  who	  seek	  to	  influence	  election	  outcomes	  for	  
their	  favored	  party	  or	  candidate	  (Ben-­‐Zion	  and	  Eytan	  1974;	  Welch	  1974).	  
Contributor	  surveys	  find	  that	  ideological	  and	  policy-­‐oriented	  motives	  dominate	  self-­‐
reported	  reasons	  for	  individual	  giving	  (Francia	  et	  al.	  2003;	  Magleby,	  Goodliffe,	  and	  




message	  because	  it	  emphasizes	  issues	  that	  elections	  influence	  rather	  than	  power	  
imbalances	  between	  individuals	  and	  special	  interest	  groups	  that	  may	  be	  due	  to	  
campaign	  contributions.	  
Our	  contribution	  incentive	  experiments	  investigate	  whether	  donors	  can	  be	  
motivated	  by	  financial	  incentives.	  We	  examine	  two	  types	  of	  public	  contribution	  
incentive	  programs	  in	  two	  jurisdictions:	  contribution	  matching	  in	  New	  York	  City	  
and	  tax	  credits	  in	  Ohio.	  In	  New	  York	  City,	  a	  system	  of	  public	  financing	  using	  
matching	  funds	  has	  been	  in	  place	  since	  1988;	  in	  the	  2013	  election	  cycle,	  individual	  
contributions	  up	  to	  $175	  were	  matched	  six-­‐to-­‐one	  for	  eligible	  municipal	  candidates.	  
Thus,	  an	  eligible	  candidate	  who	  receives	  the	  maximum	  match-­‐eligible	  donation	  
($175)	  from	  an	  individual	  would	  receive	  an	  additional	  $1,050	  from	  the	  city’s	  
program	  for	  his	  or	  her	  campaign.	  Candidates	  who	  participate	  in	  the	  public	  matching	  
program	  must	  comply	  with	  an	  overall	  spending	  cap,	  which	  is	  different	  for	  each	  city	  
office.	  Ohio	  offers	  a	  tax	  credit	  for	  political	  contributions	  to	  state-­‐level	  candidates	  up	  
to	  $50	  ($100	  for	  joint	  filers).	  
Contribution	  incentives	  are	  a	  fairly	  common	  policy	  that	  states	  employ	  to	  
encourage	  and	  increase	  the	  value	  of	  small	  donations.	  Seven	  states	  offer	  some	  form	  
of	  donation	  matching	  for	  statewide	  candidates,	  but	  no	  system	  is	  as	  generous	  as	  New	  
York	  City’s	  6-­‐to-­‐1	  match.	  Donation	  matching	  programs	  are	  voluntary	  and	  typically	  
require	  candidates	  who	  opt	  in	  to	  comply	  with	  campaign	  spending	  limits	  (National	  
Conference	  of	  State	  Legislatures	  2013).	  Seven	  states	  also	  offer	  tax	  credits,	  
deductions,	  or	  refunds	  for	  political	  contributions	  in	  order	  to	  encourage	  individuals	  




Matching	  programs	  and	  tax	  credits	  may	  affect	  donations	  through	  two	  distinct	  
causal	  pathways.	  The	  first	  is	  by	  affecting	  donors’	  benefit-­‐cost	  calculations.	  Matching	  
programs	  increase	  the	  effective	  size	  of	  an	  individual’s	  contribution,	  thereby	  making	  
it	  cheaper	  to	  give	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  money	  to	  a	  campaign	  than	  it	  would	  be	  in	  the	  
absence	  of	  the	  match.	  Tax	  credits	  lower	  the	  cost	  of	  making	  a	  contribution	  by	  
lowering	  contributor	  tax	  bills	  up	  to	  a	  given	  limit,	  typically	  at	  a	  1:1	  ratio.	  A	  donation	  
below	  the	  credit	  limit	  is	  essentially	  free	  if	  the	  donor	  files	  for	  the	  tax	  credit,	  though	  
potential	  donors	  would	  have	  to	  factor	  in	  the	  time	  and	  effort	  involved	  in	  the	  tax	  filing	  
process.	  Since	  both	  types	  of	  incentive	  lower	  the	  cost	  of	  making	  small	  donations,	  the	  
programs	  should	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  small	  contributors	  and,	  possibly,	  the	  
amount	  that	  they	  give	  (Eckel	  and	  Grossman	  2003).	  This	  causal	  pathway	  is	  the	  focus	  
of	  our	  investigation.	  Another	  causal	  pathway	  operates	  through	  the	  incentives	  that	  
campaigns	  face	  when	  soliciting	  donations.	  Matching	  funds	  and	  tax	  credits	  may	  
change	  the	  effort	  that	  campaigns	  expend	  in	  seeking	  out	  small	  donors.	  It	  should	  be	  
stressed	  that	  even	  if	  information	  about	  matching	  funds	  and	  tax	  credits	  has	  no	  effect	  
on	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  potential	  donor	  makes	  a	  contribution,	  these	  incentive	  
systems	  may	  nevertheless	  affect	  the	  number	  of	  small	  donors	  through	  the	  latter	  
causal	  channel.	  
Most	  evaluations	  of	  contribution	  incentive	  programs	  rely	  on	  observational	  
research	  designs.	  Ramsden	  and	  Donnay	  (2001),	  for	  example,	  find	  that	  Minnesota’s	  
political	  contribution	  refund	  program	  increased	  the	  share	  of	  small	  donations	  raised	  
by	  candidates	  in	  competitive	  elections	  by	  comparing	  donations	  before	  and	  after	  the	  




survey	  attributed	  much	  of	  their	  small	  donor	  fundraising	  to	  the	  refund	  program	  
(Campaign	  Finance	  Institute	  2009).	  In	  a	  recent	  report	  on	  New	  York	  City’s	  matching	  
program,	  Malbin,	  Brusoe,	  and	  Glavin	  (2012)	  use	  a	  before-­‐and-­‐after	  approach	  to	  
argue	  that	  the	  program	  has	  increased	  the	  number	  of	  small	  donors	  and	  shifted	  the	  
demographic	  profile	  of	  those	  who	  contribute.	  Genn	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  compare	  the	  
geographic	  diversity	  of	  donors	  to	  New	  York	  City	  council	  races,	  which	  are	  subject	  to	  
the	  matching	  program,	  and	  New	  York	  State	  Assembly	  races	  in	  the	  same	  areas,	  which	  
are	  not	  part	  of	  the	  program.	  The	  authors	  find	  that	  the	  geographic	  distribution	  of	  
small	  donors	  to	  city	  campaigns	  is	  much	  more	  diverse,	  including	  more	  low-­‐income	  
and	  ethnic	  minority	  areas,	  than	  the	  distribution	  of	  small	  donors	  to	  the	  Assembly.	  
Receiving	  mailings	  about	  contribution	  incentive	  programs	  may	  provide	  new	  
information	  to	  recipients	  or	  may	  remind	  knowledgeable	  recipients	  that	  such	  
programs	  exist.	  Boatright	  and	  Malbin	  (2005),	  analyzing	  parallel	  surveys	  of	  Ohio	  
residents	  and	  campaign	  contributors,	  find	  that	  only	  27	  percent	  of	  the	  general	  
population	  in	  Ohio	  express	  awareness	  of	  their	  state’s	  contribution	  tax	  credit	  
compared	  to	  60	  percent	  of	  contributors.	  The	  authors	  conclude	  that	  up	  to	  one	  
quarter	  of	  Ohio	  residents	  would	  have	  been	  more	  likely	  to	  make	  a	  contribution	  had	  
they	  known	  about	  the	  tax	  credit.	  Though	  we	  are	  not	  aware	  of	  comparable	  studies	  for	  
New	  York	  City,	  we	  can	  assume	  that	  most	  people	  who	  received	  our	  mailings	  were	  
probably	  unaware	  of	  the	  contribution	  incentives	  available	  to	  them.4	  Recipients	  who	  
were	  aware	  may	  nonetheless	  be	  spurred	  to	  action	  by	  our	  reminders.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  We	  searched	  extensively	  for	  surveys	  measuring	  public	  awareness	  of	  contribution	  incentive	  




Scholars	  have	  conducted	  few	  experimental	  studies	  related	  to	  campaign	  
finance	  and	  political	  contribution	  behavior.	  In	  the	  main	  precursor	  to	  this	  study,	  
Boatright,	  Green,	  and	  Malbin	  (2006)	  find	  that	  randomly	  informing	  Ohio	  residents	  
about	  the	  state’s	  contribution	  tax	  credit	  leads	  to	  a	  slight	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  
residents	  filing	  for	  the	  credit.	  However,	  their	  study	  does	  not	  evaluate	  whether	  the	  
tax	  credit	  reminder	  had	  any	  effect	  on	  the	  probability	  of	  making	  a	  contribution	  or	  the	  
amount	  given.	  The	  tax	  credit	  message	  may	  simply	  remind	  existing	  contributors	  to	  
file	  for	  the	  credit	  rather	  than	  affecting	  the	  decision	  to	  donate.	  Other	  experiments	  
test	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  different	  appeals	  on	  contribution	  decisions	  (Miller	  and	  
Krosnick	  2004;	  Green	  et	  al.	  2015)	  but	  do	  not	  assess	  the	  effects	  of	  incentives.	  
The	  effects	  of	  incentivizing	  contributions	  have	  been	  subjected	  to	  
experimental	  investigation	  in	  other	  domains—in	  particular,	  charitable	  
contributions—but	  the	  evidence	  is	  mixed.	  Some	  laboratory	  and	  field	  experiments	  
find	  that	  matching	  donations	  increase	  charitable	  contributions	  (Eckel	  and	  Grossman	  
2003,	  2008;	  Meier	  2007),	  at	  least	  in	  the	  short	  run,	  but	  may	  undermine	  contributing	  
over	  the	  long	  term	  (Meier	  2007).	  Other	  scholars	  find	  that	  matching	  funds	  fail	  to	  
influence	  charitable	  contributions	  in	  the	  field	  (Rondeau	  and	  List	  2008).	  Karlan	  and	  
List	  (2007)	  conducted	  a	  field	  experiment	  using	  direct	  mail	  solicitations	  to	  over	  
50,000	  prior	  donors	  of	  a	  non-­‐profit	  organization	  to	  test	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  a	  
matching	  grant	  on	  charitable	  giving.	  The	  authors	  found	  the	  match	  offer	  increased	  
both	  the	  revenue	  per	  solicitation	  and	  the	  participation	  rate,	  but	  that	  larger	  match	  
ratios	  (2:1	  or	  3:1)	  had	  no	  additional	  impact	  over	  smaller	  (1:1)	  match	  ratios.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
found	  nothing. Anecdotal evidence from the people we contacted indicates that most members of the 




	   A	  rich	  literature	  on	  the	  related	  question	  of	  rebate	  mechanisms	  (such	  as	  tax	  
deductions)	  through	  which	  charitable	  contributions	  can	  be	  used	  to	  reduce	  an	  
individual’s	  tax	  burden	  has	  also	  yielded	  inconclusive	  results	  (Clotfelter	  1985;	  
Randolph	  1995;	  Peloza	  and	  Steel	  2005;	  Auten,	  Sieg,	  and	  Clotfelter	  2002).	  However,	  
laboratory	  experiments	  typically	  find	  the	  level	  of	  giving	  to	  others	  increases	  as	  the	  
cost	  of	  doing	  so	  decreases	  (Andreoni	  and	  Miller	  2002).	  The	  results	  of	  our	  
experiment	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  speak	  directly	  to	  this	  literature	  on	  the	  psychology	  
of	  donations,	  extending	  this	  line	  of	  inquiry	  to	  the	  domain	  of	  political	  contributions.	  	  
	  
Identifying	  Likely	  Donors	  
	   The	  process	  of	  identifying	  likely	  donors	  in	  New	  York	  City	  was	  similar	  to	  the	  
process	  used	  in	  Ohio.	  The	  approach	  used	  in	  Ohio	  was	  explained	  in	  the	  previous	  
essay	  and	  so	  is	  not	  described	  again	  here.	  In	  New	  York	  City,	  we	  obtained	  the	  city’s	  
public	  voter	  file,	  which	  included	  information	  on	  voter	  turnout	  history,	  gender,	  party	  
registration,	  and	  age,	  and	  matched	  it	  to	  political	  contribution	  data	  from	  the	  New	  
York	  City	  Campaign	  Finance	  Board.	  The	  city	  requires	  that	  all	  contributions,	  
regardless	  of	  size,	  be	  reported	  by	  campaigns.	  (Ohio	  has	  the	  same	  policy,	  making	  
both	  locations	  ideal	  for	  this	  kind	  of	  investigation.)	  Logistic	  regression	  predicted	  
donations	  to	  city	  campaigns	  during	  the	  2009	  election	  cycle	  or	  the	  2013	  election	  
cycle	  through	  late	  spring	  of	  2013.	  Independent	  variables	  included	  age,	  age-­‐squared,	  
gender,	  party	  registration,	  the	  proportion	  of	  donors	  in	  a	  zip	  code,	  and	  the	  voter’s	  
turnout	  history.	  Regression	  estimates	  were	  then	  used	  to	  generate	  each	  voter’s	  




studies	  of	  contributions,	  we	  find	  that	  the	  distribution	  of	  predicted	  probabilities	  
spikes	  near	  zero	  and	  then	  declines	  gradually	  with	  a	  long	  right	  tail.	  The	  average	  
predicted	  probability	  of	  making	  a	  donation	  was	  1.9	  percent,	  which	  is	  close	  to	  the	  
actual	  proportion	  of	  donors	  in	  our	  dataset.	  	  
The	  predicted	  probabilities	  of	  donating	  then	  served	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  selecting	  
our	  experimental	  subject	  pool	  and	  blocking	  subjects	  according	  to	  their	  propensity	  to	  
donate.	  In	  New	  York	  City	  and	  Ohio,	  we	  restricted	  our	  experimental	  subject	  pool	  to	  
registered	  voters	  who	  had	  an	  above-­‐average	  predicted	  probability	  of	  donating.	  We	  
then	  grouped	  these	  subjects	  into	  blocks	  according	  to	  their	  predicted	  probability	  of	  
donating	  and	  randomly	  allocated	  subjects	  within	  each	  block	  to	  treatment	  and	  
control	  conditions.	  The	  blocking	  procedure	  is	  described	  below	  in	  more	  detail.	  
	   In	  New	  York	  City,	  our	  calculated	  probabilities	  proved	  to	  be	  highly	  predictive	  
of	  post-­‐treatment	  donations.	  Using	  only	  members	  of	  the	  control	  group	  (N	  =	  
976,355),	  who	  were	  unaffected	  by	  our	  treatments,	  a	  regression	  of	  actual	  donating	  
(based	  on	  matched	  post-­‐treatment	  donations)	  on	  predicted	  probability	  of	  
contributing	  reveals	  a	  positive	  and	  statistically	  significant	  relationship	  (see	  Table	  1).	  
The	  regression	  coefficient,	  0.061	  (SE=0.003),	  implies	  that	  moving	  from	  a	  zero	  
predicted	  probability	  to	  a	  100	  percent	  predicted	  probability	  of	  donating	  on	  our	  
measure	  is	  associated	  with	  an	  increase	  of	  6.1	  percentage	  points	  in	  the	  actual	  
probability	  of	  donating.	  Readers	  should	  recall	  that	  we	  used	  many	  more	  donations	  to	  
make	  the	  prediction	  model	  than	  we	  used	  to	  test	  it.	  As	  a	  result,	  we	  would	  expect	  our	  





In	  order	  to	  convey	  a	  sense	  of	  how	  predicted	  probabilities	  and	  actual	  donation	  
rates	  match	  up,	  Table	  2	  presents	  the	  proportion	  of	  post-­‐treatment	  donors	  in	  the	  
control	  group	  by	  each	  predicted	  probability	  group.	  Although	  the	  actual	  proportions	  
of	  donors	  are	  lower	  than	  the	  nominal	  predicted	  probability	  within	  each	  block,	  there	  
is	  nonetheless	  a	  clear	  positive	  trend	  among	  the	  predicted	  probability	  groups	  toward	  
higher	  levels	  of	  donations.	  As	  the	  predicted	  probability	  of	  donating	  increases	  by	  an	  
order	  of	  magnitude	  from	  0.02	  to	  0.2,	  the	  proportion	  of	  donors	  follows	  suit,	  rising	  




	   We	  conducted	  our	  experiments	  during	  the	  November	  2013	  elections	  for	  city	  
offices	  in	  New	  York	  City	  and	  the	  November	  2014	  elections	  for	  state	  offices	  in	  Ohio.	  
In	  New	  York	  City,	  the	  mayoral,	  city	  advocate,	  and	  city	  comptroller	  elections	  were	  all	  
open	  races	  that	  garnered	  significant	  attention,	  although	  the	  high-­‐profile	  mayoral	  
runoff	  election	  was	  not	  expected	  to	  be	  close.	  All	  of	  the	  city	  council	  seats	  were	  also	  up	  
for	  election.	  Including	  elections	  for	  borough	  president,	  a	  total	  of	  347	  candidates	  
contested	  59	  offices.	  In	  Ohio,	  all	  statewide	  offices	  were	  up	  for	  election	  along	  with	  the	  
entire	  Ohio	  House	  of	  Representatives	  and	  half	  of	  the	  Ohio	  Senate.	  Despite	  initial	  






In	  New	  York	  City,	  we	  mailed	  postcards	  encouraging	  randomly	  selected	  
recipients	  to	  make	  contributions	  to	  candidates	  of	  their	  choice.	  The	  postcards	  were	  
mailed	  on	  October	  10,	  2013.	  As	  described	  above,	  we	  tested	  four	  messages	  that	  
emphasized	  (1)	  making	  one’s	  voice	  heard,	  (2)	  leveling	  the	  playing	  field	  with	  special	  
interests,	  (3)	  doing	  one’s	  civic	  duty,	  and	  (4)	  influencing	  public	  policy.	  The	  wordings	  
of	  these	  mailings	  are	  shown	  in	  Figure	  1.	  
Each	  of	  the	  contribution	  incentive	  experiments	  was	  embedded	  in	  a	  larger	  
field	  experiment.	  The	  New	  York	  City	  matching	  funds	  experiment	  was	  embedded	  in	  
the	  larger	  New	  York	  City	  experiment	  described	  here,	  and	  the	  Ohio	  experiment	  was	  
embedded	  in	  the	  experiment	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  essay.	  In	  each	  case,	  half	  of	  
the	  treated	  subjects	  in	  the	  larger	  field	  experiments	  randomly	  were	  mailed	  postcards	  
that	  included	  information	  about	  their	  jurisdiction’s	  contribution	  incentive	  program,	  
and	  half	  did	  not.	  Those	  subjects	  who	  were	  sent	  postcards	  with	  no	  information	  about	  
contribution	  incentives	  serve	  as	  the	  control	  group	  in	  our	  analysis.	  Our	  design	  allows	  
us	  to	  test	  the	  incentives	  reminder	  across	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  different	  mailings.	  As	  a	  
result,	  our	  findings	  are	  not	  contingent	  on	  the	  content	  of	  a	  specific	  mailing	  or	  the	  
behavior	  of	  individuals	  in	  just	  one	  setting.	  	  
We	  crossed	  each	  mailed	  message	  in	  New	  York	  City	  and	  Ohio	  with	  
information	  about	  the	  donation	  incentive	  in	  the	  relevant	  jurisdiction.	  In	  New	  York	  
City,	  we	  added	  the	  following	  language	  to	  half	  of	  the	  postcards	  in	  each	  message	  
treatment	  group:	  	  
“Remember	  that	  NYC’s	  campaign	  finance	  program	  adds	  as	  much	  as	  $6	  






In	  Ohio,	  the	  larger	  experiment	  tested	  seven	  messages	  that	  provided	  subjects	  with	  
information	  about	  fundraising	  and	  endorsements	  for	  the	  major	  party	  candidates	  in	  
the	  gubernatorial	  and	  secretary	  of	  state	  elections.	  We	  crossed	  each	  message	  with	  
information	  about	  Ohio’s	  contribution	  tax	  credit	  using	  the	  following	  language:	  
Ohio	  residents	  can	  claim	  a	  tax	  credit	  of	  up	  to	  $50	  ($100	  for	  married	  
couples)	  for	  political	  contributions	  to	  candidates	  for	  state-­‐level	  
offices,	  such	  as	  governor	  and	  secretary	  of	  state.	  
	  
In	  each	  jurisdiction,	  we	  provided	  information	  about	  a	  public	  contribution	  incentive	  
to	  half	  of	  the	  subjects	  in	  each	  of	  our	  larger	  treatment	  groups.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  
treatment	  group	  subjects	  in	  the	  public	  incentives	  experiments	  differ	  from	  the	  
control	  group	  only	  in	  the	  extra	  language	  on	  their	  postcards.	  	  
	  
Random	  assignment	  procedures	  
	   In	  both	  New	  York	  City	  and	  Ohio,	  the	  larger	  experimental	  groups	  were	  formed	  
using	  block	  random	  assignment.	  Blocks	  were	  based	  on	  ranges	  in	  subjects’	  predicted	  
probability	  of	  making	  a	  contribution	  (tables	  showing	  the	  blocks	  in	  each	  experiment	  
are	  available	  in	  the	  appendix).	  In	  New	  York	  City,	  the	  subject	  pool	  consisted	  of	  
registered	  voters	  whose	  predicted	  probability	  of	  donating	  ranged	  from	  2	  to	  22	  
percent.	  Because	  many	  City	  Council	  seats	  were	  barely	  contested	  or	  uncontested,	  we	  
divided	  these	  subjects	  into	  two	  geographic	  groups:	  those	  who	  lived	  in	  one	  of	  seven	  
“Target”	  districts	  deemed	  competitive	  (council	  districts	  19,	  30,	  32,	  43,	  48,	  50,	  and	  
51),	  and	  those	  who	  lived	  in	  the	  remaining	  “At	  Large”	  districts.	  Within	  each,	  complete	  
random	  assignment	  of	  voters	  into	  treatment	  and	  control	  groups	  was	  performed	  




donating	  (e.g.,	  0.02-­‐0.03).	  Since	  there	  were	  more	  subjects	  at	  lower	  values	  of	  
predicted	  probabilities,	  lower	  probability	  blocks	  were	  larger	  than	  higher	  probability	  
blocks.	  Each	  block	  was	  randomly	  assigned	  the	  same	  number	  of	  subjects	  in	  each	  
treatment	  condition,	  which	  means	  that	  the	  probability	  of	  treatment	  varied	  by	  block.	  
The	  block	  randomization	  procedure	  for	  the	  larger	  field	  experiment	  in	  Ohio	  is	  
described	  in	  the	  previous	  essay,	  but	  was	  similar	  to	  the	  procedure	  used	  in	  New	  York.	  
	   Among	  those	  subjects	  assigned	  to	  receive	  mailers	  in	  the	  larger	  New	  York	  City	  
and	  Ohio	  experiments,	  we	  randomly	  assigned	  half	  to	  be	  sent	  information	  about	  
public	  incentives	  for	  campaign	  contributions.	  In	  New	  York	  City,	  the	  sample	  
consisted	  of	  20,000	  subjects,	  half	  of	  whom	  were	  sent	  the	  public	  incentives	  versions	  
of	  the	  postcards.	  In	  Ohio,	  39,900	  subjects	  were	  sent	  mailings	  with	  19,950	  subjects	  in	  
the	  public	  incentives	  treatment	  condition.	  Across	  the	  two	  sites,	  nearly	  60,000	  
subjects	  were	  sent	  mailings.	  
	  
Outcome	  measures	  and	  statistical	  model	  
	   Outcomes	  were	  measured	  in	  two	  ways.	  In	  each	  location,	  we	  used	  
administrative	  sources	  to	  count	  the	  size	  and	  frequency	  of	  donations	  made	  in	  the	  
post-­‐treatment	  period.	  Using	  the	  same	  matching	  procedure	  as	  in	  our	  donor	  
prediction	  model,	  we	  matched	  post-­‐treatment	  donations	  to	  our	  experimental	  
subjects.	  In	  New	  York	  City,	  we	  focus	  on	  two	  dependent	  variables.	  The	  first	  is	  a	  
binary	  variable	  indicating	  whether	  a	  subject	  made	  a	  donation	  or	  not;	  the	  second	  is	  
the	  amount	  that	  each	  subject	  donated	  to	  any	  candidate	  (in	  the	  relevant	  jurisdiction)	  




mentioned	  the	  gubernatorial	  and	  secretary	  of	  state	  races,	  we	  examine	  (1)	  giving	  to	  
just	  those	  races	  and	  (2)	  giving	  to	  any	  Ohio	  race	  in	  separate	  analyses.	  	  
	   When	  aggregate	  donation	  amount	  is	  the	  dependent	  variable,	  the	  estimand	  is	  
the	  average	  treatment	  effect	  associated	  with	  each	  mailing:	  how	  many	  dollars	  on	  
average	  were	  donated	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  treatment?	  In	  the	  binary	  case,	  we	  are	  
interested	  in	  how	  each	  mailing	  affected	  the	  rate	  of	  donation.	  Both	  quantities	  can	  be	  
estimated	  by	  comparing	  average	  outcomes	  in	  treatment	  and	  control	  groups	  using	  
least	  squares	  regression.	  In	  order	  to	  summarize	  these	  results	  across	  all	  blocks	  while	  
taking	  into	  account	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  probability	  of	  treatment	  assignment	  varied	  by	  
block	  in	  the	  larger	  experiment,	  we	  use	  inverse-­‐probability	  weights	  (Gerber	  and	  
Green	  2012,	  pp.71-­‐77).	  We	  report	  heteroskedasticity-­‐robust	  standard	  errors,	  as	  we	  
expect	  the	  treatment	  to	  change	  the	  disturbance	  variance	  in	  the	  experimental	  groups.	  
Finally,	  we	  calculate	  p-­‐values	  for	  our	  estimates	  based	  on	  randomization	  inference.	  
Since	  we	  know	  the	  actual	  probabilities	  of	  assignment	  to	  each	  treatment	  condition,	  
we	  can	  simulate	  a	  large	  number	  of	  randomly	  generated	  treatment	  assignments	  and	  
obtain	  a	  distribution	  of	  treatment	  effect	  estimates	  from	  these	  assignments	  under	  the	  
sharp	  null	  hypothesis	  of	  no	  treatment	  effect	  (Gerber	  and	  Green	  2012).	  The	  
proportion	  of	  simulated	  estimates	  that	  are	  larger	  in	  absolute	  value	  than	  the	  
observed	  estimate	  provides	  a	  two-­‐tailed	  p-­‐value.	  All	  of	  the	  randomization	  inference	  






We	  first	  describe	  the	  results	  for	  the	  larger	  field	  experiment	  in	  New	  York	  City	  
that	  tested	  nonpartisan	  encouragements	  to	  donate.	  For	  brevity,	  we	  pool	  the	  results	  
for	  the	  Target	  and	  At-­‐Large	  samples	  described	  above.	  The	  first	  part	  of	  Table	  3	  shows	  
the	  results	  from	  a	  regression	  of	  the	  binary	  donating	  variable	  on	  treatment	  
assignment.	  The	  intercept	  represents	  the	  donation	  rate	  in	  the	  control	  group.	  Each	  of	  
the	  independent	  variables	  is	  an	  indicator	  variable,	  scored	  1	  if	  a	  subject	  received	  a	  
postcard	  of	  a	  given	  type	  (with	  or	  without	  matching	  information)	  and	  0	  otherwise.	  
Although	  some	  of	  the	  regression	  estimates	  suggest	  slightly	  negative	  effects	  on	  
donating,	  none	  of	  the	  randomization	  inference-­‐based	  p-­‐values	  approaches	  
significance.	  The	  second	  part	  of	  Table	  3	  reports	  estimates	  from	  a	  regression	  of	  total	  
donation	  amount	  on	  treatment	  assignment.	  The	  only	  postcard	  that	  generated	  a	  
positive	  and	  statistically	  significant	  estimate	  is	  the	  Policy	  message.	  The	  estimate	  of	  
3.67	  implies	  that	  receiving	  this	  postcard	  increases	  average	  donations	  by	  $3.67	  over	  
the	  control	  group.	  This	  increase	  represents	  a	  360	  percent	  increase	  over	  the	  average	  
donation	  of	  $1.01	  in	  the	  control	  group.	  
	   Before	  reporting	  the	  results	  of	  the	  contribution	  incentive	  experiments,	  we	  
first	  employ	  F-­‐tests	  to	  check	  if	  there	  are	  any	  interactions	  between	  our	  incentive	  
information	  treatments	  and	  the	  donor	  message	  treatments	  from	  the	  larger	  studies	  
in	  our	  data	  set.	  A	  pattern	  of	  interaction	  effects	  between	  the	  two	  factors	  would	  call	  
into	  question	  the	  validity	  of	  pooling	  across	  the	  message	  treatment	  groups	  from	  the	  
larger	  studies.	  In	  order	  to	  conduct	  the	  tests,	  we	  first	  regress	  the	  outcome	  variables	  
on	  the	  incentive	  information	  treatment	  variable	  and	  an	  indicator	  variable	  




null	  model,	  to	  which	  an	  alternative	  model	  is	  compared.	  The	  alternative	  specification	  
regresses	  the	  outcome	  on	  those	  same	  variables	  (i.e.,	  variables	  for	  the	  two	  types	  of	  
treatment	  groups)	  plus	  a	  variable	  made	  up	  of	  their	  interaction.	  We	  then	  obtain	  an	  F-­‐
statistic	  and	  an	  associated	  p-­‐value	  from	  a	  comparison	  of	  the	  sum	  of	  squared	  
residuals	  of	  the	  two	  models.	  In	  each	  jurisdiction,	  we	  use	  the	  probability	  of	  donating	  
and	  total	  amount	  donated	  as	  outcome	  variables,	  resulting	  in	  two	  tests	  per	  
jurisdiction	  and	  four	  tests	  in	  total.	  Table	  4	  shows	  the	  p-­‐values	  associated	  with	  our	  
four	  tests.	  The	  results	  of	  our	  tests	  show	  that	  all	  four	  F-­‐statistics	  are	  not	  significant	  at	  
the	  typical	  5	  percent	  level,	  indicating	  that	  a	  meaningful	  interaction	  between	  the	  
treatments	  is	  unlikely.	  
	   Below	  we	  describe	  the	  results	  of	  informing	  subjects	  about	  contribution	  
incentives.	  Table	  5	  displays	  the	  effects	  of	  mailing	  contribution	  incentive	  information	  
on	  the	  probability	  of	  donating	  and	  on	  donation	  amount	  in	  New	  York	  City	  and	  Ohio.	  
Subjects	  who	  were	  sent	  the	  treatments	  had	  a	  slightly	  higher	  probability	  of	  making	  
donations	  than	  subjects	  in	  the	  control	  groups.	  However,	  none	  of	  the	  treatment	  
effects	  is	  statistically	  significant.	  As	  for	  the	  amount	  contributed,	  subjects	  who	  were	  
sent	  information	  about	  contribution	  incentives	  donated	  slightly	  less	  money	  on	  
average	  to	  political	  candidates	  compared	  to	  subjects	  in	  the	  control	  conditions.	  
Again,	  none	  of	  estimated	  effects	  is	  distinguishable	  from	  zero	  at	  standard	  levels	  of	  
significance.	  	  
	   Readers	  will	  recall	  that	  the	  postcards	  we	  sent	  to	  subjects	  in	  Ohio	  provided	  
information	  specifically	  about	  the	  major	  party	  candidates	  in	  the	  state’s	  




about	  these	  candidates	  in	  particular,	  we	  check	  if	  our	  incentive	  information	  
treatment	  has	  an	  effect	  on	  giving	  to	  just	  the	  candidates	  mentioned	  in	  the	  postcards.	  
Table	  6	  shows	  the	  results	  of	  this	  analysis.	  Though	  the	  estimated	  treatment	  effects	  in	  
Table	  6	  are	  both	  positive,	  neither	  coefficient	  approaches	  standard	  levels	  of	  
significance.	  
	   The	  only	  coefficient	  that	  approaches	  significance	  in	  Tables	  5	  and	  6	  is	  the	  
effect	  of	  being	  sent	  the	  Ohio	  tax	  credit	  treatment	  on	  the	  probability	  of	  making	  a	  
donation	  to	  any	  Ohio	  candidate.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  positive	  sign	  on	  the	  probability	  of	  
donating	  to	  any	  candidate	  is	  marginally	  significant	  at	  the	  0.1	  level.	  The	  coefficient	  
implies	  that	  the	  tax	  credit	  information	  message	  increases	  the	  probability	  of	  making	  
a	  donation	  by	  about	  14	  percent.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  weakly	  negative	  estimated	  
effect	  on	  donation	  amount	  implies	  that	  tax	  credit	  reminders	  diminished	  the	  average	  
amount	  donated,	  although	  the	  estimated	  effect	  falls	  well	  short	  of	  statistical	  
significance.	  Given	  that	  an	  increase	  in	  donations	  to	  candidates	  not	  explicitly	  
mentioned	  in	  the	  mailings	  was	  unexpected,	  the	  overall	  pattern	  suggests	  that	  the	  
apparent	  effect	  may	  be	  due	  to	  sampling	  variability.	  
	   In	  order	  to	  leverage	  the	  statistical	  power	  of	  the	  two	  experiments,	  we	  
conducted	  a	  fixed-­‐effects	  meta-­‐analysis	  by	  calculating	  precision-­‐weighted	  averages	  
of	  the	  estimated	  treatment	  effects.	  This	  procedure	  summarizes	  the	  average	  effect	  of	  
providing	  contribution	  incentive	  information	  across	  the	  two	  jurisdictions	  and	  
incentive	  types.	  The	  precision-­‐weighted	  average	  weights	  each	  experimental	  result	  
by	  the	  inverse	  of	  its	  squared	  standard	  error.	  The	  calculation	  effectively	  gives	  more	  




standard	  error	  of	  the	  precision-­‐weighted	  average	  also	  aggregates	  the	  standard	  
errors	  of	  the	  underlying	  estimates,	  resulting	  in	  a	  smaller	  standard	  error	  for	  the	  
pooled	  estimate	  (Gerber	  and	  Green	  2012,	  361-­‐362).	  
	   Table	  7	  shows	  the	  precision-­‐weighted	  averages	  of	  our	  experimental	  
treatment	  effects	  for	  the	  probability	  of	  donating	  and	  total	  donation	  amount.	  The	  
pooled	  estimates	  have	  smaller	  sampling	  variability,	  as	  we	  would	  expect,	  but	  they	  are	  
still	  not	  distinguishable	  from	  zero	  at	  standard	  levels	  of	  significance.	  The	  implied	  95	  
percent	  confidence	  interval	  for	  our	  estimated	  probability	  of	  donating	  indicates	  that	  
the	  true	  value	  is	  likely	  to	  fall	  in	  the	  range	  from	  -­‐0.00036	  to	  0.00276.	  Even	  at	  the	  high	  
end	  of	  the	  range	  of	  probable	  values,	  the	  effect	  of	  sending	  information	  about	  




Our	  larger	  study	  in	  New	  York	  City	  provides	  new	  evidence	  about	  
responsiveness	  to	  nonpartisan	  fundraising	  appeals.	  While	  nonpartisan	  entreaties	  to	  
vote	  based	  on	  civic	  duty	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  increase	  the	  rate	  of	  voting	  (Gerber,	  
Green,	  and	  Larimer	  2008),	  similar	  references	  appear	  to	  have	  no	  effect	  on	  donations.	  
In	  addition,	  calls	  to	  make	  one’s	  voice	  heard	  or	  to	  counterbalance	  special	  interests	  by	  
giving	  money	  –	  both	  staples	  in	  the	  rhetoric	  on	  campaign	  finance	  reform	  –	  also	  
appear	  to	  have	  no	  impact	  on	  donations.	  Only	  reminders	  that	  important	  policy	  
decisions	  hang	  in	  the	  balance	  seem	  to	  generate	  additional	  donations.	  This	  outcome	  




often	  motivated	  by	  policy-­‐based	  and	  ideological	  concerns.	  We	  had	  less	  success	  
growing	  the	  number	  of	  donors	  than	  increasing	  the	  size	  of	  the	  average	  donation.	  This	  
may	  explain	  why	  political	  campaigns	  typically	  focus	  their	  fundraising	  efforts	  
narrowly	  on	  individuals	  who	  have	  previously	  given	  to	  other	  candidates	  or	  
organizations.	  	  
	   Our	  study	  of	  contribution	  incentives	  in	  New	  York	  City	  and	  Ohio	  reveals	  that	  
providing	  nonpartisan	  information	  about	  public	  contribution	  incentives	  has	  little	  
apparent	  effect	  on	  the	  probability	  of	  making	  a	  contribution	  or	  on	  the	  amount	  that	  
contributors	  give.	  Our	  findings	  are	  fairly	  consistent	  across	  two	  jurisdictions	  and	  two	  
different	  kinds	  of	  public	  incentives	  for	  political	  contributions.	  One	  possible	  
exception	  is	  Ohio,	  where	  our	  information	  treatment	  had	  a	  marginally	  significant	  
positive	  impact	  on	  the	  probability	  of	  making	  a	  donation.	  However,	  even	  when	  we	  
calculate	  a	  precision-­‐weighted	  average	  of	  our	  treatment	  effects,	  the	  pooled	  
coefficient	  and	  its	  implied	  confidence	  interval	  indicate	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  sending	  
incentive	  information	  on	  the	  probability	  of	  giving,	  though	  likely	  positive,	  is	  modest	  
at	  best.	  
	   We	  cannot	  be	  sure	  how	  many	  of	  our	  subjects	  read	  the	  postcards	  that	  we	  sent	  
(though	  very	  few	  mailings	  were	  returned,	  indicating	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  
postcards	  reached	  their	  intended	  destination).	  As	  a	  result,	  we	  necessarily	  estimate	  
the	  average	  intent-­‐to-­‐treat	  effect	  (the	  effect	  of	  assignment	  to	  treatment)	  rather	  than	  
the	  average	  effect	  of	  the	  treatment	  among	  those	  who	  were	  treated	  (i.e.,	  read	  the	  
mailer).	  However,	  even	  if	  one	  were	  to	  assume	  that	  our	  mailings	  were	  read	  by,	  for	  




mailer	  would	  be	  the	  intent-­‐to-­‐treat	  effects	  reported	  in	  the	  table	  divided	  by	  one-­‐
fourth	  (or	  multiplied	  by	  four).	  Those	  adjusted	  estimates	  would	  still	  be	  quite	  small.	  
Lest	  readers	  wonder	  whether	  any	  recipients	  read	  the	  mailers,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  
that	  we	  found	  statistically	  and	  substantively	  significant	  effects	  on	  donor	  behavior	  
from	  the	  mailed	  treatments	  in	  the	  larger	  New	  York	  City	  experiment.	  
	   Potential	  donors	  may	  not	  respond	  to	  small	  tax	  credits	  because	  the	  credits	  do	  
not	  outweigh	  the	  perceived	  time	  and	  effort	  costs	  of	  filing	  for	  the	  credit	  in	  the	  distant	  
future.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  larger	  tax	  credits	  would	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  donor	  behavior	  
by	  altering	  this	  cost/benefit	  analysis.	  In	  addition,	  programs	  that	  provide	  a	  quick	  and	  
easy	  rebate	  for	  contributions	  outside	  of	  the	  tax	  system	  may	  lower	  the	  perception	  of	  
time	  and	  effort	  costs.	  Some	  reform	  advocates	  have	  praised	  Minnesota’s	  political	  
contribution	  rebate	  system	  as	  relatively	  easy	  for	  donors	  to	  use	  and	  for	  providing	  
rebates	  quickly	  (Campaign	  Finance	  Institute	  2009).	  However,	  if	  potential	  donors	  
want	  candidates	  to	  receive	  more	  money	  at	  a	  lower	  price	  to	  the	  donor,	  then	  learning	  
about	  New	  York	  City’s	  generous	  6-­‐to-­‐1	  matching	  program	  should	  inspire	  them	  to	  
give.	  The	  fact	  that	  our	  treatment	  does	  not	  work	  in	  New	  York	  City	  raises	  the	  
possibility	  that	  donors	  are	  not	  primarily	  motivated	  by	  the	  “price”	  of	  their	  donation.	  
	   Some	  scholars	  have	  argued	  that	  donations,	  and	  especially	  small	  donations,	  
are	  more	  expressive	  than	  instrumental.	  Ansolabehere,	  de	  Figueiredo,	  and	  Snyder	  
(2003)	  make	  the	  case	  that	  most	  political	  donations	  should	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  type	  of	  
consumption	  good,	  which	  provide	  individuals	  with	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  participating	  
in	  the	  political	  process.	  Since	  this	  satisfaction	  is	  tied	  to	  an	  individual’s	  own	  




be	  unlikely	  to	  change	  individual	  behavior.	  Our	  study	  is	  not	  an	  explicit	  test	  of	  this	  
theory,	  but	  our	  results	  lend	  some	  support	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  many	  donations,	  and	  
small	  donations	  in	  particular,	  are	  expressive	  in	  nature.	  
	   Campaign	  finance	  reformers	  may	  be	  disappointed	  to	  learn	  the	  results	  of	  our	  
study	  of	  contribution	  incentives,	  but	  we	  think	  our	  experiments	  provide	  important	  
lessons	  for	  the	  design	  of	  campaign	  finance	  policies.	  We	  stress	  that	  we	  have	  tested	  
only	  one	  causal	  pathway,	  incentives	  conveyed	  via	  nonpartisan	  information,	  by	  
which	  contribution	  incentive	  policies	  may	  influence	  donations.	  Partisan	  messages	  
highlighting	  contribution	  incentives	  may	  prove	  more	  effective	  at	  changing	  donor	  
behavior.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  our	  findings	  should	  spur	  reformers	  to	  consider	  how	  
campaign	  finance	  policies	  can	  alter	  the	  behaviors	  of	  campaigns.	  While	  donating	  may	  
often	  be	  expressive,	  fundraising	  is	  instrumental.	  New	  York	  City’s	  contribution	  
matching	  program	  explicitly	  incentivizes	  campaigns	  to	  pursue	  small	  donations.	  
“Clean	  elections”	  programs	  in	  states	  like	  Maine,	  Arizona,	  and	  Connecticut	  focus	  on	  
incentivizing	  campaigns	  to	  participate	  in	  public	  financing	  (National	  Conference	  of	  
State	  Legislatures	  2013).	  Our	  findings	  suggest	  that	  future	  research	  about	  the	  effects	  
of	  campaign	  finance	  incentives	  programs	  should	  include	  a	  strong	  focus	  on	  campaign	  
fundraising	  behavior,	  possibly	  by	  experimenting	  with	  matching	  donations	  at	  the	  









Tables	  and	  Figures	  
	  
Table	  1:	  NYC	  Sample	  –	  OLS	  Regression	  of	  Donating	  on	  Predicted	  Probability	  of	  
Donating	  within	  Control	  Group	  
	   DV:	  Made	  
Donation	  	  	  	  	  
Std.	  Error	  	  
(Intercept)	  	   -­‐0.00022*	   0.00011	  
Predicted	  Probability	  
of	  Donating	  
0.061*	   0.0026	  
Note:	  Heteroskedasticity-­‐robust	  standard	  errors	  are	  reported.	  
*	  p	  <	  0.5;	  N	  =	  976,355;	  R-­‐squared:	  0.0015	  
	  
Table	  2:	  NYC	  Sample	  –	  Predicted	  Probabilities	  of	  Donating	  and	  Actual	  






Donors	   Proportion	  
of	  Donors	  
0.02-­‐0.03	   400733	   463	   0.0012	  
0.03-­‐0.04	   195705	  	  	   396	   0.0020	  
0.04-­‐0.05	   112131	  	  	   315	   0.0028	  
0.05-­‐0.06	   71697	  	  	   224	   0.0031	  
0.06-­‐0.07	   48288	  	  	   196	   0.0041	  
0.07-­‐0.08	   32013	  	  	   125	   0.0039	  
0.08-­‐0.09	   24053	  	  	   111	   0.0046	  
0.09-­‐0.10	   18491	  	  	   104	   0.0056	  
0.10-­‐0.11	   14838	  	  	  	   84	   0.0057	  
0.11-­‐0.12	   11811	  	  	  	   80	   0.0068	  
0.12-­‐0.13	   9522	  	  	  	   68	   0.0071	  
0.13-­‐0.14	   7603	  	  	   56	   0.0074	  
0.14-­‐0.15	   6094	  	  	  	   55	   0.0090	  
0.15-­‐0.16	   5138	  	  	  	   57	   0.011	  
0.16-­‐0.17	   4206	  	  	  	   32	   0.0076	  
0.17-­‐0.18	   3294	  	  	  	   32	   0.0097	  
0.18-­‐0.19	   2656	  	  	  	   30	   0.011	  
0.19-­‐0.20	   2289	  	  	  	   31	   0.014	  
0.20-­‐0.21	   1817	  	  	   29	   0.016	  
0.21-­‐0.22	   1471	  	  	  	   17	   0.012	  
N	  =	  976,355	  




Table	  3:	  NYC	  Sample	  –	  Weighted	  Least	  Squares	  Regressions	  of	  Donating	  and	  
Total	  Donation	  Amount	  on	  Message	  Treatment	  Assignment	  with	  
Randomization	  Inference	  p-­‐values	  
Treatments	  	  	  	  	   DV:	  Donating	   Std.	  Error	  	  
P-­‐value	  	  
(2-­‐tailed)	  
(Intercept)	  	   0.0026	  	   0.000052	   	  
NYC:	  Voice	  	   -­‐0.00056	  	   0.0011	   0.7281	  
NYC:	  Special	  
Interest	   -­‐0.0016	   0.00027	   0.2166	  
NYC:	  Civic	  Duty	   -­‐0.00011	   0.0011	   0.9488	  
NYC:	  Policy	   0.00082	   0.0018	   0.5869	  
	   	   	   	  




Std.	  Error	  	   P-­‐value	  	  (2-­‐tailed)	  
(Intercept)	  	   1.01	   0.051	   	  
NYC:	  Voice	  	   -­‐0.87	  	   0.066	   0.1585	  
NYC:	  Special	  
Interest	   -­‐0.89	   0.059	   0.1381	  
NYC:	  Civic	  Duty	   -­‐0.32	  	   0.37	   0.7941	  
NYC:	  Policy	   3.67*	   3.79	   0.0309	  
Note:	  Heteroskedasticity-­‐robust	  standard	  errors	  are	  reported.	  Data	  are	  weighted	  by	  
inverse	  probability	  of	  assignment.	  
*	  p	  <	  0.05	  using	  a	  two-­‐tailed	  test	  based	  on	  randomization	  inference	  with	  10,000	  
simulations;	  N	  =	  996,355	  
	  
	  
Table	  4:	  P-­‐values	  from	  F-­‐Tests	  of	  Information	  Treatment	  by	  Message	  
Treatment	  Interactions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Dependent	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Variable	  
Location	  
DV:	  Donating	   DV:	  Total	  Donation	  
Amount	  
NYC	   0.103	   0.605	  






Table	  5:	  Least	  Squares	  Regressions	  of	  Donating	  and	  Total	  Donation	  Amount	  on	  
Contribution	  Incentive	  Information	  Treatment	  Assignment	  






	   	   	   	  
(NYC:	  Intercept)	  	   0.0048	   0.00069	   	  
NYC:	  Matching	  
Info	  	  
0.00060	   0.0010	   0.5572	  
	   	   	   	  
(OH:	  Intercept)	  	   0.015	   0.00085	   	  
OH:	  Tax	  Credit	  
Info	  	  
0.0020	   0.0013	   0.0977	  
	   	   	   	  







	   	   	   	  
(NYC:	  Intercept)	  	   2.01	   0.72	   	  
NYC:	  Matching	  
Info	  	  
-­‐1.01	   0.76	   0.2017	  
	   	   	   	  
(OH:	  Intercept)	  	   4.50	   0.88	   	  
OH:	  Tax	  Credit	  
Info	  	  
-­‐0.71	   1.08	   0.5162	  
Note:	  Heteroskedasticity-­‐robust	  standard	  errors	  are	  reported.	  We	  report	  p-­‐values	  
from	  a	  two-­‐tailed	  test	  based	  on	  10,000	  simulations	  using	  randomization	  inference.	  	  
N	  =	  20,000	  (NYC);	  39,900	  (OH)	  
	  




Table	  6:	  Least	  Squares	  Regressions	  of	  Donating	  and	  Total	  Amount	  Donated	  to	  
Gubernatorial	  and	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Candidates	  on	  OH	  Tax	  Credit	  Information	  
Treatment	  Assignment	  
Treatments	  	  	  	  	  	   DV:	  Donating	  to	  





(Intercept)	  	   0.00406	   0.000450	   	  
OH:	  Tax	  Credit	  
Info	  	  
0.000551	   0.000658	   0.388	  
	   	   	   	  
Treatments	  	  	  	  	  	   DV:	  Total	  
Amount	  






(Intercept)	  	   0.912	   0.509	   	  
OH:	  Tax	  Credit	  
Info	  	  
0.216	   0.697	   0.782	  
Note:	  Heteroskedasticity-­‐robust	  standard	  errors	  are	  reported.	  We	  report	  p-­‐values	  
from	  a	  two-­‐tailed	  test	  based	  on	  10,000	  simulations	  using	  randomization	  inference.	  	  
N	  =	  39,900	  
	  





Table	  7:	  Precision-­‐Weighted	  Averages	  of	  Incentive	  Information	  Treatment	  
Effects	  
















NYC	   0.00060	   0.0010	   	   	   -­‐1.01	   0.76	   	  
OH	   0.0020	   0.0013	   	   	   -­‐0.71	   1.08	   	  
Pooled	   0.0012	   0.00078	   0.14	   	   -­‐0.91	   0.62	   0.14	  
Pooled	  N	  =	  59,900	  
	  
	  




Figure	  1:	  Treatment	  Mailings	  
	  
Voice	   Only	  2%	  of	  Americans	  donate	  money	  to	  any	  political	  candidate.	  If	  politicians	  only	  listen	  to	  
the	  people	  who	  give	  them	  money,	  there’s	  a	  lot	  they	  aren’t	  hearing!	  
	  	  
Make	  your	  voice	  heard.	  Donate	  to	  your	  favorite	  candidate	  in	  this	  year’s	  elections	  in	  New	  
York	  City.	  Even	  a	  small	  contribution	  will	  send	  a	  message	  to	  the	  candidates.	  
	  	  
Make	  sure	  candidates	  are	  hearing	  from	  ALL	  Americans.	  Donate	  today.	  
	  
To	  donate	  to	  a	  candidate	  of	  your	  choice,	  visit	  www.donatenyc.net.	  
	  
As	  Election	  Day	  approaches,	  a	  contribution	  from	  you	  
is	  more	  important	  than	  ever.	  
Special	  
Interest	  
Lobbyists	  and	  special	  interests	  make	  big	  donations	  to	  political	  campaigns	  every	  day.	  
	  	  
But	  regular	  Americans	  can	  level	  the	  playing	  field	  if	  we	  all	  step	  up	  and	  participate.	  Donate	  
to	  your	  favorite	  candidate	  in	  this	  year’s	  elections	  in	  New	  York	  City.	  Every	  contribution	  
adds	  up.	  	  
	  	  
Make	  sure	  politicians	  work	  for	  us	  and	  not	  for	  special	  interests.	  
	  
To	  donate	  to	  a	  candidate	  of	  your	  choice,	  visit	  www.donatenyc.net.	  
	  
As	  Election	  Day	  approaches,	  a	  contribution	  from	  you	  
is	  more	  important	  than	  ever.	  
Civic	  
Duty	  
Democracy	  costs	  money.	  To	  run	  for	  office,	  candidates	  must	  raise	  money	  from	  contributors.	  
But	  only	  2%	  of	  Americans	  donate	  to	  political	  campaigns.	  
	  	  
Do	  your	  part.	  Donate	  to	  your	  favorite	  candidate	  in	  this	  year’s	  election	  in	  New	  York	  City.	  
Every	  contribution	  counts.	  	  
	  	  
Contribute	  to	  democracy	  today.	  	  
	  
To	  donate	  to	  a	  candidate	  of	  your	  choice,	  visit	  www.donatenyc.net.	  
	  
As	  Election	  Day	  approaches,	  a	  contribution	  from	  you	  
is	  more	  important	  than	  ever.	  
Policy	   Every	  day,	  our	  elected	  officials	  make	  important	  decisions	  about	  all	  kinds	  of	  policies.	  From	  
taxes,	  to	  education,	  to	  safety	  and	  crime,	  their	  decisions	  can	  affect	  us	  all.	  	  
	  	  
Candidates	  in	  New	  York	  City	  need	  your	  help	  to	  fight	  for	  the	  issues	  you	  believe	  in.	  
Campaigns	  are	  expensive,	  and	  every	  contribution	  helps.	  	  
	  	  
Do	  your	  part.	  Donate	  to	  your	  favorite	  candidate	  who	  is	  fighting	  for	  the	  causes	  you	  care	  
about	  in	  this	  year’s	  elections.	  
	  
To	  donate	  to	  a	  candidate	  of	  your	  choice,	  visit	  www.donatenyc.net.	  
	  
As	  Election	  Day	  approaches,	  a	  contribution	  from	  you	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Below	  we	  show	  the	  designs	  for	  the	  larger	  New	  York	  City	  field	  experiment	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  designs	  for	  the	  contribution	  incentive	  information	  experiments	  in	  New	  York	  City	  
and	  Ohio.	  
	  
Table	  A1:	  NYC	  Donor	  Message	  Experiment	  Design	  
	  
Propensity	  Blocks	   Treatment	   Control	   Totals	  
Block	  1	   Block	  Total	  =	  400	   338,881	   339,281	  
Block	  2	   Block	  Total	  =	  400	   166,036	   166,436	  
Block	  3	   Block	  Total	  =	  400	   97,658	   98,058	  
Block	  4	   Block	  Total	  =	  400	   64,194	   64,594	  
Block	  5	   Block	  Total	  =	  400	   44,286	   44,686	  
Block	  6	   Block	  Total	  =	  400	   32,138	   32,538	  
Block	  7	   Block	  Total	  =	  400	   24,164	   24,564	  
Block	  8	   Block	  Total	  =	  400	   18,595	   18,995	  
Block	  9	   Block	  Total	  =	  400	   14,922	   15,322	  
Block	  10	   Block	  Total	  =	  400	   11,891	   12,291	  
Block	  11	   Block	  Total	  =	  400	   9,590	   9,990	  
Block	  12	   Block	  Total	  =	  400	   7,659	   8,059	  
Block	  13	   Block	  Total	  =	  400	   6,149	   6,549	  
Block	  14	   Block	  Total	  =	  400	   5,195	   5,595	  
Block	  15	   Block	  Total	  =	  400	   4,238	   4,638	  
Block	  16	   Block	  Total	  =	  400	   3,326	   3,726	  
Block	  17	   Block	  Total	  =	  400	   2,686	   3,086	  
Block	  18	   Block	  Total	  =	  400	   2,320	   2,720	  
Block	  19	   Block	  Total	  =	  400	   1,846	   2,246	  
Block	  20	   Block	  Total	  =	  400	   1,488	   1,888	  
Block	  21	   Block	  Total	  =	  2,400	   62,315	   64,715	  
Block	  22	   Block	  Total	  =	  2,400	   30,065	   32,465	  
Block	  23	   Block	  Total	  =	  2,400	   14,788	   17,188	  
Block	  24	   Block	  Total	  =	  2,400	   7,727	   10,127	  
Block	  25	   Block	  Total	  =	  2,400	   4,198	   6,598	  
	   	   	   	  
Totals	   20,000	   976,355	   996,355	  
	  




Table	  A2:	  NYC	  Contribution	  Matching	  Information	  Experiment	  
Design	  
Propensity	  Blocks	   Treatment	   Control	  
	  
Totals	  
Block	  1	   200	   200	   400	  
Block	  2	   200	   200	   400	  
Block	  3	   200	   200	   400	  
Block	  4	   200	   200	   400	  
Block	  5	   200	   200	   400	  
Block	  6	   200	   200	   400	  
Block	  7	   200	   200	   400	  
Block	  8	   200	   200	   400	  
Block	  9	   200	   200	   400	  
Block	  10	   200	   200	   400	  
Block	  11	   200	   200	   400	  
Block	  12	   200	   200	   400	  
Block	  13	   200	   200	   400	  
Block	  14	   200	   200	   400	  
Block	  15	   200	   200	   400	  
Block	  16	   200	   200	   400	  
Block	  17	   200	   200	   400	  
Block	  18	   200	   200	   400	  
Block	  19	   200	   200	   400	  
Block	  20	   200	   200	   400	  
Block	  21	   1,200	   1,200	   2,400	  
Block	  22	   1,200	   1,200	   2,400	  
Block	  23	   1,200	   1,200	   2,400	  
Block	  24	   1,200	   1,200	   2,400	  
Block	  25	   1,200	   1,200	   2,400	  
	   	   	   	  
Totals	   10,000	   10,000	   20,000	  
	  




Table	  A3:	  Ohio	  Tax	  Credit	  Information	  Experiment	  Design	  
	  
Propensity	  Blocks	   Treatment	   Control	  
	  
Totals	  
Block	  1	   1645	   1645	   3290	  
Block	  2	   1645	   1645	   3290	  
Block	  3	   1645	   1645	   3290	  
Block	  4	   1645	   1645	   3290	  
Block	  5	   1645	   1645	   3290	  
Block	  6	   1645	   1645	   3290	  
Block	  7	   1645	   1645	   3290	  
Block	  8	   1645	   1645	   3290	  
Block	  9	   1645	   1645	   3290	  
Block	  10	   1645	   1645	   3290	  
Block	  11:	  
Previous	  Donors	   3500	   3500	   7000	  
	   	   	   	  
Totals	   19,950	   19,950	   39,900	  
	  










Television	  advertisements	  are	  a	  major	  tool	  of	  modern	  political	  campaigns	  
and	  one	  of	  their	  most	  costly	  expenditures.	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  examine	  the	  effect	  of	  
presidential	  political	  advertisements	  on	  contributing	  to	  the	  presidential	  campaigns	  
of	  the	  major	  party	  candidates.	  There	  is	  no	  clear	  intentional	  link	  between	  political	  
ads	  and	  campaign	  fundraising.	  Even	  so,	  advertising	  may	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  
activating	  partisan	  sentiment	  and	  mobilization	  during	  the	  campaign.	  I	  examine	  the	  
effect	  of	  aggregate	  political	  advertising	  on	  aggregate	  contributing	  at	  the	  media	  zone	  
level,	  and	  also	  estimate	  the	  effects	  of	  each	  party’s	  advertisements	  separately	  on	  
giving	  to	  the	  party’s	  presidential	  campaign.	  I	  find	  that	  aggregate	  advertisements	  
may	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  aggregate	  giving,	  but	  this	  effect	  is	  substantively	  small	  (much	  
smaller	  than	  previous	  scholars	  have	  found)	  and	  inconsistent	  across	  different	  model	  
specifications.	  In	  addition,	  I	  find	  that	  examining	  aggregate	  amounts	  may	  mask	  
differences	  between	  the	  parties.	  During	  the	  2008	  election,	  Democratic	  presidential	  
advertisements	  had	  a	  small,	  but	  detectable,	  positive	  effect	  on	  giving	  to	  the	  
Democratic	  campaign.	  By	  contrast,	  Republican	  advertisements	  did	  not	  significantly	  
increase	  giving	  to	  the	  Republican	  campaign	  in	  2008.	  





Television	  advertisements	  are	  a	  major	  tool	  of	  modern	  political	  campaigns	  
and	  one	  of	  their	  most	  costly	  expenditures.	  Political	  campaigns	  typically	  run	  
advertisements	  in	  order	  to	  promote	  their	  candidate	  or	  denigrate	  the	  opposing	  
candidate	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  voters	  (Goldstein	  and	  Ridout	  2004).	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  examine	  
the	  effect	  of	  presidential	  political	  advertisements	  on	  contributing	  to	  the	  presidential	  
campaigns	  of	  the	  major	  party	  candidates.	  There	  is	  no	  clear	  intentional	  link	  between	  
political	  television	  advertising	  and	  campaign	  fundraising.	  Television	  advertisements	  
rarely	  ask	  for	  or	  mention	  political	  donations.	  Even	  so,	  advertising	  may	  play	  an	  
important	  role	  in	  reinforcing	  and	  activating	  partisan	  mobilization	  during	  the	  
campaign.	  Advertising	  may	  reinforce	  in-­‐group	  and	  out-­‐group	  feelings	  that	  
encourage	  partisan	  behaviors,	  like	  willingness	  to	  work	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  party's	  
candidate	  or	  give	  money	  to	  the	  campaign.	  Precisely	  because	  political	  advertisements	  
are	  not	  a	  vehicle	  for	  direct	  solicitation,	  they	  provide	  a	  potential	  test	  of	  how	  general	  
partisan	  and	  ideological	  cues	  may	  inspire	  donations.	  	  
Advertisements	  are	  just	  one	  way	  in	  which	  political	  campaigns	  communicate	  
with	  the	  public	  during	  an	  election.	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  measure	  the	  effect	  of	  
exposure	  to	  political	  advertisements	  on	  donations	  while	  controlling	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  a	  
campaign’s	  activities.	  This	  paper	  takes	  advantage	  of	  a	  natural	  quasi-­‐experiment,	  
first	  suggested	  by	  Huber	  and	  Arceneaux	  (2007)	  and	  Krasno	  and	  Green	  (2008),	  
created	  by	  the	  overlapping	  boundaries	  of	  states	  and	  media	  markets	  and	  the	  dictates	  
of	  the	  Electoral	  College.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  these	  overlaps,	  residents	  in	  different	  media	  




political	  advertising.	  As	  I	  explain	  in	  more	  detail	  below,	  this	  variation	  in	  within-­‐state	  
exposure	  provides	  a	  useful	  tool	  for	  examining	  the	  effects	  of	  advertising	  in	  isolation	  
from	  other	  parts	  of	  a	  statewide	  presidential	  campaign.	  
This	  paper	  is	  structured	  as	  follows:	  The	  next	  section	  reviews	  the	  literature	  on	  
the	  role	  of	  political	  advertising	  in	  encouraging	  political	  mobilization	  and	  examines	  
in	  detail	  several	  studies	  that	  find	  a	  link	  between	  political	  advertising	  and	  campaign	  
contributions.	  The	  following	  section	  reviews	  the	  analysis	  of	  one	  major	  study	  on	  the	  
topic	  (Urban	  and	  Niebler	  2014)	  and	  some	  of	  the	  problems	  with	  that	  study	  before	  
explaining	  my	  own	  analytic	  strategy.	  The	  penultimate	  section	  describes	  the	  results	  
of	  my	  analysis	  and	  the	  final	  section	  discusses	  the	  results	  and	  concludes.	  
	  
Previous	  Literature	  
Political	  campaigns	  use	  advertising	  to	  inform	  the	  public	  about	  their	  
candidate,	  to	  define	  the	  opposition,	  and	  possibly	  to	  mobilize	  or	  demobilize	  key	  
groups	  of	  voters	  (Goldstein	  and	  Ridout	  2004).	  Early	  voting	  studies,	  conducted	  
before	  the	  advent	  of	  television	  campaigning,	  found	  that	  campaigns	  tend	  to	  reinforce	  
previous	  partisan	  allegiances	  (Lazarsfeld	  et	  al.	  1948;	  Berelson	  et	  al.	  1954).	  Stable	  
social	  allegiances	  and	  party	  identification	  were	  found	  to	  be	  the	  major	  determinants	  
of	  vote	  choice	  (Campbell	  et	  al.	  1960).	  The	  observation	  that	  campaigns	  reinforce	  
previously	  held	  party	  and	  ideological	  allegiances	  rather	  than	  move	  voters	  across	  
party	  lines	  is	  confirmed	  by	  later	  findings	  that	  elections	  can	  often	  be	  predicted	  fairly	  





Much	  of	  the	  literature	  that	  addresses	  political	  advertising	  focuses	  on	  voting	  
and	  especially	  on	  the	  thesis	  that	  negative	  advertising	  depresses	  voter	  turnout	  
(Ansolabehere	  and	  Iyengar	  1995).	  This	  finding,	  in	  turn,	  has	  generated	  significant	  
criticism	  (Finkel	  and	  Geer	  1998;	  Lau	  et	  al.	  1999;	  Wattenburg	  and	  Brians	  1999).	  
Branching	  off	  from	  this	  literature,	  several	  studies	  have	  found	  a	  positive	  relationship	  
between	  overall	  political	  advertising	  exposure	  and	  voter	  turnout	  (Freedman,	  Franz,	  
and	  Goldstein	  2004;	  Hillygus	  2005).	  However,	  these	  studies	  rely	  on	  self-­‐reported	  
measures	  of	  media	  consumption	  and	  voting	  intent,	  leading	  to	  concerns	  about	  
measurement	  error	  and	  self-­‐reporting	  bias.	  By	  contrast,	  Krasno	  and	  Green	  (2008)	  
use	  measures	  of	  actual	  advertisements	  and	  votes	  cast	  and	  find	  no	  effect	  of	  
advertising	  exposure	  on	  voter	  turnout	  in	  the	  2000	  presidential	  election.	  Ashworth	  
and	  Clinton	  (2006)	  find	  a	  similar	  null	  effect	  for	  the	  2000	  election	  using	  self-­‐reported	  
data.	  Enos	  and	  Fowler	  (2014)	  replicate	  Krasno	  and	  Green’s	  (2008)	  analysis	  with	  
data	  from	  the	  2012	  presidential	  election	  and	  also	  find	  no	  effect	  of	  advertising	  
exposure	  on	  turnout.	  	  
In	  spite	  of	  limited	  support	  for	  the	  influence	  of	  political	  advertising	  on	  
turnout,	  lab	  experiments	  provide	  some	  evidence	  that	  political	  advertisements	  
activate	  partisan	  sentiments	  among	  committed	  party	  loyalists	  when	  advertisements	  
resonate	  with	  their	  pre-­‐existing	  political	  beliefs	  (Ansolabehere	  and	  Iyengar	  1995).	  
Political	  advertisements	  may	  serve	  as	  a	  reminder	  and	  activator	  for	  partisans	  to	  
engage	  in	  political	  action,	  including	  making	  political	  contributions.	  However,	  as	  
Ansolabehere,	  de	  Figueiredo,	  and	  Snyder	  (2003)	  have	  noted,	  the	  literature	  on	  




contributing	  typically	  divide	  donors	  into	  "investors"	  and	  "ideologues"	  (Ben-­‐Zion	  and	  
Eytan	  1974;	  Welch	  1974),	  survey	  research	  indicates	  that	  most	  individual	  donors	  are	  
committed	  partisans	  who	  give	  overwhelmingly	  to	  one	  of	  the	  major	  political	  parties	  
(Francia	  et	  al.	  2003;	  Johnson	  2010;	  Johnson	  2013;	  Barber	  2016).	  Verba,	  Schlozman,	  
and	  Brady	  (1995)	  also	  emphasize	  the	  importance	  of	  political	  engagement	  in	  making	  
contributions.	  Since	  political	  donations	  can	  be	  made	  at	  any	  time	  throughout	  the	  
campaign,	  advertisements	  may	  encourage	  partisans	  in	  the	  short	  term	  to	  make	  a	  
contribution	  even	  if	  their	  effects	  on	  individual	  attitudes	  quickly	  decay	  (Gerber	  et	  al.	  
2011).	  Donating	  money	  is	  also	  unlike	  voting	  in	  that	  it	  is	  not	  geographically	  bounded;	  
citizens	  can	  only	  vote	  in	  districts	  where	  they	  reside,	  but	  they	  can	  contribute	  to	  any	  
political	  race	  in	  the	  country.	  	  
Collins	  (2012),	  building	  on	  social	  identity	  theory	  (Tajfel	  and	  Turner	  1986),	  
suggests	  in	  a	  working	  paper	  that	  political	  advertising	  influences	  party	  loyalists	  by	  
priming	  partisan	  social	  identities	  and	  making	  them	  more	  salient.	  This	  in	  turn	  
triggers	  emotional	  responses	  that	  favor	  the	  partisan	  in-­‐group	  and	  provokes	  
negative	  reactions	  towards	  the	  partisan	  out-­‐group.	  Political	  advertising	  may	  
reinforce	  existing	  partisan	  identities	  and	  mobilize	  strong	  partisans	  toward	  making	  
donations	  by	  priming	  their	  in-­‐group	  loyalties	  and	  their	  concerns	  that	  the	  out-­‐group	  
(i.e.,	  the	  other	  party)	  could	  win	  the	  election.	  Collins	  (2012)	  uses	  a	  time	  series	  cross-­‐
sectional	  analysis	  with	  county	  and	  day	  fixed	  effects	  to	  examine	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  
previous	  seven	  days	  of	  advertisements	  on	  political	  giving.	  The	  author	  finds	  that	  
negative	  advertisements	  from	  the	  2004	  Republican	  and	  Democratic	  presidential	  




advertisements	  had	  mixed	  effects.	  However,	  building	  on	  a	  field	  experiment	  from	  
Gerber	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  in	  a	  second	  working	  paper,	  Collins	  (2011)	  finds	  limited	  
evidence	  that	  television	  advertisements	  increased	  contributions	  to	  a	  Texas	  
gubernatorial	  campaign.	  
In	  the	  main	  published	  work	  on	  the	  topic,	  Urban	  and	  Niebler	  (2014)	  find	  a	  
large	  positive	  relationship	  between	  overall	  political	  advertising	  exposure	  and	  
contributing	  in	  the	  2008	  presidential	  campaign.	  The	  authors	  use	  a	  propensity	  score	  
matching	  approach,	  matching	  zip	  codes	  in	  media	  markets	  that	  are	  exposed	  to	  
advertisements	  above	  a	  certain	  level	  (and	  thus	  "treated")	  to	  similar	  zip	  codes	  in	  
media	  markets	  that	  are	  not	  exposed	  to	  advertisements.	  All	  zip	  code-­‐level	  matching	  
occurs	  within	  non-­‐battleground	  states.	  Urban	  and	  Niebler	  estimate	  that	  aggregate	  
giving	  in	  “treated”	  zip	  codes	  was	  $6,100	  higher,	  on	  average,	  than	  in	  similar	  
“untreated”	  zip	  codes.	  This	  quantity	  represents	  a	  28	  percent	  increase	  over	  mean	  
aggregate	  contributions	  across	  all	  zip	  codes.	  	  
There	  are	  several	  important	  problems	  with	  Urban	  and	  Niebler’s	  empirical	  
approach,	  which	  I	  explain	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  In	  brief,	  however,	  Urban	  and	  
Niebler	  use	  an	  aggregate	  contributions	  outcome	  variable	  that	  is	  not	  normalized	  by	  
population.	  Zip	  codes	  range	  in	  population	  from	  the	  single	  digits	  to	  over	  100,000	  
inhabitants.	  As	  a	  result,	  aggregate	  giving	  from	  heavily	  populated	  zip	  codes	  will	  
always	  be	  higher,	  on	  average,	  than	  giving	  from	  sparsely	  populated	  zip	  codes.	  Even	  
when	  zip	  codes	  are	  matched	  on	  population,	  the	  matching	  estimator	  recovers	  the	  
average	  difference	  between	  the	  matched	  treated	  and	  untreated	  units.	  This	  estimate	  




interest	  is	  aggregate	  giving.	  (The	  authors	  also	  ignore	  the	  effects	  of	  clustering	  on	  
sampling	  variability	  in	  some	  of	  their	  models.)	  As	  I	  show	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  when	  I	  
replicate	  Urban	  and	  Niebler’s	  analysis	  with	  a	  population	  normalized	  aggregate	  
contributions	  variable,	  the	  treatment	  effect	  is	  attenuated	  and	  no	  longer	  significant	  at	  
standard	  levels.	  
Though	  Urban	  and	  Niebler	  (2014)	  find	  a	  large,	  positive	  relationship	  between	  
political	  advertising	  and	  donations,	  their	  paper	  has	  several	  drawbacks	  that	  leave	  
this	  question	  open.	  This	  essay	  seeks	  to	  improve	  on	  previous	  work	  by	  using	  the	  
natural	  experimental	  design	  suggested	  by	  Huber	  and	  Arceneaux	  (2007)	  and	  Krasno	  
and	  Green	  (2008),	  aggregating	  donations	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  media	  market	  (where	  
advertising	  exposure	  is	  assigned)	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  county	  or	  zip	  code,	  using	  
population	  normalized	  donation	  variables,	  and	  taking	  advantage	  of	  month-­‐by-­‐
month	  changes	  in	  advertising	  exposure	  and	  contributions	  in	  order	  to	  better	  




Urban	  and	  Niebler	  (2014)	  use	  the	  zip	  code	  as	  the	  unit	  of	  analysis.	  The	  
authors	  argue	  that	  this	  choice	  is	  warranted	  because	  zip	  codes	  are	  the	  smallest	  
geographic	  unit	  at	  which	  contributions	  can	  be	  measured	  based	  on	  the	  information	  
available	  in	  Federal	  Election	  Commission	  (FEC)	  records.	  The	  authors	  also	  use	  
demographic	  data	  from	  the	  US	  Census	  to	  match	  zip	  codes	  in	  media	  markets	  that	  are	  




"treated")	  to	  similar	  zip	  codes	  in	  media	  markets	  in	  the	  same	  state	  that	  receive	  no	  
advertisements.5	  Using	  propensity	  score	  matching,	  Urban	  and	  Niebler	  estimate	  that	  
aggregate	  giving	  in	  “treated”	  zip	  codes	  was	  $6,100	  higher	  than	  in	  matched	  
“untreated”	  zip	  codes,	  or	  28	  percent	  of	  mean	  aggregate	  contributions	  by	  zip	  code.	  
There	  are	  different	  possible	  critiques	  of	  this	  approach,	  but	  the	  most	  serious	  
is	  the	  authors’	  choice	  of	  outcome	  variable	  given	  their	  unit	  of	  analysis.	  The	  
population	  of	  zip	  codes	  in	  Urban	  and	  Niebler’s	  sample	  ranges	  from	  less	  than	  ten	  to	  
over	  100,000,	  with	  a	  mean	  of	  approximately	  9,000	  people.	  Likewise,	  total	  
contributions	  by	  zip	  code	  ranges	  from	  $0	  to	  $3.75	  million,	  with	  a	  median	  of	  $750	  
and	  a	  mean	  of	  $22,000.	  By	  using	  aggregate	  contributions	  at	  the	  zip	  code	  level	  as	  
their	  outcome	  variable,	  Urban	  and	  Niebler	  are	  estimating	  the	  average	  effect	  of	  
advertising	  exposure	  on	  anywhere	  from	  seven	  to	  over	  100,000	  people.	  Though	  any	  
given	  individual	  is	  assumed	  to	  have	  a	  similar	  likelihood	  of	  being	  exposed	  to	  an	  
advertisement,	  there	  is	  no	  control	  for	  the	  very	  different	  numbers	  of	  people	  in	  each	  
unit.	  Matching	  ensures	  that	  similar	  units	  (conditional	  on	  covariates)	  are	  compared,	  
but	  does	  not	  address	  the	  extreme	  skewness	  of	  the	  outcome	  variable.	  Urban	  and	  
Niebler’s	  large	  effects	  are	  driven	  by	  the	  largest	  and	  wealthiest	  zip	  codes.	  	  
One	  solution	  to	  this	  issue	  is	  to	  divide	  aggregate	  contributions	  at	  the	  zip	  code	  
level	  by	  the	  zip	  code’s	  population.	  This	  ensures	  that,	  even	  once	  zip	  codes	  are	  
matched,	  the	  quantity	  estimated	  across	  zip	  codes	  is	  the	  average	  effect	  of	  advertising	  
exposure	  on	  a	  set	  number	  of	  people.	  I	  replicate	  the	  authors’	  main	  analysis	  using	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Urban	  and	  Niebler	  use	  the	  following	  variables	  by	  zip	  code	  to	  estimate	  propensity	  scores	  for	  
matching:	  median	  household	  income,	  percent	  Hispanic,	  percent	  African	  American,	  percent	  college	  




Urban	  and	  Niebler’s	  (2014)	  code	  and	  data,	  available	  from	  the	  American	  Journal	  of	  
Political	  Science’s	  replication	  archive	  on	  Dataverse	  
(http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/22127).	  I	  use	  their	  aggregate	  contributions	  variable	  
and	  a	  second	  variable	  that	  divides	  aggregate	  contributions	  by	  thousands	  of	  
individuals	  in	  each	  zip	  code.	  The	  results	  of	  this	  analysis	  are	  shown	  in	  Table	  1.	  Using	  
only	  aggregate	  contributions	  as	  the	  outcome	  variable,	  being	  “treated”	  with	  
advertisements	  increases	  giving	  from	  a	  zip	  code	  by	  an	  average	  of	  $7,320	  and	  the	  
coefficient	  is	  highly	  significant	  (SE	  =	  1,830).	  When	  the	  outcome	  variable	  is	  
normalized	  by	  1000s	  of	  residents	  in	  a	  zip	  code,	  the	  average	  increase	  due	  to	  
treatment	  is	  $1540	  per	  thousand	  residents	  and	  is	  no	  longer	  significant	  at	  the	  0.05	  
level	  (though	  it	  is	  nominally	  significant	  at	  the	  0.1	  level;	  SE	  =	  878).	  In	  both	  cases,	  
however,	  the	  standard	  errors	  used	  to	  calculate	  the	  significance	  levels	  in	  the	  
available	  code	  ignore	  the	  clustering	  of	  zip	  codes	  within	  media	  zones.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  
estimated	  standard	  errors	  are	  almost	  certainly	  overconfident.	  
The	  difference	  in	  effects	  is	  even	  more	  pronounced	  in	  a	  later	  analysis	  where	  
the	  authors	  examine	  changes	  in	  advertising	  exposure	  and	  giving	  by	  month	  during	  
the	  general	  election.	  This	  analysis	  uses	  regression	  with	  zip	  code	  and	  month	  fixed	  
effects;	  standard	  errors	  are	  now	  clustered	  (as	  they	  should	  be)	  at	  the	  media	  zone	  
level.	  When	  the	  non-­‐normalized	  outcome	  variable	  is	  used,	  a	  doubling	  in	  the	  number	  
of	  advertisements	  (the	  number	  of	  advertisements	  is	  logged)	  is	  associated	  with	  an	  
additional	  $101	  of	  giving	  and	  the	  effect	  is	  significant	  at	  the	  0.1	  level.	  However,	  when	  
aggregate	  giving	  per	  1000	  residents	  is	  used	  as	  the	  outcome	  variable,	  the	  effect	  of	  




people	  and	  the	  effect	  is	  not	  significant	  (SE	  =	  17.10).	  These	  results	  are	  shown	  in	  
Table	  2.	  
Urban	  and	  Niebler	  use	  an	  outcome	  variable	  that	  does	  not	  account	  for	  varying	  
amounts	  of	  population	  by	  zip	  code	  and,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  their	  matching	  analysis,	  they	  
rely	  on	  overconfident	  standard	  errors	  that	  do	  not	  take	  into	  account	  the	  effect	  of	  
clustering.	  Advertising	  is	  assigned	  at	  the	  media	  market	  level	  and	  not	  the	  zip	  code	  
level.	  This	  means	  that	  knowing	  the	  average	  effect	  on	  aggregate	  contributions	  by	  zip	  
code	  tells	  us	  little	  about	  how	  assigning	  advertisements	  differently	  would	  change	  
contribution	  patterns.	  In	  the	  approach	  I	  use	  below,	  I	  examine	  the	  effects	  of	  
advertisements	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  media	  market,	  where	  exposure	  to	  advertisements	  
is	  assigned.	  As	  the	  reader	  will	  see,	  using	  the	  same	  data	  I	  find	  much	  smaller	  effects	  
than	  I	  find	  above	  when	  I	  estimate	  effects	  at	  the	  zip	  code	  level.	  
	  
Data	  
The	  unit	  of	  observation	  for	  my	  analysis	  is	  the	  within-­‐state	  media	  market,	  or	  
what	  Krasno	  and	  Green	  (2008)	  call	  "media	  zones"	  (I	  use	  the	  terms	  interchangeably).	  
The	  media	  zone	  is	  the	  portion	  of	  a	  television	  media	  market	  that	  is	  wholly	  contained	  
in	  one	  state.	  Media	  markets,	  or	  Designated	  Market	  Areas	  (DMAs),	  are	  geographic	  
areas	  established	  by	  The	  Nielsen	  Company	  in	  which	  the	  home	  market	  television	  
stations	  dominate	  total	  hours	  viewed.	  There	  are	  210	  DMA	  regions,	  covering	  the	  
entire	  continental	  United	  States,	  Hawaii,	  and	  parts	  of	  Alaska	  (Nielsen	  Company	  
2013).	  DMAs	  typically	  expand	  outward	  from	  an	  urban	  center	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  their	  




the	  geography	  of	  the	  DMA	  centered	  in	  Philadelphia,	  Pennsylvania.	  This	  media	  
market	  includes	  southeastern	  Pennsylvania,	  southern	  New	  Jersey,	  and	  Delaware.	  
Each	  portion	  of	  the	  Philadelphia	  DMA	  that	  is	  contained	  in	  one	  state,	  of	  which	  there	  
are	  three,	  is	  a	  media	  zone	  or	  within-­‐state	  media	  market.	  I	  use	  this	  level	  of	  
observation	  because	  advertisements	  are	  broadcast	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  media	  market	  
and	  not	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  zip	  code	  (or	  county).	  
Political	  advertising	  data	  come	  from	  the	  Wisconsin	  Advertising	  Project	  
(WAP)	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Wisconsin	  (the	  data	  and	  ongoing	  project	  have	  since	  
moved	  to	  Wesleyan	  University).	  WAP	  receives	  political	  advertising	  data	  from	  CMAG,	  
a	  commercial	  vendor,	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  individual	  advertisement	  airing	  in	  a	  media	  
market	  during	  a	  presidential	  election	  cycle.	  WAP	  categorizes	  each	  advertisement	  by	  
the	  party	  and	  candidate	  it	  favors	  and	  on	  a	  number	  of	  content	  variables.	  During	  the	  
2008	  election	  cycle,	  WAP	  catalogued	  over	  1.13	  million	  television	  advertisements	  in	  
the	  presidential	  race	  and	  over	  1.33	  million	  advertisements	  in	  other	  political	  races.	  
In	  the	  analyses	  I	  describe	  below,	  I	  use	  2008	  advertisements	  sponsored	  by	  the	  major	  
party	  candidates	  (Barack	  Obama	  and	  John	  McCain)	  or	  the	  major	  political	  parties	  
that	  aired	  during	  the	  period	  from	  June	  –	  October,	  2008.	  This	  captures	  the	  general	  
election	  period	  and,	  in	  particular,	  the	  period	  after	  Barack	  Obama	  effectively	  secured	  
the	  Democratic	  presidential	  nomination	  after	  an	  extended	  primary	  contest	  with	  
Hillary	  Clinton	  (John	  McCain	  effectively	  became	  the	  Republican	  nominee	  in	  March	  
2008).	  A	  small	  number	  of	  advertisements	  for	  Hillary	  Clinton	  and	  third	  party	  
presidential	  candidates	  that	  aired	  during	  this	  period	  are	  excluded	  from	  the	  data	  set.	  




their	  parties	  in	  support	  of	  the	  candidates	  in	  the	  general	  election	  period.6	  WAP	  
estimates	  the	  cost	  of	  running	  these	  advertisements	  to	  be	  approximately	  $320	  
million.	  I	  also	  include	  all	  other	  political	  advertisements	  from	  the	  WAP	  data	  set	  as	  a	  
separate	  control	  variable	  in	  the	  analysis.	  These	  include	  advertisements	  for	  US	  
House,	  Senate,	  gubernatorial,	  and	  other	  candidates	  who	  were	  not	  running	  for	  
president.	  
Individual	  political	  contributions	  data	  come	  from	  the	  Federal	  Election	  
Commission	  (FEC).	  The	  FEC	  only	  requires	  campaigns	  to	  report	  donations	  larger	  
than	  $200,	  so	  the	  donations	  data	  is	  truncated	  at	  that	  amount.	  This	  is	  an	  unfortunate	  
limitation	  of	  the	  data,	  since	  I	  expect	  that	  small	  donations	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  
influenced	  by	  partisan	  communications	  than	  large	  donations,	  which	  are	  more	  likely	  
to	  be	  solicited	  directly	  by	  the	  campaign.	  If	  this	  is	  true,	  the	  effects	  that	  I	  find	  may	  be	  
considered	  a	  lower	  bound	  estimate	  on	  the	  true	  effects	  of	  partisan	  advertisements	  on	  
political	  contributions.	  The	  data	  set	  includes	  individual	  contributions	  to	  the	  
presidential	  candidate	  committees	  and	  the	  national	  party	  committees	  from	  the	  
same	  period	  as	  the	  advertising	  data:	  June	  –	  October,	  2008.	  Following	  Urban	  and	  
Niebler	  (2014),	  national	  party	  committee	  donations	  are	  included	  because	  
candidates	  cannot	  spend	  individual	  donations	  after	  their	  party’s	  convention	  if	  they	  
accept	  federal	  public	  funds	  for	  their	  campaign.	  However,	  individuals	  can	  still	  give	  to	  
the	  political	  parties,	  which	  can	  spend	  money	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  presidential	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  The	  main	  analysis	  in	  this	  paper	  does	  not	  include	  presidential	  advertisements	  sponsored	  by	  
independent	  groups.	  However,	  I	  run	  separate	  analyses	  where	  independent	  expenditure	  
advertisements	  are	  included	  in	  the	  totals.	  These	  analyses	  appear	  in	  the	  appendix	  to	  this	  paper.	  
Independent	  expenditure	  advertisements	  make	  up	  only	  5	  percent	  of	  all	  presidential	  advertisements,	  




candidates.	  This	  situation	  only	  applied	  to	  John	  McCain,	  since	  Barack	  Obama	  did	  not	  
accept	  public	  funds	  for	  his	  campaign	  in	  2008.	  In	  order	  to	  preserve	  balance,	  however,	  
I	  include	  giving	  to	  both	  national	  party	  committees.	  (As	  it	  turns	  out,	  rerunning	  the	  
analyses	  using	  only	  contributions	  to	  the	  presidential	  candidate	  committees	  has	  little	  
substantive	  effect	  on	  the	  results.)	  
The	  data	  set	  also	  includes	  a	  variable	  for	  individual	  donations	  to	  US	  House	  
candidate	  committees	  during	  the	  same	  months	  (June	  –	  October)	  in	  2006.	  These	  
donations	  serve	  as	  a	  control	  variable	  for	  the	  variation	  in	  a	  geographic	  area’s	  general	  
propensity	  to	  donate.	  I	  choose	  off-­‐year	  elections	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  any	  interference	  
from	  events	  that	  occurred	  during	  the	  presidential	  election	  cycle.	  I	  also	  choose	  to	  use	  
donations	  to	  US	  House	  candidates	  since	  every	  House	  seat	  is	  up	  for	  election	  in	  every	  
cycle,	  while	  Senate	  elections	  are	  staggered	  and	  therefore	  could	  cause	  contribution	  
spikes	  in	  certain	  areas	  relative	  to	  others.	  
	  In	  order	  to	  map	  donations	  to	  media	  zones,	  I	  merge	  a	  geographic	  shape	  file	  
from	  the	  Nielsen	  Company	  with	  US	  Census	  shape	  files	  of	  state	  boundaries	  and	  zip	  
code	  tabulation	  areas	  (ZCTAs).	  ZCTAs	  are	  generalized	  area	  representations	  of	  
United	  States	  Postal	  Service	  (USPS)	  zip	  codes.	  Zip	  codes	  that	  cross	  DMA	  lines,	  of	  
which	  there	  are	  relatively	  few,	  are	  dropped.	  I	  assign	  donations	  to	  media	  zones	  based	  
on	  the	  zip	  code	  of	  the	  donor	  and	  aggregate	  by	  recipient	  (Democrat	  or	  Republican)	  
within	  each	  media	  zone.	  I	  then	  merge	  this	  file	  with	  the	  advertising	  data	  by	  media	  
market.	  The	  final	  data	  set	  contains	  observations	  of	  donations	  and	  advertising	  for	  




within-­‐state	  media	  market.	  It	  also	  includes,	  from	  the	  US	  Census,	  a	  variable	  for	  the	  
adult	  population	  of	  the	  media	  zone	  in	  order	  to	  normalize	  the	  donation	  variables.	  
	  
Empirical	  Strategy	  
Identifying	  the	  effect	  of	  political	  advertising	  on	  donating	  requires	  isolating	  
the	  impact	  of	  advertising	  from	  the	  effects	  of	  other	  campaign	  activities.	  Many	  of	  these	  
other	  campaign	  activities,	  like	  canvassing,	  mail,	  and	  other	  persuasion	  efforts,	  are	  
unobserved	  or	  very	  difficult	  to	  measure	  systematically	  (though	  see	  Enos	  and	  Fowler	  
2014).	  Unlike	  television	  advertising,	  other	  campaign	  activities	  in	  the	  presidential	  
election	  can	  be	  targeted	  to	  critical	  states	  that	  will	  decide	  the	  winner	  of	  the	  Electoral	  
College	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  state.	  By	  contrast,	  because	  of	  the	  mismatch	  between	  media	  
market	  and	  state	  boundaries,	  there	  is	  wide	  variation	  in	  political	  advertising	  
exposure	  within	  states.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  in	  both	  competitive	  and	  safe	  states.	  As	  a	  
result,	  by	  focusing	  on	  within-­‐state	  variation	  in	  advertising	  exposure	  using	  state	  
fixed	  effects,	  one	  can	  control	  for	  varying	  levels	  of	  campaign	  activity	  generated	  by	  the	  
competitiveness	  of	  different	  states	  as	  presidential	  candidates	  seek	  to	  win	  a	  majority	  
in	  the	  Electoral	  College	  (Krasno	  and	  Green	  2008).	  The	  state-­‐level	  fixed	  effects	  
approach	  generates	  what	  Krasno	  and	  Green	  (2008,	  246)	  describe	  as	  “a	  collection	  of	  
state-­‐level	  natural	  experiments."	  
Following	  this	  approach,	  I	  use	  a	  fixed	  effect	  for	  each	  state	  to	  capture	  
unobserved	  heterogeneity	  in	  state-­‐level	  characteristics	  that	  are	  correlated	  with	  my	  
outcome	  of	  interest.	  I	  drop	  states	  from	  the	  data	  set	  where	  there	  are	  fewer	  than	  two	  




within-­‐state	  media	  markets	  varies	  widely,	  aggregate	  contributions	  are	  divided	  by	  
thousands	  of	  adults	  in	  a	  media	  zone.	  
There	  may	  be	  features	  of	  different	  media	  zones	  within	  states	  that	  make	  them	  
donate	  more	  or	  less	  in	  aggregate	  to	  presidential	  candidates.	  I	  address	  this	  media	  
zone-­‐level	  heterogeneity	  in	  two	  ways.	  In	  the	  analysis	  that	  pools	  advertisements	  and	  
contributions	  by	  media	  zone	  across	  the	  general	  election	  period,	  I	  add	  covariates	  that	  
are	  likely	  predictors	  of	  aggregate	  giving.	  This	  includes	  aggregate	  giving	  to	  off-­‐cycle	  
US	  House	  candidates	  and	  aggregate	  advertisements	  for	  other	  political	  candidates.	  I	  
also	  conduct	  a	  second	  analysis	  that	  examines	  month-­‐by-­‐month	  changes	  in	  
advertising	  exposure	  and	  contributing.	  By	  using	  a	  two-­‐way	  fixed	  effect	  design	  for	  
media	  zone	  and	  month,	  this	  allows	  me	  to	  hold	  constant	  the	  time	  invariant	  features	  
of	  the	  media	  zone	  and	  examine	  how	  different	  levels	  of	  advertising	  influence	  
contributing	  over	  time.7	  
The	  analyses	  I	  describe	  below	  proceed	  as	  follows.	  The	  first	  set	  of	  analyses	  
aggregate	  presidential	  advertisements	  and	  presidential	  giving	  across	  the	  parties,	  
following	  the	  approach	  used	  by	  Urban	  and	  Niebler	  (2014).	  This	  approach	  measures	  
how	  aggregate	  exposure	  to	  advertisements,	  regardless	  of	  their	  partisan	  source,	  
influences	  aggregate	  giving	  to	  the	  presidential	  campaigns.	  The	  second	  set	  of	  
analyses,	  which	  I	  favor,	  divide	  the	  analysis	  by	  the	  partisan	  source	  of	  the	  
advertisements	  and	  which	  party’s	  campaign	  receives	  the	  contribution.	  Since	  most	  
scholars	  argue	  that	  ideological	  motivations	  drive	  contributing	  behavior	  (Francia	  et	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Months	  are	  a	  reasonable	  period	  to	  use	  as	  a	  unit	  because	  the	  ends	  of	  each	  month	  right	  before	  the	  
election	  are	  campaign	  finance	  reporting	  deadlines.	  Campaigns	  push	  to	  get	  in	  contributions	  by	  the	  
deadline	  in	  order	  to	  have	  a	  strong	  report.	  The	  graphs	  in	  the	  appendix	  to	  this	  chapter	  show	  that	  




al.	  2003;	  Barber	  2016),	  I	  anticipate	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  advertisements	  on	  contributing	  
should	  occur	  when	  partisans	  of	  a	  given	  candidate	  see	  advertisements	  that	  favor	  
their	  candidate.	  In	  both	  sets	  of	  analyses,	  I	  first	  pool	  the	  data	  across	  the	  entire	  




The	  first	  set	  of	  analyses	  that	  I	  discuss	  follows	  the	  approach	  of	  Urban	  and	  
Niebler	  (2014)	  by	  aggregating	  advertisements	  and	  contributions	  across	  the	  parties.	  
As	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  the	  unit	  of	  analysis	  is	  the	  market	  zone	  and	  not	  
the	  zip	  code,	  and	  the	  outcome	  variable	  is	  given	  in	  aggregate	  contributions	  per	  1000	  
adults.	  I	  also	  use	  a	  state-­‐level	  fixed	  effect	  in	  each	  model.	  Table	  3	  shows	  results	  of	  
three	  models	  that	  regress	  aggregate	  contributions	  per	  1000	  adults	  on	  thousands	  of	  
presidential	  advertisements	  and	  several	  additional	  covariates.	  The	  results	  show	  that	  
contributions	  to	  US	  House	  candidates	  in	  2006	  per	  1000	  adults	  is	  a	  large	  and	  highly	  
significant	  predictor	  of	  presidential	  giving	  per	  1000	  adults	  in	  2008	  (b	  =	  0.93,	  SE	  =	  
0.097).	  The	  inclusion	  of	  US	  House	  contributing	  alone	  increases	  the	  adjusted	  R-­‐
squared	  of	  the	  model	  from	  0.24	  to	  0.62.	  This	  predictor	  also	  increases	  the	  precision	  
of	  the	  estimated	  effect	  of	  presidential	  advertising.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  
variable	  for	  the	  number	  of	  non-­‐presidential	  political	  advertisements	  does	  not	  have	  a	  
significant	  effect	  on	  presidential	  giving	  and	  does	  not	  increase	  the	  explanatory	  power	  
of	  the	  model.	  Interpreting	  the	  third	  model	  in	  Table	  3,	  the	  coefficient	  on	  presidential	  




contributions	  by	  an	  average	  of	  $12	  per	  1000	  people	  in	  a	  market	  zone.	  Though	  this	  
result	  is	  significant	  at	  the	  0.05	  level	  using	  a	  one-­‐sided	  test	  (since	  I	  predict	  a	  positive	  
estimate),	  it	  is	  not	  substantively	  large.	  The	  mean	  media	  zone	  in	  the	  data	  set	  has	  
approximately	  630,000	  adult	  inhabitants.	  An	  extra	  1000	  advertisements	  run	  in	  the	  
average	  media	  zone	  would	  increase	  giving	  by	  approximately	  $7560	  (630	  *	  $12),	  a	  
relatively	  small	  amount	  in	  the	  world	  of	  presidential	  fundraising.	  Though	  this	  effect	  
would	  be	  larger	  in	  more	  populated	  media	  zones,	  larger	  markets	  also	  have	  higher	  
advertising	  rates.	  Contrary	  to	  Urban	  and	  Niebler’s	  conclusion	  (2014,	  333-­‐334),	  it	  is	  
unlikely	  that	  aggregate	  advertisements	  could	  result	  in	  a	  net	  fundraising	  gain	  in	  
some	  markets.	  
Table	  4	  shows	  four	  models	  in	  which	  advertisements	  and	  contributions	  are	  
aggregated	  by	  month	  (June	  –	  October)	  and	  market	  zone.	  Following	  the	  previous	  
analysis,	  the	  first	  two	  models	  use	  fixed	  effects	  at	  the	  state	  and	  month	  levels	  to	  
account	  for	  unobserved	  state-­‐level	  heterogeneity	  and	  variation	  in	  giving	  across	  the	  
months	  before	  the	  election.	  The	  second	  two	  models,	  however,	  are	  more	  instructive	  
because	  they	  include	  a	  fixed	  effect	  for	  each	  media	  zone,	  allowing	  me	  to	  account	  for	  
unobserved	  differences	  in	  each	  zone’s	  underlying	  propensity	  to	  give.	  The	  
coefficients	  on	  presidential	  advertisements	  in	  the	  second	  two	  models	  are	  both	  
positive,	  but	  neither	  one	  is	  significant	  at	  typical	  levels.	  The	  coefficients	  are	  also	  
substantively	  small,	  indicating	  that	  an	  additional	  1000	  presidential	  advertisements	  
is	  associated	  with	  $1	  -­‐	  $3	  in	  additional	  giving	  per	  1000	  adult	  inhabitants	  in	  a	  media	  
zone.	  This	  is	  much	  smaller	  than	  the	  previous	  estimate	  of	  an	  additional	  $12	  per	  1000	  




on	  donations	  is	  probably	  quite	  small	  once	  I	  control	  for	  each	  media	  zone’s	  time	  
invariant	  propensity	  to	  donate.	  
In	  the	  following	  analyses,	  I	  regress	  contributions	  to	  just	  one	  party’s	  
presidential	  candidate	  and	  national	  committee	  on	  presidential	  advertising	  favoring	  
that	  candidate	  (as	  well	  as	  other	  covariates).	  Table	  5	  shows	  the	  results	  of	  four	  
models	  that	  regress	  aggregate	  Democratic	  contributions	  per	  1000	  adults	  on	  
thousands	  of	  Democratic	  presidential	  advertisements	  and	  several	  additional	  
covariates.	  The	  results	  from	  the	  first	  three	  models	  indicate	  that	  an	  additional	  1000	  
Democratic	  presidential	  advertisements	  is	  associated	  with	  an	  average	  increase	  of	  
approximately	  $20	  in	  donations	  per	  1000	  adults.	  A	  $20	  increase	  represents	  about	  a	  
6	  percent	  increase	  over	  the	  mean	  of	  Democratic	  contributions	  per	  1000	  adults,	  
which	  is	  $360.	  
	  This	  estimate	  increases	  to	  $50	  per	  1000	  adults	  in	  the	  fourth	  specification	  
when	  Republican	  presidential	  advertisements	  are	  added	  to	  the	  model.	  This	  sudden	  
change	  in	  the	  coefficient	  is	  likely	  due	  to	  the	  high	  degree	  of	  collinearity	  between	  the	  
number	  of	  Democratic	  and	  Republican	  advertisements	  in	  a	  market.	  That	  said,	  it	  is	  
comforting	  to	  note	  that	  the	  signs	  on	  the	  Democratic	  and	  Republican	  advertising	  
coefficients	  are	  in	  the	  expected	  directions:	  Democratic	  advertisements	  are	  
associated	  with	  an	  increase	  in	  Democratic	  giving	  while	  Republican	  advertisements	  
associated	  with	  a	  decrease	  in	  Democratic	  contributions.	  	  
Table	  6	  shows	  four	  models	  in	  which	  Democratic	  contributions	  and	  
advertisements	  are	  aggregated	  by	  month	  (June	  –	  October)	  and	  market	  zone.	  Again,	  I	  




and	  market	  zone	  fixed	  effects	  in	  the	  second	  two	  specifications.	  The	  coefficients	  on	  
Democratic	  advertisements	  in	  the	  models	  that	  use	  media	  zone	  fixed	  affects	  are	  
smaller	  than	  in	  those	  models	  that	  use	  state-­‐level	  fixed	  effects.	  However,	  in	  this	  case	  
the	  effects	  of	  Democratic	  advertisements	  are	  marginally	  significant	  and	  the	  
coefficient	  signs	  on	  Democratic	  and	  Republican	  advertisements	  still	  diverge	  in	  the	  
expected	  directions.	  The	  estimate	  of	  an	  additional	  $3	  -­‐	  $6	  dollars	  in	  giving	  per	  1000	  
adults	  represents	  an	  increase	  of	  4	  –	  8	  percent	  over	  the	  mean	  of	  aggregate	  
Democratic	  giving	  per	  1000	  adults,	  which	  is	  $72.	  This	  effect	  is	  similar	  in	  percentage	  
terms	  to	  the	  size	  of	  the	  effect	  estimated	  in	  the	  aggregate	  models	  from	  Table	  5.	  
In	  Tables	  7	  and	  8,	  I	  display	  the	  results	  for	  giving	  to	  the	  Republican	  
presidential	  campaign	  regressed	  on	  Republican	  advertisements.	  Contrary	  to	  the	  
results	  for	  Democratic	  giving,	  Republican	  advertisements	  appear	  to	  have	  little	  
discernable	  effect	  on	  giving	  to	  the	  Republican	  presidential	  campaign.	  In	  some	  cases	  
the	  coefficient	  on	  Republican	  advertising	  is	  even	  in	  the	  wrong	  direction.	  
I	  find	  in	  my	  analyses	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  Democratic	  advertisements	  on	  
Democratic	  giving	  is	  a	  good	  deal	  larger	  than	  the	  effects	  of	  Republican	  
advertisements	  on	  Republican	  giving.	  In	  most,	  though	  not	  all,	  of	  the	  specifications,	  
the	  Democratic	  effects	  are	  also	  statistically	  significant.	  However,	  the	  differences	  in	  
the	  slope	  coefficients	  between	  the	  Democratic	  and	  Republican	  effects	  are	  not	  
significant	  at	  standard	  levels.	  I	  test	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  coefficients	  by	  conducting	  F-­‐
tests	  across	  several	  model	  specifications.	  In	  order	  to	  conduct	  the	  tests,	  I	  first	  regress	  
the	  outcome	  variable	  on	  the	  advertisements	  variable	  and	  an	  indicator	  variable	  




null	  model,	  to	  which	  an	  alternative	  model	  is	  compared.	  The	  alternative	  specification	  
regresses	  the	  outcome	  on	  those	  same	  variables	  plus	  a	  variable	  made	  up	  of	  their	  
interaction	  (all	  of	  the	  fixed	  effects	  are	  held	  constant).	  This	  interaction	  captures	  the	  
difference	  in	  the	  slopes	  between	  parties.	  I	  then	  obtain	  an	  F-­‐statistic	  and	  an	  
associated	  p-­‐value	  from	  a	  comparison	  of	  the	  sum	  of	  squared	  residuals	  from	  the	  two	  
models.	  	  
Using	  the	  F-­‐test	  described	  above,	  I	  compare	  the	  Democratic	  and	  Republican	  
estimates	  reported	  in	  column	  2	  of	  Tables	  5	  and	  7.	  These	  estimates	  are	  based	  on	  
models	  that	  aggregate	  Democratic	  and	  Republicans	  advertisements	  and	  giving	  
across	  the	  general	  election	  period	  and	  use	  state-­‐level	  fixed	  effects.	  The	  difference	  
between	  the	  Democratic	  and	  Republican	  coefficients	  is	  $14.69	  per	  1000	  adults	  (SE	  =	  
10.81)	  and	  the	  p-­‐value	  generated	  by	  comparing	  the	  null	  and	  alternative	  models	  
using	  an	  F-­‐test	  is	  p	  =	  0.17.	  	  
I	  also	  compare	  the	  Democratic	  and	  Republican	  estimates	  reported	  in	  
columns	  1	  and	  3	  in	  Tables	  6	  and	  8.	  These	  estimates	  are	  based	  on	  models	  that	  
aggregate	  Democratic	  and	  Republicans	  advertisements	  and	  giving	  by	  month	  within	  
the	  general	  election	  period	  and	  use	  a	  state-­‐level	  fixed	  effect	  and	  media	  zone-­‐level	  
fixed	  effect,	  respectively.	  The	  difference	  between	  the	  Democratic	  and	  Republican	  
coefficients	  in	  the	  monthly	  panel	  analysis	  that	  uses	  state-­‐level	  fixed	  effects	  is	  $6.79	  
per	  1000	  adults	  (SE	  =	  5.51)	  and	  the	  p-­‐value	  generated	  by	  comparing	  the	  null	  and	  
alternative	  models	  using	  an	  F-­‐test	  is	  p	  =	  0.22.	  Finally,	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  
Democratic	  and	  Republican	  coefficients	  in	  the	  monthly	  panel	  analysis	  that	  uses	  




value	  generated	  by	  comparing	  the	  null	  and	  alternative	  models	  using	  an	  F-­‐test	  is	  p	  =	  
0.71.	  
Although	  the	  Democratic	  slope	  coefficients	  are	  consistently	  larger	  than	  the	  
Republican	  coefficients	  across	  several	  specifications,	  the	  F-­‐test	  results	  reveal	  that	  
these	  differences	  are	  not	  statistically	  significant	  at	  standard	  levels.	  As	  a	  result,	  I	  




The	  results	  reported	  here	  show	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  analyze	  the	  effect	  of	  
political	  advertising	  on	  contributing	  (or	  other	  behaviors)	  using	  population-­‐
normalized	  outcome	  variables	  at	  the	  level	  at	  which	  advertising	  is	  assigned.	  
Analyzing	  the	  same	  effect	  at	  the	  zip	  code	  level	  can	  produce	  very	  large	  estimates	  of	  
advertising	  effects,	  particularly	  when	  the	  outcome	  variable	  is	  not	  normed	  by	  
population.	  Yet	  these	  estimates	  do	  not	  have	  a	  readily	  interpretable	  estimand.	  
Assuming	  that	  individuals	  in	  a	  media	  market	  have	  an	  equal	  probability	  of	  being	  
exposed	  to	  a	  given	  ad,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  one	  should	  interpret	  the	  effect	  of	  
advertisements	  on	  contributions	  from	  the	  average	  zip	  code	  when	  zip	  codes	  have	  
widely	  varying	  populations.	  Finally,	  standard	  errors	  that	  do	  not	  take	  clustering	  into	  
account	  almost	  certainly	  produce	  overly	  small	  estimates	  of	  sampling	  variability.	  
In	  this	  paper,	  I	  examine	  the	  effect	  of	  aggregate	  political	  advertising	  on	  
aggregate	  contributing	  at	  the	  media	  zone	  level,	  and	  also	  estimate	  the	  effects	  of	  each	  




find	  that	  aggregate	  advertisements	  may	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  aggregate	  giving,	  but	  this	  
effect	  is	  substantively	  small	  and	  inconsistently	  significant	  across	  different	  model	  
specifications.	  More	  importantly,	  I	  find	  that	  examining	  aggregate	  giving	  may	  mask	  
important	  differences	  between	  the	  parties.	  During	  the	  2008	  election,	  Democratic	  
presidential	  advertisements	  had	  a	  small,	  but	  detectable,	  positive	  effect	  on	  giving	  to	  
the	  Democratic	  campaign.	  By	  contrast,	  Republican	  advertisements	  had	  much	  
smaller	  effects	  on	  Republican	  giving	  that	  were	  not	  significantly	  difference	  from	  zero.	  
I	  note,	  however,	  that	  the	  differences	  in	  the	  effects	  between	  Democrats	  and	  
Republicans,	  though	  apparent	  across	  several	  model	  specifications,	  are	  not	  
statistically	  significant	  at	  standard	  levels.	  
In	  order	  to	  explain	  this	  possible	  partisan	  difference,	  readers	  should	  recall	  
that	  Senator	  Obama	  in	  2008	  was	  the	  first	  presidential	  candidate	  to	  refuse	  public	  
campaign	  funds	  since	  the	  system	  was	  created	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  following	  the	  
Watergate	  scandal.	  As	  a	  result,	  his	  campaign	  continued	  to	  focus	  heavily	  on	  raising	  
money	  well	  into	  the	  general	  election	  period.	  This	  may	  mean	  that,	  in	  addition	  to	  
seeing	  political	  advertising,	  potential	  Obama	  donors	  were	  also	  exposed	  to	  more	  
solicitations	  than	  Republicans	  in	  the	  general	  election	  period.	  While	  advertising	  may	  
have	  primed	  Democrats	  to	  donate,	  continued	  solicitation	  may	  have	  also	  provided	  
potential	  donors	  with	  more	  opportunities	  to	  give.	  
Finally,	  although	  the	  increases	  in	  giving	  associated	  with	  advertisements	  may	  
not	  produce	  net	  gains	  in	  campaign	  fundraising	  (given	  the	  expense	  of	  running	  
advertisements),	  the	  results	  nonetheless	  indicate	  that	  changes	  in	  exposure	  to	  




phenomenon	  implies	  that	  general	  partisan	  and	  ideological	  messages,	  which	  contain	  
no	  explicit	  encouragement	  to	  donate,	  can	  cause	  individuals	  to	  increase	  their	  
contributions.	  The	  finding	  parallels	  lab	  evidence	  that	  political	  advertisements	  
activate	  partisan	  sentiments	  among	  committed	  partisans	  (Ansolabehere	  and	  
Iyengar	  1995).	  Even	  though	  political	  advertisements	  do	  little	  to	  increase	  overall	  
turnout	  (Ashworth	  and	  Clinton	  2006;	  Krasno	  and	  Green	  2008;	  Enos	  and	  Fowler	  
2014),	  they	  may	  still	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  those	  committed	  partisans	  who	  need	  an	  extra	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Table	  1:	  Propensity	  Score	  Matching	  Results	  using	  Zip	  Codes,	  replicating	  Urban	  
and	  Niebler	  (2014)	  
	   DV:	  Aggregate	  
Donation	  Amount	  
DV:	  Aggregate	  Donation	  
Amount	  per	  1000	  people	  
ATT	   7320	  **	   1540	  *	  
S.E.	   (1830)	   (878)	  
	   	   	  
N	  	   20,215	   20,215	  
Note:	  Treatment	  =	  1	  if	  zip	  code	  received	  1,000	  advertisements	  or	  more.	  




Table	  2:	  Regression	  using	  Monthly	  Panel	  of	  Zip	  Codes,	  replicating	  Urban	  and	  
Niebler	  (2014)	  
	  
DV:	  Aggregate	  Monthly	  
Donation	  Amount	  
DV:	  Aggregate	  Monthly	  
Donation	  Amount	  per	  
1000	  people	  
Log	  (Monthly	  
Ads)	   101.0	  *	   7.07	  
S.E.	   (52.4)	   (17.1)	  
	   	   	  
N	   41540	   41540	  
Note:	  Clustered	  standard	  errors	  are	  reported.	  
*	  p	  <	  0.1,	  **	  p	  <	  0.05	  
	  





Table	  3:	  Regression	  Estimates	  of	  the	  Effects	  of	  Aggregate	  Presidential	  
Advertisements	  on	  Aggregate	  Contributions	  
	   DV:	  Aggregate	  Presidential	  Campaign	  Donation	  
Amount	  per	  1000	  Adults	  
Presidential	  Ads	  
(1000s)	  






Aggregate	  US	  House	  
Donations	  per	  1000	  
Adults	  
	   0.925	  **	  (0.0966)	  
0.926	  **	  
(0.0963)	  
Other	  Political	  Ads	  
(1000s)	   	   	  
-­‐2.54	  
(4.12)	  
	   	   	   	  
State	  FE	   X	   X	   X	  
Adjusted	  R-­‐Squared	   0.2434	   0.6223	   0.6214	  
N	   346	   346	   346	  




Table	  4:	  Regression	  Estimates	  of	  the	  Effects	  of	  Aggregate	  Presidential	  
Advertisements	  on	  Aggregate	  Contributions,	  Monthly	  Panel	  
	   DV:	  Aggregate	  Presidential	  Campaign	  Donation	  Amount	  














	   1.68	  (2.03)	   	  
2.79	  **	  
(1.56)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Month	  FE	   X	   X	   X	   X	  
State	  FE	   X	   X	   	   	  
Market	  Zone	  
FE	   	   	   X	   X	  
Adjusted	  R-­‐
Squared	   0.2941	   0.2940	   0.7525	   0.7528	  
N	   1730	   1730	   1730	   1730	  
*	  p	  <	  0.1,	  **	  p	  <	  0.05:	  One-­‐sided	  test.	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  are	  reported.	  
	  




Table	  5:	  Regression	  Estimates	  of	  the	  Effects	  of	  Aggregate	  Democratic	  
Presidential	  Advertisements	  on	  Aggregate	  Democratic	  Contributions	  
	   DV:	  Aggregate	  Democratic	  Presidential	  Donation	  















per	  1000	  Adults	  





Other	  Political	  Ads	  








	   	   	   -­‐43.44	  **	  (20.09)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
State	  FE	   X	   X	   X	   X	  
Adjusted	  R-­‐Squared	   0.2708	   0.6342	   0.6331	   0.6381	  
N	   346	   346	   346	   346	  
*	  p	  <	  0.1,	  **	  p	  <	  0.05:	  One-­‐sided	  test.	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  are	  reported.	  
	  
	  
Table	  6:	  Regression	  Estimates	  of	  the	  Effects	  of	  Aggregate	  Democratic	  
Presidential	  Advertisements	  on	  Aggregate	  Democratic	  Contributions,	  Monthly	  
Panel	  
	   DV:	  Aggregate	  Democratic	  Presidential	  Donation	  















	   -­‐9.88	  (10.75)	   	  
-­‐6.37	  	  
(6.39)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Month	  FE	   X	   X	   X	   X	  
State	  FE	   X	   X	   	   	  
Market	  Zone	  FE	   	   	   X	   X	  
Adjusted	  R-­‐
Squared	   0.2913	   0.2915	   0.6888	   0.6888	  
N	   1730	   1730	   1730	   1730	  




Table	  7:	  Regression	  Estimates	  of	  the	  Effects	  of	  Aggregate	  Republican	  
Presidential	  Advertisements	  on	  Aggregate	  Democratic	  Contributions	  	  
	   DV:	  Aggregate	  Republican	  Presidential	  













Republican	  US	  House	  
Donations	  per	  1000	  
Adults	  





Other	  Political	  Ads	  








	   	   	   9.50	  (12.49)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
State	  FE	   X	   X	   X	   X	  
Adjusted	  R-­‐Squared	   0.2484	   0.3842	   0.3841	   0.3833	  
N	   346	   346	   346	   346	  
*	  p	  <	  0.1,	  **	  p	  <	  0.05:	  One-­‐sided	  test.	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  are	  reported.	  
	  
	  
Table	  8:	  Regression	  Estimates	  of	  the	  Effects	  of	  Aggregate	  Republican	  
Presidential	  Advertisements	  on	  Aggregate	  Democratic	  Contributions,	  Monthly	  
Panel	  
	   DV:	  Aggregate	  Republican	  Presidential	  Donation	  















	   6.23	  (4.62)	   	  
5.14	  
(4.38)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Month	  FE	   X	   X	   X	   X	  
State	  FE	   X	   X	   	   	  
Market	  Zone	  FE	   	   	   X	   X	  
Adjusted	  R-­‐
Squared	   0.2322	   0.2327	   0.5184	   0.5186	  
N	   1730	   1730	   1730	   1730	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Revised	  Tables	  including	  Independent	  Expenditure	  Presidential	  
Advertisements	  
	  
Table	  A1:	  Regression	  Estimates	  of	  the	  Effects	  of	  Aggregate	  Presidential	  
Advertisements	  on	  Aggregate	  Contributions	  (with	  IE	  Ads)	  
	   DV:	  Aggregate	  Presidential	  Campaign	  Donation	  
Amount	  per	  1000	  Adults	  
Presidential	  Ads	  
(1000s)	  






Aggregate	  US	  House	  
Donations	  per	  1000	  
Adults	  
	   0.93	  **	  (0.10)	  
0.93	  **	  
(0.10)	  
Other	  Political	  Ads	  
(1000s)	   	   	  
-­‐2.42	  
(4.10)	  
	   	   	   	  
State	  FE	   X	   X	   X	  
Adjusted	  R-­‐Squared	   0.2428	   0.6222	   0.6213	  
N	   346	   346	   346	  
*	  p	  <	  0.1,	  **	  p	  <	  0.05:	  One-­‐sided	  test.	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  are	  reported.	  
	  
	  
Table	  A2:	  Regression	  Estimates	  of	  the	  Effects	  of	  Aggregate	  Presidential	  
Advertisements	  on	  Aggregate	  Contributions,	  Monthly	  Panel	  (with	  IE	  Ads)	  
	   DV:	  Aggregate	  Presidential	  Campaign	  Donation	  














	   1.68	  (2.03)	   	  
2.79	  **	  
(1.56)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Month	  FE	   X	   X	   X	   X	  
State	  FE	   X	   X	   	   	  
Market	  Zone	  
FE	   	   	   X	   X	  
Adjusted	  R-­‐
Squared	   0.2941	   0.2940	   0.7525	   0.7528	  
N	   1730	   1730	   1730	   1730	  





Table	  A3:	  Regression	  Estimates	  of	  the	  Effects	  of	  Aggregate	  Presidential	  
Advertisements	  on	  Aggregate	  Contributions,	  Monthly	  Panel	  (with	  IE	  Ads)	  
	   DV:	  Aggregate	  Presidential	  Campaign	  Donation	  














	   1.80	  (2.02)	   	  
2.79	  **	  
(1.55)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Month	  FE	   X	   X	   X	   X	  
State	  FE	   X	   X	   	   	  
Market	  Zone	  
FE	   	   	   X	   X	  
Adjusted	  R-­‐
Squared	   0.2939	   0.2938	   0.7525	   0.7528	  
N	   1730	   1730	   1730	   1730	  
*	  p	  <	  0.1,	  **	  p	  <	  0.05:	  One-­‐sided	  test.	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  are	  reported.	  
	  
	  
Table	  A4:	  Regression	  Estimates	  of	  the	  Effects	  of	  Aggregate	  Democratic	  
Presidential	  Advertisements	  on	  Aggregate	  Democratic	  Contributions	  (with	  IE	  
Ads)	  
	   DV:	  Aggregate	  Democratic	  Presidential	  Donation	  













US	  House	  Donations	  
per	  1000	  Adults	  





Other	  Political	  Ads	  








	   	   	   -­‐38.43	  **	  (18.88)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
State	  FE	   X	   X	   X	   X	  
Adjusted	  R-­‐Squared	   0.2699	   0.6337	   0.6327	   0.6368	  
N	   346	   346	   346	   346	  




Table	  A5:	  Regression	  Estimates	  of	  the	  Effects	  of	  Aggregate	  Democratic	  
Presidential	  Advertisements	  on	  Aggregate	  Democratic	  Contributions,	  Monthly	  
Panel	  (with	  IE	  Ads)	  
	   DV:	  Aggregate	  Democratic	  Presidential	  Donation	  















	   -­‐7.93	  (10.07)	   	  
-­‐4.36	  	  
(6.20)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Month	  FE	   X	   X	   X	   X	  
State	  FE	   X	   X	   	   	  
Market	  Zone	  FE	   	   	   X	   X	  
Adjusted	  R-­‐
Squared	   0.2910	   0.2910	   0.6888	   0.6888	  
N	   1730	   1730	   1730	   1730	  
*	  p	  <	  0.1,	  **	  p	  <	  0.05:	  One-­‐sided	  test.	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  are	  reported.	  
	  
Table	  A6:	  Regression	  Estimates	  of	  the	  Effects	  of	  Aggregate	  Republican	  
Presidential	  Advertisements	  on	  Aggregate	  Democratic	  Contributions	  (with	  IE	  
Ads)	  
	   DV:	  Aggregate	  Republican	  Presidential	  Donation	  













US	  House	  Donations	  
per	  1000	  Adults	  





Other	  Political	  Ads	  








	   	   	   8.99	  (11.78)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
State	  FE	   X	   X	   X	   X	  
Adjusted	  R-­‐Squared	   0.2481	   0.384	   0.3839	   0.383	  
N	   346	   346	   346	   346	  





Table	  A7:	  Regression	  Estimates	  of	  the	  Effects	  of	  Aggregate	  Republican	  
Presidential	  Advertisements	  on	  Aggregate	  Democratic	  Contributions,	  Monthly	  
Panel	  (with	  IE	  Ads)	  
	   DV:	  Aggregate	  Republican	  Presidential	  Donation	  















	   6.06	  (4.35)	   	  
5.14	  
(4.12)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Month	  FE	   X	   X	   X	   X	  
State	  FE	   X	   X	   	   	  
Market	  Zone	  FE	   	   	   X	   X	  
Adjusted	  R-­‐
Squared	   0.2321	   0.2326	   0.5183	   0.5186	  
N	   1730	   1730	   1730	   1730	  
*	  p	  <	  0.1,	  **	  p	  <	  0.05:	  One-­‐sided	  test.	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  are	  reported.	  
	  
	  































The	  empirical	  study	  of	  political	  giving	  has	  moved	  beyond	  early	  theories	  of	  
contributing	  that	  relied	  on	  rational	  choice	  and	  economic	  models	  of	  market	  exchange	  
(Stigler	  1971;	  Baron	  1989;	  Grossman	  and	  Helpman	  1996).	  A	  less	  unified,	  but	  more	  
empirically	  grounded,	  understanding	  of	  political	  giving	  has	  emerged	  from	  primarily	  
survey-­‐based	  studies.	  The	  theory	  that	  emerges	  from	  this	  literature	  contends	  that	  
campaigns	  or	  political	  events	  trigger	  a	  series	  of	  different	  motivations	  (e.g.,	  
ideological,	  solidary,	  expressive)	  that	  in	  turn	  inspire	  donations.	  	  
The	  papers	  in	  this	  dissertation	  use	  field	  experiments	  and	  a	  natural	  
experiment	  to	  examine	  the	  explanatory	  power	  of	  certain	  aspects	  of	  rational	  choice	  
models	  as	  well	  as	  theories	  positing	  motivations	  that	  may	  not	  be	  considered	  strictly	  
rational.	  What	  emerges	  is	  not	  a	  unified	  theory	  per	  se,	  but	  a	  hybrid	  of	  earlier	  work.	  I	  
find	  that	  donors	  respond	  to	  information	  in	  ways	  that	  maximize	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  
preferred	  outcome	  that	  is	  primarily	  ideological.	  Thus	  in	  the	  first	  paper,	  when	  
potential	  donors	  heard	  that	  their	  favored	  candidate	  was	  behind	  in	  fundraising,	  they	  
gave	  more	  money	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  a	  win.	  When	  their	  favored	  candidate	  was	  ahead	  
in	  the	  money	  race,	  potential	  donors	  did	  not	  alter	  their	  giving	  because	  victory	  was	  
already	  very	  likely.	  In	  the	  second	  paper,	  potential	  donors	  were	  motivated	  to	  give	  
when	  reminded	  of	  the	  ideological	  and	  policy	  implications	  of	  an	  election,	  but	  not	  
when	  prompted	  to	  think	  about	  civic	  duty,	  the	  power	  of	  special	  interests,	  or	  making	  
their	  voice	  heard.	  However,	  when	  likely	  donors	  learned	  that	  they	  could	  lower	  the	  
cost	  of	  their	  donations	  using	  contribution	  incentives,	  they	  did	  not	  act	  differently.	  




be	  matched	  at	  a	  rate	  of	  6-­‐to-­‐1,	  it	  made	  no	  difference	  in	  their	  behavior.	  Price	  signals,	  
which	  economic	  theory	  predicts	  should	  alter	  behavior,	  did	  not	  motivate	  giving	  in	  the	  
absence	  of	  ideological	  or	  partisan	  cues.	  The	  third	  paper	  furnishes	  some	  additional	  
support	  for	  the	  notion	  that	  ideological	  primes	  encourage	  contributions.	  
The	  extensive	  economic	  literature	  on	  charitable	  giving	  provides	  only	  limited	  
guidance	  for	  interpreting	  these	  findings.	  There	  are	  certain	  parallels	  between	  
charitable	  and	  political	  giving.	  Charitable	  and	  political	  donors	  wish	  to	  provide	  a	  
public,	  or	  at	  least	  collective,	  good	  with	  their	  donations:	  a	  charitable	  service,	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  charitable	  giving,	  or	  a	  win	  for	  their	  favored	  candidate	  or	  party,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
political	  donors.	  Charitable	  giving,	  like	  political	  giving,	  may	  also	  be	  inspired	  by	  
psychological	  motivations	  that	  are	  not	  strictly	  rational,	  like	  the	  “warm	  glow”	  that	  
comes	  from	  participating	  in	  charitable	  acts	  (Andreoni	  1990;	  Andreoni	  1995).	  Yet	  
charitable	  giving	  is	  not	  characterized	  by	  the	  binary	  outcomes	  and	  oppositional	  
framework	  of	  an	  election.	  When	  political	  donors	  perceive	  that	  their	  candidate	  has	  
much	  more	  money	  than	  his	  opponent,	  they	  conclude	  that	  securing	  a	  win	  does	  not	  
require	  more	  contributions.	  By	  contrast,	  most	  of	  the	  charitable	  giving	  literature	  
finds	  that	  donors	  are	  willing	  to	  give	  more	  money	  to	  charity	  when	  they	  perceive	  that	  
others	  are	  doing	  so	  as	  well	  (Andreoni	  1998;	  Romano	  and	  Yildirim	  2001;	  List	  and	  
Lucking-­‐Reiley	  2002).	  To	  be	  sure,	  early	  in	  a	  candidate’s	  campaign,	  it	  may	  be	  
encouraging	  to	  donors	  to	  see	  that	  a	  candidate	  has	  already	  amassed	  a	  significant	  war	  
chest.	  Candidates	  who	  are	  far	  behind	  in	  the	  money	  race	  will	  probably	  also	  lose	  
future	  donations.	  In	  the	  heat	  of	  an	  election	  runoff,	  however,	  donors	  who	  support	  a	  




already	  as	  good	  as	  won.	  In	  sum,	  charitable	  giving’s	  vastly	  different	  setting	  makes	  it	  
an	  unsatisfying	  model	  for	  the	  dynamics	  of	  political	  contributing.	  
The	  poverty	  of	  theory	  in	  the	  area	  of	  political	  contributing	  makes	  it	  fertile	  
ground	  for	  future	  research.	  The	  limitations	  of	  the	  studies	  in	  this	  dissertation	  provide	  
direction	  for	  the	  work	  I	  hope	  to	  do	  next.	  Perhaps	  most	  important,	  the	  mail	  that	  was	  
sent	  to	  each	  subject	  in	  the	  first	  two	  studies	  was	  a	  single,	  simple	  postcard.	  These	  
stimuli	  were	  relatively	  muted	  and	  contained	  no	  overtly	  partisan	  cues.	  The	  postcards	  
also	  arrived	  relatively	  late	  in	  the	  election	  cycle,	  when	  many	  donors	  may	  have	  
already	  made	  their	  contributions	  and	  had	  more	  exposure	  to	  political	  information	  
than	  earlier	  in	  the	  cycle.	  Finally,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Ohio	  study,	  both	  races	  featured	  a	  
Republican	  incumbent	  well	  ahead	  of	  his	  Democratic	  challenger	  in	  the	  polls	  and	  the	  
money	  race.	  As	  a	  result,	  I	  could	  not	  isolate	  the	  effects	  of	  partisanship,	  incumbency,	  
or	  being	  the	  likely	  winner.	  
In	  future	  research,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  vary	  all	  of	  these	  features,	  including	  the	  
strength	  and	  volume	  of	  communications,	  the	  point	  in	  the	  election	  cycle	  when	  donor	  
communication	  occurs,	  and	  the	  dynamics	  of	  race	  itself.	  Critically,	  donors	  are	  used	  to	  
receiving	  solicitations	  and	  candidate	  information	  from	  the	  campaigns	  themselves.	  I	  
would	  like	  to	  partner	  with	  candidates	  and	  independent	  expenditure	  groups	  in	  order	  
to	  conduct	  fundraising	  field	  experiments	  using	  more	  naturalistic	  partisan	  campaign	  
communications.	  Since	  campaign	  finance	  laws	  forbid	  non-­‐profit	  entities	  (which	  
most	  academics	  work	  for)	  from	  soliciting	  money	  on	  behalf	  of	  political	  campaigns,	  I	  
think	  it	  would	  be	  essential	  to	  form	  partnerships	  with	  political	  groups	  in	  order	  to	  




Ultimately,	  the	  findings	  of	  all	  three	  papers	  indicate	  that	  it	  may	  be	  very	  hard	  
to	  alter	  donor	  behavior.	  Political	  donors	  are	  highly	  informed	  actors	  who	  may	  not	  be	  
easily	  influenced	  by	  new	  information.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  first	  paper	  shows	  how	  
unlikely	  it	  is	  for	  someone	  who	  has	  never	  made	  a	  donation	  before	  to	  donate.	  The	  
difficulty	  of	  inspiring	  non-­‐donors	  to	  contribute	  may	  frustrate	  attempts	  by	  reformers	  
to	  broaden	  the	  pool	  of	  small	  donors.	  However,	  given	  the	  success	  of	  recent	  
candidates	  like	  Barack	  Obama	  at	  soliciting	  small	  donations,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  
still	  much	  more	  work	  to	  be	  done	  to	  understand	  the	  dynamics	  of	  political	  giving.	  I	  
look	  forward	  to	  being	  a	  part	  of	  this	  work.	  
